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PREFACE 
Many volumes have been written dealing with American politics, and it is 
a perpetually fascinating subject for scholars, journalists, columnists, and 
politicians themselves. A great deal has been discovered about the v/ay polit-
ical parties in the United States work to gain office and how they operate in 
the government, but relatively little has been written about how one or the 
other of our major parties functioned and operated over a period of time 
either with regard to all questions of public policy or on a given issue. Our 
minor parties have perhaps fared better in this respect, but the task of pro-
ducing a complete history of the Republican party, for example, has yet to be 
undertaken, if indeed it will ever be feasible. 
Even books treating the behavior of one party on a particular issue over 
an extended period of time are comparatively rare, and it is this type of study 
which is attempted here with regard to Republican foreign policy from the 
opening of the Second World War in Europe to the beginning of the Eisenhower 
Administration. During this period—September, 1939, to January, 1953—for-
eign policy assumed a central significance for the United States equalled 
only seldom in our history. These years found the Republicans out of the 
White House and constituting the Minority in Congress for all but two years. 
The Republicans were therefore not "responsible" for our foreign policy, but 
this does not mean that their attitudes were unimportant in determining the 
course pursued by the United States in world affairs. In a democracy no 
Government or Majority can afford to have the gap between its policies and 
those of its Opposition become too wide, and under our system the Majority 
party is seldom in a position to carry out an extensive program, even in 
foreign affairs, without the active consent of at least part of the Minority. 
2 
In 1939 the opposition of the Republicans in Congress to Democratic foreign 
policy was almost unanimous; sfter 1941 Republicans gave their consent in 
varying degrees to various phases of Administration policy. Thus the country 
founditself greatly concerned dtiring this entire period with questions about 
what policies were held by which Republicans and which Republicans were the 
most powerful in Congress and the party. These are the questions which I have 
attempted to answer in detail below. 
To my thesis adviser at the University of Illinois, Dr. Clarence A. 
Berdahl, must go credit for suggesting this comprehensive topic, for many help-
ful suggestions and criticisms, and for patience with my struggling first 
efforts. I wish to thank Dr. Floyd E. McCaffree, Director of Research for the 
Republican National Committee, for his cooperation in making a collection of 
party documents available to me. Only by many months of household chores can 
I repay my wife, Bonnie, for the untold hours she spent translating my hand-
writing into a typewritten maruscript. 
CHAPTER I 
PAST IS PROLOGUE 
It is still customary, both academically and popularly, to begin any 
review of Republican foreign policy with a discussion of the League fight of 
1919-1920 and the policies of the Harding Administration. This study, which 
really proposes a much later date as a starting point, must do likewise. There 
seem to be good reasons for not starting earlier and for treating World War I 
as the cause as well as the beginning of all which has followed. If World War 
II can be said to have destroyed the old issues and created new ones for 
United States foreign policy, certainly this was at least as true of World War 
I. The decisions made after 1918 set the course for American participation 
in world affairs, and, inevitably, the activities of the Republican party in 
that period were crucial in determining the character of Republican foreign 
policy for the following decades. 
Occasionally, to be sure, attempts have been made within and without the 
party to call up the foreign policy sentiments of Theodore Roosevelt, William 
Howard Taft, Elihu Root, and Charles Evans Hughes; to remind Republicans of a 
later day that these, as well as Lodge, Harding, and Borah, are part of the 
party's heritage.1 The spirit of these early saints, it has been contended, 
was quite different and certainly more worthy as a guide for the party's be-
havior. We are asked to recall that the able and farsighted statesmen of the 
Republican Bra "developed a strong, open, almost aggressive foreign policy."2 
1Russell W. Davenport, "The Fate of Mighty Nations", Fortune. May, 19^31 
pp. 114-140 
2Ibid.. p. llo 
It is true that in the first decade of the century Republican Administra-
tions had made suggestions for a world court and periodic conferences among 
nations to discuss common problems. The early movement for a league of nations 
had much Republican leadership and backing. William Howard Taft was the first 
President of the League to Enforce Peace, and many prominent Republicans were 
among its leaders. Through the battle of the League and into the campaign of 
1920 Republican friends of the League of Nations fought to commit the party to 
international cooperation through the League and the Court.3 
The period following the end of World War I, however, saw the twilight of 
these internationalist gods.^ The Republicans who debated foreign policy in 
the 1940's had to read about these men of 1900-1920, while they were reared in 
the schools of the leaders of the twenties and the thirties when Republican 
attitudes were quite different. 
Just which factors were most important in bringing forth the new and 
different post-war Republican party are difficult to isolate. There had, of 
course, been non-interventionist elements in the party all along. They were 
the "irreconcilables" of the League fight, and they apparently had a sbrong 
3Republican foreign policy before World War I is reviewed in Clarence A. 
Berdahl, Policy of the United States with Rogard to the League of Nations, and 
Derma Frank Fleming, The United States and the World Court. 
^It should be kept in mind that it was the attitude of the Republicans in 
international affairs that changed so drastically after 1920. To Justify re-
jection of the League a philosophy of minimum participation had to be developed. 
As will be seen below the international activities of the United States in the 
tv/enties became very extensive in terms of attendance at international meetings 
and interest and concern in world affairs—-perhaps significantly more so then 
before World War I. There was no league to reject in the earlier period. 
Whether or not we were any less "isolationist" in that period ought to be 
examined in the light of concrete governmental activities as well as in stated 
sentiments. 
"In 1917 public opinion in the United States repudiated our century-old 
tradition of isolation. With the defeat of Germany in 1918 our prewar isola-
tionism revived to become a dogma." Richard B. Scandrett, Jr., "Self-Govern-
ment and Isolation," Forum. April, 1940, pp. 214-217 
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voice in the convention of 1920. The end of the "Republican Era" came with 
the split in the Party in 1912. Russell Davenport contends that had Hughes 
won in 1916, the "new-era Republicans," as he calls the pro-leaguers, would 
have remained in command of the party, and he fo<=>ls this narrov; defeat played 
its part in changing the character of the party.5 
The hate engendered by the League controversy has often been mentioned as 
an important factor. Unable to react objectively to any Wilsonian proposal, 
the Republicans were driven to justifying their stand on the League on the 
grounds of a theory of national isolation.^ The events which put Warren 
Harding in the White House in 1920 must also be considered as factors in the 
molding of the new party. The story of the nomination and the platform on 
which the candidate was asked to stand has been related many times and need 
not be repeated here in detail: 
The Republican Party stands [the platform stated] for agree-
ment among the nations to preserve the peace of the world. We 
believe that such an international association must be based upon 
international justice, and must provide methods which shall main-
tain the rule of public right tj the development of law and the 
decision of impartial courts, and which shall secure instant and 
general international conference whenever peace shall be threatened 
by political action, so that nations pledged to do and insist upon 
what is just and fair may exercise their influence and power for the 
prevention of war."7 
As Dr. C. A. Berdahl has said, "on this platform Senator Harding made an 
almost ideal candidate."8 The "Thirty One" friends of the League apparently 
5Davenport, Fortune, p. 138 
°John A. Garraty, Henry Cabot Lodge, discusses the political hatred of 
Lodge for Wilson 
7Proceedings, Rep. Nat J.. Conv.. 1920, pp. 96-97 
8Clarence A. Berdehl, "The United States and the League of Nations", 
Michigan Law Review. Vol. XXVII, p. 6l8, (Apr. 1929) 
6 
thought he meant to endorse the League. Others were confident he meant to 
reject it. In DesMoines on October 7 Harding said, "It is not interpretation 
but rejection I am seeking. "̂  Immediately following that speech, Borah, one 
of the Senate's "irreconcilables" who had up to now refused to join the cam-
paign, announced that he would enter actively.*0 The mystery and confusion of 
Harding's position were not removed even to election day. After the inaugura-
tion, however, time, if not the President's utterances, made it clear that he 
would make no move to take the United States into the League of Nations. 
II 
The relations of the United States with the League of Nations under the 
Republicans might be portrayed on a graph by an almost straight ascending line 
from zero in 1921 to something just short of 100 percent participation (member-
ship) at the end of the Republican period. The use of zero for 1921 would be 
no exageration in view of the famous policy at that time of refusing even to 
answer communications from Geneva. The extent of our participation in the 
late twenties has been outlined by Dr. Berdahl who describes the type and 
character of our relationship in 1928-1929.11 There was, first of all, he 
points otit, a great deal of unofficial cooperation with the League by individ-
ual Americans who served as members of numerous organs, commissions, and agen-
cies of the League, but who did not represent the government. Secondly, the 
Administration had "unofficial observers" at meetings of practically every 
organ, committee, or conference of the League to observe the functioning of 
9lew York Times. Oct. 1920, p. 1 
1°James Maiin, The. United States After the World War, p. 66 
HBerdahl, Michigan Law Review, pp. 627-630 
7 
these bodies and report to Washington but not to participate in the proceedings 
or discussions. Thirdly, there were what Secretary Hughes called "official 
representatives acting in an unofficial capacity," and, fourthly, completely 
official representatives were designated in increasing numbers to sit with 
League committees and commissions such as the Temporary Mixed Commission on 
the Reduction of Armaments (1924), the Preparatory Disarmament Conference, the 
Opium Conferences, and the International Economic Conference. 
The policy of non-membership in the League, however, was fixed and never 
questioned by the successive Republican Administrations. The platform of 1928 
stated it this way: 
"This Government has definitely refused membership in the 
League of Nations snd to assume any obligation under the covenant 
of the League. 
"On this we stand. 
"In accordance, however, with the long established American 
practice of giving aid and assistance to other peoples, we have 
most tisefully assisted by cooperation in the humanitarian and tech-
nical work undertaken by the League without involving ourselves in 
European policies by accepting membership."12 
The Permanent Court of International Justice was a different matter. The 
idea of a court had been associated with Republican foreign policy for a quarter 
of a century, and it did not die easily. All three of the Republican presi-
dents from 1921-1933 favored joining the World Court, and each of them attempted 
to get the Senate to adhere to the protocol. President Harding submitted the 
proposal to the Senate on February 24, 1923. No action was taken. Coolidge 
recommended ratification in his first annual message in December, 1923. After 
more than two years of debate, wherein the Republicans in the Senate were divi-
ded along lines reminiscent of the League controversy, the resolution for ad-
herence, with reservations, was successful on January 25, 1926. After 
12Proceedings. Ren. Natl. Cony.. 1928, p. 113 
deliberation at a special conference in Geneva among other members of the 
Court, it was agreed to accept all of the reservations save the second part 
of the last (the fifth). On Armistice Day following the election of 1926, which 
had brought heavy defeats to the Republicans, Coolidge announced he would not 
ask the Senate to modify its position with respect to the Court.*3 
Shortly after Hoover's election in November 1928, the Council of the 
League decided to invite a committee of experts to meet at Geneva for the pur-
pose of considering amendments to the Statute which established the Court. 
Elihu Root was invited to become a member of the committee, an act which 
caused at once the question to arise whether or not the problem of the Amer-
ican Fifth Reservation might be solved, A formula submitted by Root was ac-
cepted by the committee, and on December 10, 1930, Hoover submitted the Protocols 
to the Senate, In spite of his repeated urgings, they were never brought to a 
vote during Hoover's administration,1^ 
Thus it is clear that in spite of the somewhat middle-of-the road policies 
of the Republican Administrations there was a large, even predominant, group 
in the party consistently opposed to any suggestion that the United States par-
ticipate in permanent international organization.*5 These same elements,how-
ever, felt that the goals of worldwide disarmament and the outlawry of war 
were worthy ones and were willing to attempt to reach agreement with the great 
military powerB of the world for this method of attack on the war problem. 
The Kellogg-Briand Pact met little opposition in the Senate, and the original 
suggestion for a conference on naval disarmament came from William E. Borah, 
13Malin, pp. 465-483 
^William Starr Myers, The Foreign Policies of Herbert Hoover. 1929-1933. 
pp. 27-40 
l5George Grassmuck's study shows that during the period 1921-1931 68.5$ 
of Republican Senators' votes on roll calls were favorable to participation in 
international organization. Sectional Biases in Congress on Foreign Policy, p. 72 
pacifist and isolationist, who was then the third ranking Republican on the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee and destined to replace Lodge as chairman 
in 1924.16 The result was the Washington Naval Conference of 1922 where three 
treaties were signed regarding the level of naval strength, and these were 
guided through the Senate by Lodge.37 
In 1924 the Coolidge Administration designated Mr. Joseph C. Grew to sit 
with the League's Temporary Mixed Commission on the Reduction of Armaments, 
and in 1926 sent a delegation to the Preparatory Disarmament Conference sitting 
in Geneva. When it seemed to Coolidge in 1927 that this commission was not 
making satisfactory progress along the lines he wished to see, he suggested a 
conference of the powers signatory to the Washington Naval Treaties to discuss 
the extension of the limitation of armaments. Italy and France declined, but 
Japan, Great Britain.and the United States met at Geneva from June 20 to 
August 4 without arriving at any agreement. 
In his Memorial Day speech of 1929, President Hoover asserted that re-
duction of armaments was the only way to support the Kellogg Pact. He accepted 
the invitation to the World Conference on the Reduction of Armaments in 1932 
and sent a delegation headed by Mr. Hugh Gibson. When the failure of the con-
ference appeared imminent, Mr. Hoover sent a series of proposals designed to 
suggest a solution for the deadlocked conference, but he left office before 
the conference had ended.18 
Mr. Hoover's efforts were specifically cited for praise in the 1932 Repub-
lican platform, although there were a few words of caution about the maintenance 
^Karl Schriftgiesser, This Was Normalcy, p. 134 
17_Ibid.,p. 138 
l8Myers, pp. 137-152 
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of naval par i ty : 
"Conscious that the limitation of armaments will contribute to 
security against war, and that the financial burdens of military 
preparation have been shamefully increased throughout the world the 
Administration under President Hoover has made steady efforts and 
marked progress in the direction of proportional reduction of arms 
by agreement with other nations. 
"...this policy will be pursued... 
"Meanwhile maintenance of our Navy on the basis of parity with any 
nation is a fundamental policy to which the Republican Party is 
committed."19 
Aside from these matters of League, Court, international law, and dis-
armament, which were problems of a world-wide nature, the Republican Adminis-
trations were called upon to form policies with regard to various specific 
area problems. 
With respect to Europe the theory was clear: under the terms of the 
Monroe Doctrine the Government of the United States would take no part in 
European political questions. Secretary of State Hughes made a distinction 
between political and economic questions, saying the United States was vitally 
interested in the latter field owing to its position in the monetary world. 
Actually, of course, since economic implications were found to be present in 
almost all matters, the distinction broke down in practice and was used prima-
rily for political purposes as a means of conciliating the extreme isolation-
ists in the party,-0 
The Harding Administration undertook to make treaties of peace with Ger-
many, Austria, and Hungary, while in the meantime German payments under the 
Versailles Treaty came to a halt. When France undertook to collect by force, 
a commission of experts worked out the Dawes Plan for collection of reparations, 
l9Proceedlngs. Ren. Natl. Conv.. 1932, pp. 114-115 
2°Malin, p. 442 
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and to implement the plan there followed the London and Paris financial con-
ferences at which the United States was officially represented. 
In the matter of foreign debts owed the United States, settlements were 
negotiated over a period of years to provide for payment in a long period and, 
in effect, for partial cancellation, this in spite of the fact that the official 
Republican position was for full repayment.21 A few governments repudiated 
their debts entirely. One of these wa.s the Soviet Union, and this fact was 
given as one of the reasons for not recognizing the new Soviet regime. Added 
to this were the charges that the Soviet Government did not represent the 
Russian people and that the Soviets continued to carry on revolutionary activ-
ities in the United States against the Government, 
Pacific area policies wore outlined by Mr. Hughes on November 30, 1923, 
when he stated: 
"In relation to the Pacific Ocean and the Far East we have 
developed the policies of l) the Open Door, 2) the maintenance of 
the integrity of China, 3) cooperation with other powers in the 
declaration of common principles, 4) cooperation with other powers 
by conference and consultation in the interests of peace, 5) lim-
itation of naval armament, 6) the limitation of fortification and 
naval bases."22 
Nearly a decade later, when the United States and the League of Nations 
were faced by a crisis in the Far East, President Hoover's Secretary of Sts.te 
put forth the famous Stimson Doctrine as a policy under which the United 
States could cooperate with the League in censuring Japanese aggression in 
Manchuria. Briefly stated it was that the United States could Dot admit the 
legality of any situation, nor did it intend to recognize any treaty of agree-
ment entered into between these governments which might impair the treaty 
21proceedings. Sep.. Natl. Conv.. 1928, p. 113 
22Malin, p. 3^5 
j? ••'• " ! r ^^j-^--—— •,-••= .••• 
12 
r ights of the United States or of i t s c i t izens in China. Furthermore, the 
statement was made that the United States did not intend to recognize any s i t -
uation, t reaty , or agreement which might be brought about by means contrary to 
the covenant and obligations of the Kellogg-Eriand Pact."" 
I l l 
As the Great Depression settled down upon the United States, the attention 
of the American people was largely diverted from matters of foreign policy. 
The last term of the Republicans and the first of the Democrats saw the efforts 
of the Government directed to domestic economic problems of the gravest kind. 
In the election of 1932 the Republicans not only lost control of the 
Executive branch but were reduced to a relatively small minority in both 
houses of Congress, In 1933 there were in the House of Representatives only 
115 Republicans and in the upper house only 35 Senators. In 1935 their numbers 
were 103 Representatives and 25 Senators, and in 1937 after the Roosevelt 
"landslide" of 1936 there were only 89 Republicans in the House and 16 in the 
Senate. Significant gains were made in the election of 1938 bringing the 
figures to 23 in the Senate and l69 in the House of Representatives. 
The greatest significance in the above statistics lies in two resulting 
factors. First of all the Republicans became the Minority and fell heir to 
the tradition of this role in opposing the President's program in foreign as 
well as domestic policy. That the Republicans carried this strategy to ex-
tremes may have partly been due to the second major factor which was that 
Republican representation in Congress after 1932 v/as confined to certain geo-
graphical areas which were at that time traditionary isolationist. "By 193^ 
23Myers, pp. l60-l6l 
13 
the Democrats held most of the metropolitan and sea coast congressional seats 
while the Republicans, became an inland party, driven out of the big cities and 
away from the sea."24 In the study by George Grassmuck, noted above, it is 
shown that these rural and inland areas tended generally to be less sympathetic 
to measures of international participation and national defense. 
Taken together these factors intensified the isolationist attitudes of 
the Republican party in the thirties as against the twenties. The following 
figures from the Grassmuck study are revealing. In the Senate the Republican 
votes favorable to increasing the Army decreased by 13.4 percent in the thirties 
as against the tvrentles. On support for foreign loans and aid the percentage 
of decrease was 63.8 percent, and on participation in international organiza-
tion, the decrease was 52 percent. In the House of Representatives the de-
creases in favorable votes were as follows: on increasing the Army, 30 percent, 
on support for the Navy, 09.2 percent, and on foreign loans and aid, 62.6 per-
cent,25 Grassmuck points out the iarportence of the anti-presidential attitude 
of the Republicans by noting in the above figures that the change of attitude 
on the part of the Republicans in Congress from a Republican to a Democratic 
Administration was greatest on those issues where presidential prestige and 
influence was most important, namely foreign aid and international organi-
zation, 26" 
With this view of the general trends of Republican Congressional voting 
in the thirties, the party's actions on some of the specific issues can be 
examined. Although on national defense matters there was some decrease in 
24Grassmuck, p, 113 
25Ibid., p. 139 
26Ibid. 
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Republican support from the twenties to the thirties, by and large it remained 
high although not so high as Democratic support. As noted above the 1932 plat-
form, while endorsing disarmament as a worthy aim, called for maintaining the 
Navy at parity. The 193& platform was noncommittal, but Grassmuck's tabula-
tions show that the percent of favorable Republican roll call votes from 1933-
1941 was 63.85 in the House and 70.45 in the Senate. The percentages for Army 
support are somewhat lower, being 44.3 for the House and 54.2 for the Senate.27 
The major Republican criteria for judging military affairs issues was 
whether or not a given measure would increase American commitments abroad. 
Republican opposition to the fortification of Guam is a case in point. The 
first pronouncement was a statement drawn up in 1939 by the House Republicans 
from the military and naval affairs committees and other regular committees 
which dealt with national defense. 
"The Monroe Doctrine...is a policy of defense... 
"Obviously our military establishment must be adequate to carry 
out the obligation so clearly implied in the Monroe Doctrine—the 
obligation to prevent the extension of foreign political domination 
through military action in the Western Hemisphere... 
"For our defense in the Pacific we believe the uission of our 
military establishment is the maintenance, impreghably, of the line 
following roughly the 180th meridian, commencing at the Alaskan 
Islands, passing somewhat westward of Hawaii, and thence generally 
southeastward to include and cover the Panama Canal. 
"We find ourselves in agreement with...pending legislation 
looking toward the addition and strengthening of naval aviation and 
submarine bases in the Atlantic as well as the addition of similar 
bases in the vast Pacific area bounded...by the l80th meridian.., 
"We entertain serious doubts as to the necessity or wisdom of 
extending our line of defense as far to the Westward as the Islands 
of Guam." 
27iMd., p. 33 
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By 1932 the controlling elements in both parties were agreed that the United 
States should not join the League of Nations, although some leading men in each 
favored membership. Both party platforms and both candidates, on the other 
hand, called for joining the world court, but when Mr, Roosevelt submitted a 
protocol to the Senate in 1935 he was unsuccessful in pushing it through. The 
resolution of approval was defeated by a vote of 52 for adherence to ?6 against, 
thxis failing to get the needed two-thir&D .najority.2° Nine Republicans voted 
for the court and 14 against, and as if to finally bury this long-lived issue, 
the 1936 Republican platform for the first time stated that the party WPS 
opposed to joining the court.29 The rejection of 1936 was final and our 
relationship with the League and the Permanent Court was settled once and for 
all. The Republican Party through its rejection first of the League and 
finally of the Court had become the symbol of opposition to international 
organization. 
Final rejection of the League, however, did not solve America's problems 
with regard to the new conflicts and dangers arising in Europe and Asia. 
America's first answer to these threats wa.s the same as it had been in 1793, 
in 1806, and in 1914—neutrality. By 1935 Italy had attacked Ethiopia. Also-
in 1935 the Nye Committee, investigating the munitions industry, brought out 
in the course of its public hearings some disturbing information concerning 
the international trade in arms. 
Neither party had spoken of neutrality in the platforms of 1932, but by 
1935» "right or wrong, the nation wanted legal protection against actions 
leading to war and expected Congress to provide such protection."-'0 
23lbid.. p. 88 
29Proceedings. Ren. Natl. Conv., 1936, p. 145 
30Q-rassmuck, p. 115 
16 
The primary issue throughout the debates over neutrality from 1935-1939 was 
the strictness of the neutrality requirements imposed on the President. The 
Pittman Resolution, the initial neutrality law, passed in August, I935i was 
not considered as a permanent solution, and its operation was limited to six 
months. From that time until our entry into World War II there were 39 Senate 
and 18 House roll calls related to this broad issue of developing and maintain-
ing or relaxing strict neutrality laws. In February, 1936, the Pittman Reso-
lution was extended, with modifications, for one year. In 1937 Senate Joint 
Resolution 51 extended the neutrality law indefinitely, but by 1939 Mr. 
Roosevelt was asking for the repeal of certain parts of the law which he felt 
were working against cur best interests. 
The President after 1935 became increasingly identified with efforts to 
relax the laws and allow more discretion to the Chief Executive. This fact 
in itself tended to make the Republicans in Congress defend a strict neutrality. 
Add to this the other factor mentioned above, that Republican representation in 
Congress during this period was largely from the northern, inland areas. These 
areas, standing to lose little or nothing, economically, from strict neutrality, 
generally opposed relaxation of the laws. Working together, these factors 
made it almost inevitable that the Republicans would oppose changes in the 
stricter provisions of the law.31 Grassmuck's survey of the roll calls men-
tioned above show that Republicans in the House of Representatives cast only 
13 percent of their votes for neutrality relaxation and that Republicans in the 
Senate voted favorably on this issue only 31.8 percent of the time.32 
3lGrassmuck, pp. 113-132. The foregoing discussion is largely based on 
the findings and conclusions of the Grassmuck study. 
32lMd., p. 120 
I ' ^ ^ " = 
17 
Coming up to the end of the period considered in this chapter, the final 
question facing the first session of the Seventy-Sixth Congress was one re-
garding repeal of certain sections of the neutrality law. The President h*id 
pointed out to Congress early in 1939 that "we have learned that when we delib-
erately try to legislate neutrality, our neutrality laws may operate unevenly 
and unfairly—may actually give aid to the agressor and deny it to the victim."33 
The House of Representatives went along with the President's request by a vote 
of 201 to 187 with the Republicans in opposition by a margin of 150 to 8 . ^ 
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, however, by a vote of 16 to 11 on 
July 11, decided not to report the bill to the floor. Congress adjourned its 
regular session with the laws unchanged. 
IV 
In concluding this brief survey of Republican policies during the twenties 
and the thirties it may be asked what phases of the party's experience were 
most important in determining the character of GOP foreign policy in the fall 
of 1939 when the war in Europe began. In two periods of crucial foreign policy 
decision, the Republicans found themselves in the role of the opposition. In 
both cases the Presidents they were opposing were taking bold strides toward 
more international involvement for the United States. If tl.o GOP was to 
oppose the foreign policies of Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt, it v/as most apt 
to develop theories of non-participation and non-intervention in international 
affairs. Thus during the two great periods of crisis in American foreign 
policy, 1914-1920 and 1935-1939, the Republicans took stands against the kind 
of international actions proposed by the Democratic executive. 
33Cong.. Record. Vol. 84, p. 75 (76th Cong., 1st Sess., Jan. 4, 1939) 
3^Ibid., p. 8513 (June 3°. 1939) 
What kind of foreign policies would have been adopted by the Republicans 
if the Presidents during these crises had been from their own party cannot be 
determined. Being the opposition in Congress the GOP did not feel it necessary 
or possible to formulate detailed positive programs to meet the urgent problems 
as they arose. There were many ideas among individuals and groups about what 
American policy should be, but Republican policy as it was made by the party 
in Congress was largely a matter of opposition.-^5 
35Further discussion of the problems experienced by the Republicans as 
an opposition party will be found in Chapter X: Conclusion 
CHAPTER II 
REPUBLICANS AND THE COMING OF THE WAR 
Having aided effectively in defeating neutrality revision, the F-epub-
licans went home when Congress adjourned in August, 1939, and they may have 
found some support for their stand when they made political soundings among 
their constitixents. The American Institute of Public Opinion found that by 
and large a majority of Republicans in the country had views similar to their 
congressmen, although not always in the same proportions. Without question 
they wanted to stay out of war, and many of them wore willing to go to almost 
any lengths to do so. 
Fifty-two percent of the Republican voters, said the AIPO, thought that 
the Constitution should be amended to require a national referendum before 
Congress cculd draft men for war overseas (September 19).1 Only forty-seven 
percent thought Congress should change the neutrality law so that the United 
States could sell war materials to England and France (September 3 ) , ? Just 
seventeen percent thought the United States should allow its citizens to travel 
on ships of countries which were then at war (September 14),3 On September 
19 only thirteen percent thought we should send our own army and naxj abroad 
to fight Germany.^ 
War was declared by Great Britain and France on Germany on September 3. 
On September 13 Mr. Roosevelt called a special session of Congress for 
September 21 to reconsider the amendments to the Neutrality Act, the main 
1Public Opinion Quarterly. Vol. 4, p. 103,,(Mar., 1940) 
2Ibid.t p. 105 
3lbid.. p. 106 
4Ibid. 
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issue being the repeal of the embargo on arms. At this special session there 
were twenty-two Republicans in the Senate (total membership of 96) with three 
former Republicans, Messrs. Lundeen and Shipstead of Minnesota and Norris of 
Nebraska. Senator McNary of Oregon v/as the Minority Leader and Chairman of the 
Republican Conference; Austin of Maine was the Party whip; and William E, Borah 
of Idaho v/as ranking Republican member of the Senate Committer on Foreign 
Relations which had in addition the following Minority members: Johnson of 
California, Capper of Kansss, Vandenberg of Michigan, White of Maine, as well 
as Lundeen of Minnesota. Figure IV indicates that all of these, with exception 
of White and Austin, were clearly isolationists. In the House of Representa.-
tives, whose total membership is 435, there were l66 Republicans. Joseph W. 
Martin of Massachusetts was the Minority Leader and Hamilton Fish, arch-
isolationist, was the ranking Minority member of the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, 
The Senate took up the resolution to amend the Neutrality Act which had 
passed the House in the regular session. The Committee on Foreign Relations 
reported the resolution favorably but with considerable amendment, eliminating 
completely the embargo on the export of arms which the House had retained with 
some reservations. There was no Minority report, but on October 10 Senator 
Tobey of New Hampshire moved to recommit the resolution to committee, and, 
although the motion was defeated, he was supported by a majority of the Repub-
licans 15 to 7.-5 
There followed a series of fifteen amendments proposed by Republicans and 
Democrats who were opposed to relaxing neutrality. Among the Republicans these 
amendments were supported regularly by a group comprising more than half of 
5Cong. Record. Vol. 85, p. 237- (76th Cong., 2nd Sess., Oct. 10, 1939) 
21 
their membership in the Senate. Senators Johnson, Capper, Frazier, Nye, Wiley, 
Borah, McNary, Reed, Danaher, Holmen, and Lodge voted almost solidly for these 
amendments; Senators Tobey, Vandenberg, Davis, and Townsend voted for somewhat 
fewer of them, and Senator Taft was found voting for about half of these. As 
was so often the case, the Senator from Ohio himself proposed the tv/o amend-
ments which gained the widest support among Republican Senators. The first of 
these would have prohibited the Secretary of the Treasury from using more than 
one half the money available for exchange stabilization under the Gold Reserve 
Act for the purpose of stabilizing the exchange of any belligerent. Every 
Republican voting in the Senate supported this amendment.0 
Another Taft amendment, which would have prohibited any United States 
Government agency or corporation from financing the export of goods to a 
belligerent, was supported by all the Republicans save one.? The voting 
during the entire consideration of this measure found a small group of Senators 
opposing almost all of the limiting amendments. Senators Austin, Hale, Gibson, 
and, to a somewhat lesser extent, Barbour, Gurney, and White voted as a group 
opposed to the effcrts of the majority of the Republicans to amend the reso-
lution. Using the record of Senator Johnson of California as an example of 
the voting of the extreme isolaticnist Republicans in the Senate, a scale will 
show that Austin voted against Johnson on eighteen roll calls out of twenty, 
Hale and Gibson on sixteen, and Barbour and Gurney on thirteen and fourteen 
respectively. (Figure I) 
Figure I and the others of its type throughout this paper are designed 
to reveal trends in voting among Congressional Republicans, and for this pur-
pose all the foreign policy roll calls from September, 1939, through the last 
6Ibid., p. 923 (Oct. 26, 1939) 
7Ibid., p. 925 
22 
adjournment of Congress in 1952 have been used. This means, of course, that 
only those issues on which individual yeas and nays were recorded are considered, 
but it seems evident that the issues on which roll calls are taken are the ones 
that members of Congress consider the most important, the ones on which some 
members at least want their positions and the positions of others recorded and 
available to constituents, the Administration, and the country at large. It 
is felt, also, that, a recorded vote comes nearest to indicating the political 
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Figure I. Republican voting in the Senate on 
H.J. Res. 3°6 (Neutrality Relaxation) 
It is clear that the main questions at issue among Republicans (1939-1952) 
were (l) the degree to which the United States should participate in world 
politics, and (2) the extent to which Republicans in Congress should cooperate 
with the Democratic Administration in the area of foreign policy. At first 
the two questions were almost synonymous, that is, the internationalists 
tended to follow Administration leadership, while the isolationists opposed it. 
After 1949, however, as will be shown below, many Republicans who favored a 
considerable degree of American participation in world, affairs opposed the 
Administration's method and manner of carrying this out. None the less, there 
tended to be throughout the entire period two consistent groups at the extreme 
poles on both issues. The group moe.t violently opposed to Administration 
policies in 1952 was the most extreme isolationist before 1949 (Langer, Malone, 
Kern, Wherry). It can even be contended that these men were still isolationists, 
but the same cannot be said of all those who followed them in their opposition 
to the Administration. At the other extreme the group that v/ae made up of the 
leading internationalists before 1949 was the same who also continued to support 
the Administration down to 1952,(Lodge, Saltonstall, H. A. Smith, Morse). 
In order to discover trends on these two issues among the whole Repub-
lican membership in Congress, it is possible to compare the voting of all mem-
bers with the record of the extreme group. The extreme isolationist or opposi-
tionist group was selected for this purpose, but the problem then became to 
find G single individual whose record could be used as a standard of isola-
tionism or, later, opposition. In the Senate William Langer of North Dakota 
was chosen, because, among this group, his tenure in the Senate covered more 
of the period than any other, and because his record is ar.iong the most isola-
tionist (Langer voted against ratification of the United Nations Charter). 
Langer, however, did net enter the Senate until 1941, so the record of Hiram 
Johnson (equally isolationist) was used for the ?6th Congress. In the House 
Noah M. Mason of Illinois, whose membership covers the entire period of the 
study, was selected. Mason is from the heart of Chicago Tribune Republicanism, 
and has been a. consistent supporter of that newspaper's foreign policy views. 
It is not to be inferred that Langer or Mason were the most isolaticnist 
members of Congress at all times, nor that their own positions were not mod-
ified from time to time, but it is clear that the contrast in voting on foreign 
policy between these men and such men as Austin, Lodge, Saltonstall, and Morse 
is greater than that of any other two Republican groups in Congress. 
On the final Senate vote on neutrality relaxation fifteen Republicans 
voted against the resolution and eight supported it. The eight were: Taft, 
Gurney, Hale, Bridges, Austin, Gibson, Barbour, and Reed. It is quite clear 
that a majority of the Republicans in the Senate were opposed to relaxing 
neutrality to the extent proposed by this resolution. 
In the House of Representatives the situation v/as somewhat different. The 
Senate version differed considerably from the House version and the question 
before the House was to what extent it ti/ould insist on its position which 
retained saany more restrictions on trade v/ith belligerents than did the Senate 
measure. There were five roll calls on various phases of thQ resolution. One 
hundred forty-four of the Republican Congressmen voted together in opposition 
to the attempts to further relax the neutrality law. The greatest number of 
Republicans which broke away from the majority position on any vote was twenty-
one. Only two Republican Representatives voted against the party position 
on all five roll-call votes. Hov/ever, on the final vote eighteen Republicans 
Q 
voted for repeal, ten more than had. done so in June. 
We may conclude from this examination that the outbreak of war in Europe 
had little effect on Republican views of what the United States ought to do. 
In the Senate the desire to help England and France contended with the desire 
to stay neutral, and a few Senators broke away from what might be called the 
Congressional party position. Outside of Congress a few Republican leaders 
were beginning to press for more aid, but by November, 1939, Congressional 
party thinking had not changed. 
II 
Congress came back to Washington in January for an election-year session 
v/ith important decisions to make. Early in the session the Republicans 
received the report of a Program Committer which had been appointed by the 
National Committee early in 1938. At that time there had been a great deal 
8New York Times, November 3, 1939, T>v. 1-2 
of discussion about the possibility of holding a mid-term convention designed 
to rejuvenate the spirits of the party, crushed in 1936. Many prominent Re-
publicans, including former President Herbert Hoover, favored such a step, but 
it met the opposition of Alfred Landon, the party's titular leader, and his 
1936 running mate, Frank Khox, publisher of the Chicago Daily News. In lieu 
of the convention, the idea of a program comnittee v/as accepted and began work 
under the leadership of Dr. Glenn Frank, former President of the Universitj'- of 
Wisconsin. The membership on the committee eventually comprised more than 
200 members including specific representation of farmers, manufacturers, edu-
cators, labor, the professions, and many other groups. No holders of public 
office v/ere included, nor were any members of the National Committee appointed, 
and Dr. Frank made a great deal of the fact that it was a layman's group. He 
envisioned it as a study committee which would sample GOP opinion in the 
country and study the issues which the party and the nation faced, but he was 
clear to point out that: 
"It is not the business of this commission to write plat-
forms for the 1938 and 1940 campaigns...The sole legal source of 
national party policy is the national convention, and the custo-
dians of party policy in the interval between national conventions 
are the Republican members in the Senate and the House when, as 
now, the party is not in power."° 
The committee divided into nine regional groups designated to study 
problems directly or particularly concerning their areas, but it is interesting 
to note that no group was assigned the topic of foreign policy. In the final 
report of the committee, issued by the National Committee on February 19, 1940, 
scant attention was given to foreign affairs in spite of their growing urgency. 
This much was stated: 
9Ibid., Jan. 7. 1.938, p. 7 
"In the forefront of our foreign policy must be the avoidance 
of all commitments and courses of action that might involve us in 
other peoples' wars. When such wars are on, we must observe a 
scrupulous government neutrality,"!^ 
h. strong defense was called for, but the implication v/as clear that this 
defense was to be confined to the Westerr Hemisphere, a view widely held by 
Republicans in Congress. There was no discussion of foreign aid, selective 
service, or other issues which confronted Congress at the moment.H 
The Selective Service debate was one of the longest of the session, 
lasting from August 7 to September 13. In the Senate there were fourteen 
roll-call votes before the bill passed in final form. Again, as in the neu-
trality debate, Republicans and a few Democrats tried to modify the bill before 
it was enacted. 
Wher the bill was reported favorably out of the Committee, a minority 
of three members wrote a dissenting report. Ed.win C. Johnson of Colorado 
(Democrat), John Thomas of Idaho (Republican), and Ernest Lundeen (Farmer-
Labor) of Minnesota signed a statement which called for the use of voluntary 
enlistment until such a system had failed to meet the needs of the armed 
services: 
"Voluntary enlistment (the report concluded] should be given 
a thorough trial before any Hitlerized method of peacetime con-
scription with its far reaching implication of militarism and 
imperialism is adopted as a permanent policy in America. After a 
thorough end fair trial, if the voluntary enlistment plan fails 
in part or in whole, then before it is too late, the minority 
will be glad to support conscription, but not before."12 
On the question of limiting the use of troops to the Western Hemisphere 
the Republicans were nearly united. In the Senate there v/ere no Republican 
10Ibid.. Feb. 19, 1940, p. 2 
11Ibid. 
12s. Rent. . No.. 2002, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess. (Aug. 5. 1940), p. 13 
27 
votes against the Lodge amendment which would have restricted service of men 
drafted to the Western Hemisphere and Territories of the United States. On the 
second issue the Senate Republicans were divided, but in the House the Repub-
licans supported (135-25) an amendment which was accepted to provide for a 
period of voluntary enlistment before the draft would, become effective.13 The 
bill passed the House September 7, and, with the above amendment attached, 
fifty-four Repxiblicans voted for it and 111 against, 1^ In the Senate the Re-
publicans cast eight yeas and ten nays, with two others announced against the 
bill and three for it,15 
Voting among the Republicans in the Senate on this issue formed a some-
what different pattern than it had on the neutrality bill the year before. There 
were a. total of eleven roll-call votes and the familiar division in the party 
can be observed. Austin, Gurney, Gibson, and Barbour voted against all but two 
of the amendments designed to modify the committee measure, while Johnson and 
Capper voted for all but one.l° There was, however, considersble v/svering 
in the ranks of the isolationists. Danaher, for example, voted "no" on three 
of the "crippling" amendments, and even more striking is the. fact that 
Senators Lodge and Holman were found voting almost identically to the Austin 
group. It is to be remembered that while the Selective Service issue was 
partially fought out on lines of "intervention" versus "non-intervention," it 
was also a defense measure, and Republican support for national defense had re-
mained relatively high through the entire period of the twenties and 
thirties. 17 (Fig-are II). 
13Cong_. Record. Vol. 8C-, p. 117I1.8 (76th Cong., 3rd Sess., Sept. 7, 1940) 
l^Ibid., p. 11755 
x^Ibid., p. 11142, (Aug. 23, 1940) 
l°Ann;mnced positions will be Included throughout except where noted. 
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Figure II. Republican voting in the Senate on Selective Service, 1940 
In the House cf Representatives a similar pattern can be noted, and the 
frequently well-united ranks of the party in that chamber were somewhat 
shattered on this issue. Sixty of the most faithful stood strongly against 
the bill and Sn favor of all proposed modifications. Thirty-nine varied by 
only one vote on five roll calls from that position. Twelve wavered twice, 
twenty-six three times, ten four times, and twelve representatives voted in 
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Figure III. Republican voting in the House of Representatives 
on Selective Service, 1940. 
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Another issue developed when, on July 22, 1940, President Roosevelt sent 
to Congress a message in which he stated that as a result of the European War, 
with the resultant blockades and counter-blockades, the sale of Latin-American 
products in their natural market was being prevented. This, he declared, v/as 
causing and would continue to cause distress in Latin American countries until 
the war was ended and normal commerce restored. For these reasons he asked 
Congress to increase the capital and lending powers of the Export-Import Bank 
by $500,000,000 to enable the bank to make loans to Latin American countries 
for the financing and orderly marketing of some part of their surpluses.13 
The proposal was submitted to the appropriate Senate and House committees 
end subsequently was reported favorably in both Houses. In the Senate Robert 
Taft wrote a Minority report which was signed by the Republican membeie of 
the ConuiUee on Banking and Currency. Tnft pointed out that this bill would 
remove for Latin American countries the limitation of $20,000,000 on loans 
to one country. It also, he reminded the Senate, would remove the limitation 
prohibiting loans to finance the export of arms, ammunition, and implements 
of war. Continuing, the Minority argued against this bill for several specific 
reasons: 
1. The constitutionality of the proposition was challenged on the 
grounds that no such powers were given Congress under Article 1, Section 8. 
2. Taft maintained that the policy of international surplus control 
is not only futile but positively harmful to the producers of North and South 
America. 
3. The furnishing of economic aid to South America was not thought 
to be an advisable step. 
'Cjmg^RflCord.. Vol. 86, pp. 9571-9572 , (76th Cong., 3rd Sess., July 22, 
1940) 
30 
4. The new policy, the Taft opinion stated, had a definitely "anti-
German" flavor. It seemed to suggest that we should prevent the Gnrmans from 
acquiring American products. It could hardly be considered wise to adopt such 
a policy before the totalitarian nations had taken any economic steps of the 
kind contemplated. 
5. This step would in the long run be encouraging Latin American 
competition for North American products. 
"We know[the Minority report concluded! as individuals that the poorest 
way to make a man a good neighbor is to lend him money. It is far 
more likely to make him your enemy for life. The same result has 
come in the past from international loans and is bound to come in 
- the future."19 
Republican Senators were almost unanimous in their opposition to the bill 
when it came up for vote, only one voting for it on final passage. And the 
party was equally united in the House of Representatives v/here a total of only 
five votes was cast against the party majority on the three roll calls taken 
on this issue. Only four Republican votes were cgst in favor of the bill on 
final passage in the House. 
In reviewing foreign policy voting in the 2nd and 3rd Sessions of the 
76th Congress we find, in brief, the following: In the Senate six Republicans 
voted ©gainst the extreme isolationists on more than half the roll-call votes. 
These internationalists were quite regularly supporting the Administration 
in its efforts to prepare the United States for possible war and to act on an 
international scale to solve certain problems arising out of the wars in 
Europe and Asia. (Figure IV). In the House of Representatives greater unity 
was maintained in the Republican ranks, and only two Republicans voted 
differently than Mason on as many as half the votes recorded. (Figure V) 









































































Figure IV: Republican voting on Foreign Policy issues in the Senate; 
76th Congress; 1939(2nd Sess.)-1940; as compared with the record 
of Senator Hiram Johnson of California 
(The letter (A) indicates that no vote or announced position 
was recorded for that Senator on more than one third of the roll 
calls compiled. In compilations for the House, members not voting 
or announced on more than one third of the recorded votes are not 
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Figure V: Republican voting on Foreign Policy Issues in the House 
of Representatives; 76th Congress; 1939(2nd Sess.)-1940; as 
corapared with the record of Congressman Noah M. Mason of Illinois 
Ill 
Again the question arises as to whether or not Republican congressional 
views were representative of the "rank and file" of party members. First of 
all one must ssy that it would not be expected that they would represent Re-
publican views from all parts of the country but only of the states and 
districts which elected them. To the extent that Republicans from areas 
represented in Congress by Democrats had views different from those in areas 
represented by Republicans, their opinions were not herrd in the party councils 
on Capitol Hill. 
That there v/ere such variations became evident in several ways during 
1940. The first was the appearance of many prominent Republicans high in the 
circles of a new organization known as the Committee to Defend America by 
Aiding the Allies. This group was formed through the efforts of leading 
citizens of both parties to take every form of political action possible to 
obtain American aid for the countries still fighting Germany in Europe. The 
group was headed by William Allen White, a prime mover in the organization. 
White was chosen for his ability, his sympathy for the cause of allied aid, 
and also what he represented. Coming from the Middle Went, traditional seat 
of isolation, be wss an outstanding liberal Republican who at the same time 
was on very good terms with President Roosevelt. 
The efforts of the group took several forms, among them the formation of 
local groups and regional organizations seeking to influence public opinion 
in favor of American support for England and France. Newspaper and magazine 
space was purchased on a nation-wide scale, and full page messages were 
printed periodically. Not only did the Committee seek to mold public opinion, 
but also to bring the force of this public opinion to bear on public officials 
and especially on Congress. 
The 1940 political conventions gave another opportunity for the Committee 
to gain political support for a program of aid to the allies. Henry L. Stim-
son, a Secretary of War under Theodore Roosevelt and Secretary of State under 
Herbert Hoover, was active in the group, and was particularly anxio\j.s that the 
Republican party should not follow an isolationist policy. William Allen 
White felt the best hope in this direction was to keep the Republican Committee 
on Resolutions from making any definite declaration on foreign policy that 
would prevent the Presidential candidate from taking a stsnd in favor of aiding 
the p.llies. Many supporters of the Committee to Aid the Allies had friends in 
high places in the Republican party, and they promised to work through these 
friends while White worked through his fellow Kanssn, Alf Landon.20 
On the opposite side of the question was the America First Committee in 
v/hich many Republicans were active but which was also intended to be private 
and nonpartisan. This group, which opposed first the relaxation of neutrality, 
secondly the loaning of money to the Allies, and finally the entrance of the 
United States into the war, was headed by General Robert E. Wood, chairman of 
the boa I'd of Sears Roebuck and Company, who v/as considered to be a Reprb"! ican, 
and a majority of the national committee of America First with political 
affiliations were Republicans.*! Among the many Republicans who served as 
speakers or advisors for the America First Committee were Philip LaFollette, 
former Governor of Wisconsin, Senator Gerald P. Nye (North Dakota), Representa-
tives Karl Mundt (South Dakota), Hamilton Fish (New York), and Dewey Short 
(Missouri).22 
'Walter Johnson, The Battle Against Isolation, p. 66 
Wayne 5, Cole, American First, p. l69 
'Ibid., p. 170 
During its brief life, which ended in December, 1941, this organization 
attempted by the same methods used by the Committee to Defend America to 
influence public opinion and the course of legislation along lines consistent 
with its principles of non-intervention. Although it cannot be said that the 
committee was totally without influence in the course of American foreign 
policy, it is obvious that it failed coinpletel,y to achieve its major objectives. 
The fascinating story of Wendell Willkie's rise and fall in the Repub-
lican Party has been told in considerable detail by Donald Johnson in his 
doctoral thesis entitled Wendell Willkie and the Republican Party.23 The 
Herculean effort which brought Willkie forward from comparative obscurity, the 
spectacular convention where he was nominated, and the candidate's attempts 
to swing the party away from its stand against intervention in the European 
War—all these are examined by Dr. Johnpon. The details need not be gone 
over again. 
Willkie's earliest and strongest backing came from certain eastern business 
interests and the editors of the New York Herald Tribune. By and large Willkie1 
foreign policy views coincided with those of his backers. It v/as obvious that 
his attitudes would bear little resemblance to those of the party in Congress. 
Willkie was to do much wavering and compromising in the course of the cam-
paign, but from beginning to end it was clear that he favored as much aid to 
the British as possible, and supported most of the President's efforts in this 
direction.2^ It became very difficult for him to attack the President's 
foreign policy program, and he was often found to be criticizing the President 
for too little rather than too much intervention and preparation for war. 
^University of Illinois, 1952 
24 
Donald Johnson, Wendell Willkie and the Republican Party, pp. 71-76. 
See also Mary Earhart Dillon, Wendell Willkie. Chaos. 9-12 
36 
At the time the 1940 platform was written Willkie was far from the 
favored candidate for the nomination but was nonetheless enough in the running 
to have some influence on the drafting of the foreign policy plank. On June 8 
he spoke out to say that sentiment in the Re-publican party was overwhelmingly 
for aid short of war and that he was confident that the Republican party was 
not isolationist, 
"I don't think there is any chance that the Republicans will 
adopt any isolation plank. I haven't been able to find any strong 
isolation group in the Republican Party, and I am sure that the 
country is overwhelmingly in favor of granting immediate aid to 
the allies. "2-5 
This kind of a statement must certainly be considered something akin to 
whistling in the dark, for that there would be a real battle over the platform 
on the issue of intervention appeared certain from the beginning. John D. M. 
Hamilton, Chairman of the Republican National Committae, v/as saying that the 
°6 declaration on foreign policy would be the most important in the platform,*-D 
The Republican Resolutions Committee convened informally on June 17» 
several days before the opening of the convention. Turner Catledge, New York 
Times reporter, wrote that "a strong current toward a declaration of sympathy 
for the forces still battling Nazi domination, as well as for all possible 
material aid 'short of war', developed quickly among the 40-odd members..."27 
Led by Mr. Dandon and Walter E, Edge of Nev; Jersey, this "current" was reported 
to be pushing into the background, for the time being at least, any serious 
agitation for a restatement of the traditional isolation policy for which the 
part;/- had been noted in recent years. 
2^New York Times. June 9, 1940, p, 3 
26lbid.. June 14, 1940, p. 18 
2?Ibid.. June 13, 1940', p. 1 
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In spite of this sentiment Mr. Herbert K. Hyde, a Dewey supporter, v/as 
chosen chairman of the Committee, although it was said that his foreign policy 
views were not sought before the selection was made.28 Mr„ Landon refused the 
chairmanship so as to be free to make his fight for allied aid in the committee 
and, if necessary, on the convention floor. Mr. Landon, in line with the 
views of William Allen White, v/as said to favor a short 'postal card" platform 
with the most general and simple statement possible on foreign affairs, leaving 
details to be filled in to meet events abroad. He said, "I favor all possible 
aid to the allies that does not involve any comrni-t ment that will take us 
into war unless the vital interests of America are threatened in a tangible 
and concrete way."29 
On the l8th Landon was chosen Chairman of the Subcommittee oa Foreign 
Policy and National Defense. The membership of the subcommittee represented 
almost all shades of opinion on the foreign policy issue ranging from strong 
pro-ally sentiment in the East to old-time isolation in the West,3° The sub-
committee held hearings the same day, and a general cross-sect ion of views 
was presented. H. C. Hogan of Indiana told the group that the Middle Western 
Region, for which he was Program Committee Chairman, was "definitely and. over-
whelmingly" for staying out of the war. Furthermore, he said the idea of 
following a policy of giving aid to the belligerents "short of war" was like 
rabbit sausage—"half rabbit and half horse." A delegate from North Carolina 
endorsed the views of the Frank Committee for the Southeastern States. E, E. 
Galloway of Florida warned the committee that if it tried to counter the New 
2 8 Ibid. 
29lbid. 
3°Ibid.. June 19... 1940, p. 1 
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Deal foreign policy it might as well give up hope of again breaking into the 
solid South, for he had no doubt of the popularity of that policy in the South-
east. William S. Hov/e of Sommerville, Massachusetts, speaking for former 
Governor John H. Trumbull of Connecticut, insisted the party would make a grave 
mistake if it failed to recognize the idealistic strain of Americans which was 
now being aroxised by events abroad. Howe also favored giving all help to the 
allies "short of an expeditionary force," and said this was the expressed 
opinion of New England,31 
At this point in the efforts to write a platform a bomb shell exploded 
in Washington and was immediately felt in the deliberations of the Committee 
on Resolutions. Mr. Roosevelt on June 20 appointed Frank Knox, editor of the 
Chicago Daily News and Republican Vice-Presidential candidate in 193^, and 
Henry L. Stimson, both considered to be pro-interventionist Republicans, to be 
the Secretaries of Navy and War respectively. The immediate reaction at the 
convention was generally to the effect that these appointments were made to 
form a psuedo-coalition ce.binet to gain the support of certain segments of the 
Republican party. It v/as also felt that this more than ever demanded that the 
Republican party take a stand as the "peace party." Many observers were cer-
tain that from this incident would result a more clearly anti-intervention 
foreign policy plank, and this is just what many leading Republicans were 
saying. The National Committee Chairman, Mr. John Hamilton, issued the 
following statement: 
"The action v/hich has been taken by Colonel Knox and Mr. Stimson 
in associating themselves with the present national administration 
as members of the President's cabinet is purely personal on their 
part. Every individual has the right to serve the State and Govern-
ment as he sees fit. As members of the President's Cabinet they 
31lhid. 
ov/e their allegiance to the President and hereafter will speak and 
act in that capacity. Colonel Knox's and Mr. Stimson's desire for 
American intervention in European affairs is so well known that 
their appointment speaks for itself. "3*-
This statement was subsequently adopted as the sentiment of the National 
Committee. Colonel Enox resigned as a delegate-at-large to the convention 
from Illinois. The isolationists on the platform committee took the position 
that the appointments made it virtually mandatory for the convention to adopt 
a non-intervention plank. Even Mr. Landon was reported to feel that the 
appointments had given the Republicans the cue to become strictly a "peace 
party" and to attack the Democrats as the "war party." 
It is a little difficult at first to see the logic of this position, but 
perhaps the best explanation came from Herbert Hyde who said, "The appointment 
indicates that President Roosevelt is attempting to lead this nation into war, 
because a coalition government is not possible in our two-party system of 
government in times of p^ace. "33 The Republicans v/er-̂  anxious to show that 
they did not consider that a coalition had been formed and that the Republican 
party was not represented by Knox and Stimson in the Cabinet. The tv/o best 
ways to make this clear were to read Knox and Stimson out of the party and to 
adopt a foreign policy plarkabsolutely opposed to the Administration program. 
The first of these actions was taken by Hamilton's statement, but in 
another twenty-four hours the move to include support for aid to the allies 
revived strongly. Many leaders still were determined to pin the label of 
peece en their party, but a goodly number of the platform writers seemed equally 
intent upon avoiding any action that would run directly counter to what they 
felt was the current popular demand for every possible material assistance to 
the allies. 
32lbid.. June,21, 1940,,p. 1 
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On June 22, Thomas Dewey of New York declared himself to be in favor of 
aid to the allies without violating international or domestic law or entering 
the war, Willkie, of course, v/as for aid to the allies without going to war. 
By this time it appeared that the best way out of the controversy over the 
platforn was to leave the whole matter mainly up to the candidate. The idea 
would have been to tell the convention and to st̂ .te in the platform that the 
international situation v/as so fluid that the party could take no restricted 
stand on this issue. It evidently appeared at this stage that almost any 
positive stand v/ould lead to clash in the full Resolutions Committee or on the 
floor of the convention.34 Also on June 22 there was a meeting of the delegates 
of thirteen western states and Alaska called by Ezra Whitla, national committee-
man from Idaho. This group adopted a resolution opi^osing any intervention by 
the United States in European or Asis.tic wars, and selected Senator John 
Thomas, also of Idaho, to present these views to the Committee on Resolutions.-5-* 
The same day tentative agreement "in principle" was reported reached 
on the foreign policy plank. It was learned that the main features of the 
plank v/ere (l) a condemnation of the Roosevelt Administration's foreign policy; 
(2.) a declaration for keeping us out of war; and (3) while the originally 
planned support for aid to the allies "short of war" was omitted, there was a 
general statement of support for all "oppressed peoples" in their fight for 
freedom, and approval of such aid to these beleagured governments as might be 
extended without violation of international la.w or peril to the United States. 
Finally, coupled v/ith the foregoing statement and evidently inserted as part 
of the bargain, was a reference to the cost in lives and money of the last 
venture of the United States into foreign wars.36 




After the drafting committee had completed its work, the resolution went 
to the full platform committee. At a session of the committee on June 26, C. 
Wayland Brooks of Illinois, backed by Senators Thomas, Lodge, and Hyde, succeeded 
in writing in still another sentence which provided that any aid extended to 
oppressed peoples "does not include the sons of America." This language v/as a 
part of the Illinois State Republican Platform. The next xorning when the 
drafters met again to approve the document for mimeograx^hing, Messrs. Pepper 
and Edge discovered the new clause. Apparently outnumbered by the non-interven-
tionists, they threatened to resign, and Mr. Pepper actually left the room. 
Brooks finally agreed to withdraw the new clause in the interests of a unanimous 
report, but told the committee he might go before the convention to explain 
his position. 
This episode over the 1940 Republican platform is quite illustrative of 
how platforms are written and of what their language can be taken to mean. It 
is difficult to say just where a majority of the convention stood on aid to 
the allies and on an anti-war program for the party. The New York Times felt 
the platform indicated that the convention was overwhelmingly non-intervention-
ist. 37 William Allen White was certain thst seventy percent of the delegates 
favored aid to the allies short of war. The nomination of Willkie would tend 
to support the latter view, but the later rejection of Willkie by large seg-
ments of the party throws any such conclusion into doubt. 
Whether or not the platform represented the views of the convention is 
impossible to guess. That there were two strong conflicting points of view 
is obvious. One was primarily agreed that we stay our of war but also wanted 
to include a statement in support of aid to the allies. The other group was 
37iMd., June 27, 1940, p. 22 
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anxious to see a strong anti-intervention plank adopted and wcxald accept approval 
of anv aid only in the most general terms and then only grudgingly. Both the 
Committee on Resolutions as a whole and its foreign policy subcommittee were 
divided along these lines. The fact that the fight did not reach the floor of 
the convention could be talter, to indicate that neit-her group felt the report was 
entirely unrepresentative of their viev/s and that eacl felt no new strength v/ould 
be found on the floor. To this extent the plank could be said to represent the 
viev/s of the convention—and a rather delicate balance of those views at that. 
One. phrase different, in one direction or the other, might have resulted in a 
lack of unanimity in the report. 
To most people reading the 19^0 platform today, or even on the day it was 
adopted, it v/ould seem merely a weak and meaningless statement which should be 
ignored in favor of an examination of the viev/s of the candidate. And so it is, 
abstractly considered. Ar.d yet reading it against the background of the struggle 
over every word in its sentences, it gives some indication of the state of 
foreign policy in the Republican party convention. It tells us that the faction 
which wanted aid to the. allies was not strong enough to have a direct statement 
to that effect adopted. It tells us that the isolationist group v/as not strong 
enough to exclude all mention of aid, but v/as able to exact additional strong 
anti-intervention statements as a price for the inclusion of the. clause favoring 
aid to oppressed peoples.38 
1 *jij " ' 
^°"Th3 Republican Party is firmly opposed to involving this Nation in 
foreign war. 
"We are still suffering from the ill effects of the last World War:—a war 
which cost us a twenty-four billion dollar increase in our national debt, billions 
of uncollectible foreign debts, and the complete upset of our economic system, in 
addition to the loss of human life and irreparable damage to the health of 
thousands of our boys... 
"Our sympathies have been profoundly stirred by invasion of unoffending 
countries and by disaster to nations whose ideals most clearly resemble our own. 
We favor the extension to all peoples fighting for liberty, or whose liberty is 
threatened, of such aid as shall not be in violation of international law or con-
sistent with the requirements of our own defense..." Proceedings. Rep. Natl. 
Conv.. 1940, p. I4i 
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Considering this balance of strength and remembering the stand of the 
Republicans in Congress in 1939-19A0, one is bound to conclude that Wendell 
Willkie did not on matters of foreign policy reprosert the viev/s of the Repub-
lican organization. That he may have come close to representing the viev/s of 
a large segment of the party "rank and file" Js to be presumed fr-m the public 
opinion polls, but car. never bo clearly proved. The factors which influenced 
his nomination pre too complex to aralyze in terms of his foreign policy viev/s, 
but the nomination of Senator McNary would indicate that the convention did 
not support Willkie's views sz strongly tha.t it felt it necessary tu nominate 
a running mate with similar ideas. It seems probable that McNary was nominated 
chiefly for his favorable viev/s toward public -Dover to counteract the anti-
public power views often expressed by Willkie. McNary's voting record shows 
that he oppored all measures to aid the allies—«vcr. thoce reaeures which vere 
specifically endorsed by Wer.dell Willkie. All the efforts from June to November 
which v/ere nade to create an appearance of agreement between the two men were 
neve r convinciig. 
Willkie's statements:, on foreign policy during the campaign v/ere often 
confusing, contradictory, ana nuzzling, but ther-e v/as little doubt that his 
opinions regained essentially as he stated them in his acceptance ppeceh at 
Elwood, Indiana, on August 17. There, after a rather careful and lengthy 
explanation of hie thinking or. the situation America faced, he specifically 
indicated his support of Selective Service and the general foreign policy line 
of the Roosevelt Administration: 
"I cannot ask the American people to put their faith in me 
without recording my conviction that some forn of Selective Service 
is the only democratic way in which to assure the trained and 
competent manpower we need in our national defense. 
"Also, in the light of my principles we must honestly face 
our relationship with Great Britain. We must admit that the loss 
of the British fleet would greatly weaken our defense... 
"The President of the United Sta.tes recently said, 'We will 
extend to the opponents of force the :naterial resources of this 
nation, and at the same time we will harness the use of those 
resources in order that v/e ourselves in America may have the equip-
ment and training equal to the ta.sk of e,r,.j emergency and every 
defense.' 
"I should like to state that I am in agreement with those two 
principles as I understand them—and I don't understand them as imply-
ing military involvement in the present hostilities. As PD. American 
citizen I am glad to pledge whole-hearted support to the President 
in whatever action he may take in accord with those principles."-" 
He then went on to attack Roosevelt's policy on tv/o grounds: (l) for 
making belligerent and threatening statements which v/ere uncalled for and 
unnecessary and thus running the risk of taking us into war; (2) for failing 
to take the people of the United States into his confidence in his diplomatic 
moves. 
Senator McNary and other non-interventionists were placed in a very diffi-
cult position in trying to march under a Willkie banner emblazoned with the 
foregoing principles. They were, by and large, restricted to agreeing again 
and again with the Willkie statement v/hich said he was against our entering 
the war—a. rather frustrating situation to cay the leart. Willkie's defeat 
deprived political observers of their chance to see whether or not Willkie 
v/ould have been able as President to change the viev/s of Congressional Repub-
licans and gain their support for his policies. It will be seen later that 
in his role as "titular leader" of the party Willkie did attempt to influence 
party policy, largely without success. 
IT 
The Republicans, although defeated for control of the Executive, just 
about held their own in the House of Representatives and. gained six Senate 
seats. There v/ere now twenty-eight Republican Senators and l62 Representatives, 
39Kew York Times, August 18, 1940, p. 33 
The Minority leadership remained in the hands of Senator McNary and Joseph 
Martin, and McNary's votij.^ record for the 1941 session indicates he v/as in-
fluenced in his foreign policy views little, if at all, by the experience of 
running v/ith Wendell Willkie, He continued to line up solidly with the major-
ity of Republicans in the Senate v/ho opposed all efforts to further commit the 
United States on the international ecene. It is curious, however, that Senator 
Austin was again the Republican whip in the Senate, for during the entire 
period from 1939 to 1942 he v/as voting in almost constant opposition to the 
isolationist group. He voted in opposition to such Senators as Johnson, Nye, 
and Capper more than three-fourths.of the time during this entire period. On 
some issues his percentage of deviation neared 100 percent. 
In November, 1940, William E. Borah, Republican Senator from Idaho, died 
after thirty-three years in the Senate and seventeen as ranking Republican 
member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He v/as replaced in this 
latter role by Hiram Johnson of California, whose voting record en foreign 
policy from 1939 to 1941 paralleled Borah' F, almost exactly. Added to the 
Committee at this time was Senator Nye, again with a roll-call record almost 
identical to that of Borah. Add to this the fact that in this session Henrik 
Shipstead of Minnesota, who for a time had worn the Farmer-Labor label, decided 
to list himself among the Republicans, and it Is evident that the character 
of the Republican representation on the Committee was xinchanged by Borah's 
death. 
Taking the session as a whole, the Republican voting pattern v/as about 
the same as in the two previous years. The large majority of Republicans 
continued to oppose consistently the Administration's measures for relaxing 
neutrality, aiding the allies, and strengthening Selective Service, while a 
small but persistent minority voted down the line in support of these measures. 
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In the Senate the majority was augmented by the election of Butler of Nebraska, 
Brooks of Illinois, Willis of Indiana, and, to a slightly lesser extent, Burton 
of Ohio and Aiken of Verrpnt. Senator Brewster, who replaced Hale from Maine, 
was found lass often with the minority than his predecessor, but Senator Ball 
from Minnesota voted regularly with Senators Austin, Gurney, and Barbour against 
the majority. Senator Thomas, who replaced Borah from Idaho, voted as consist-
ently with the non-intervention group as did Bo rail before him, and the same v/as 
true of William Langer, who replaced Frazier as a Senator from North. Dakota. 
Although there were numerous changes in the Republican membership in the 
House of Representatives, few, if any, of these were significant for their 
effect on the foreign policy complexion of the party in the lower chamber. Four 
of the group which had dissented from the majority most often v/ere not returned 
to the 77th Congress, while two new members v/ere added to this group. 
The lend-lease Bill was introduced on January 10 of the year-long session 
which was to end with the United States at wa.r.^° It was reported to the 
House January 30 with the views of the Minority on the Foreign Affairs Committee 
presented by Mr. Hamilton Fish the next day.*11 This report, signed by each 
Minority member, began by stating that, "We are for all aid to Britain short of 
War and short of sacrificing our own defense and our own freedom. The British, 
in their valiant struggle which has aroused our deepest sympathy, need planes, 
guns and war material." "But the Republicans were convinced that "this bill 
does not provide dollar exchange for Britain, and is not needed to procure 
coordination of our defense efforts. This bill will not provide any additional 
^QCong. Record. Vol. 87, p. 121 (77th Cong., 1st Sess., Jan. 10, I9^l) 
^llbid., pp. 427-^29 
war supplies for Britain within the 60-90 days of her crisis, unless the Presi-
dent uses the powers provided to dispose of part of our arms or our Navy, which 
he and his Cabinet officers have specifically denied they could spare."^2 
After asserting that this bill would give the President "unlimited, un-
precedented and unpredictable powers literally to seize anything in this country 
and give it to any other country," the Republicans proposed their own seven-
point program to meet the situation. 
"1. A $2,000,000,000 credit to Britain, to be used in this country 
for purchasing arms when her dollar balance for this purpose is ex-
hausted, requiring reasonable colsteral security if available. 
"2. Permit the sale by our Government of arms to Britain only when 
our highest Army and Navy officers certify in writing such arms are 
not necessary for our national deferse. 
"3. A one-year time limit on all extraordinary powers. 
"4. Provide that no vessels of the U. S. Navy shall be disposed of 
without consent of Congress. 
"5. Prohibit the use of our ports for repair bases for belligerents' 
ships. 
"6. Prohibit the use of American vessels to transfer exports to 
belligerents. 
"7. Prohibit the convoying of merchantmen by our Navy.^3 
On February 8 a roll-call vote was taken on a motion to recommit the bill 
to committee. It v/as defeated by the House (263-160), but the Republicans 
supported it (l.49-ll). On the same day the bill was passed in the House, but 
it received the favorable votes of only 24 Republicans while 135 opposed it.44 
^ H . Rent. No. 18, 77th Cong., 1st' Sess. . (Jan. 30, 1941) 
^3ibid. 
^Cone. Record. Vol. 87, p. 8l4-8l5- (77th Cong., 1st Sess., Feb. 8, 1941) 
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In the upper chamber Senator Johnson submitted a report on behalf of "a 
few of the Minority." This v/as a short report v/hich offered, nothing in the 
way of an alternative program but s\i.mmarized Johnson's objections to the bill 
as follows: 
"A. There is no need now for additional aid to Britain. Britain 
is receiving—and will continue to receive—all add necessary that can 
with due rega.rd to our safety be accorded. 
"1. [The billj is successful only in concealing its purpose. It 
is not a. bill for aiding Britain nor a. bill for the national defense 
of our country. 
"2. If read realistically, it grants extraordinary powers to 
the President such as have never before been granted to a Chief 
Executive, 
"3. It makes of the Chief Txecutive a dictator, and worse, a 
dictator v/ith, power to take us into war. 
"4. It transfers the war malting power from Congress to the 
President. 
"5. It leaves to the President (a) the determination of aggressor 
nations and (b) what punishments shall be meted out to them. 
"6. It commits the American people permanently to support the 
course he takes, for once embarked upon a course, it will be necessary 
for the people to follow through."45 
There followed, on the Senate floor, a long series of amendments to limit 
or restrict the application of the le:id-leai,e program. A few cf the amendments 
v/hich received the widest Republican support were (l) a Taft proposal that 
nothing in the act should be deemed to confer any additional authority to em-
ploy military personnel beyond the limits cf the Western Hemisphere except in 
the Territories of the United States;2^ (2) a Reynolds (Democrat of North 
Carolina.) amendment to prohibit use of any of the aid for the Soviet Union; l< 
45s. Rent.., No. 41, 77th C0ng., 1st Sess.. (Feb. 13, l94l), Part 2, p. 6 
^Cone. Record. Vol. 87, p. 1971, (77th Cong., 1st Sess., March 7, l94l) 
^Itid.. p. 1984 
and (3) an amendment by Senator Vandenberg that would have required certifi-
cation by the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations that articles 
sent abroad v/ere not needed in United States defense.^® On final passage of 
the bill, March 8, the Republicans divided ten for and seventeen against the 
Dill."* 
Senator Ball, writing in The Republican, reported tha.t Minority members 
in both houses divided roughly into three groups in their initial attitude 
toward the bill. A few in both houses were ready to vote for the bill as it 
stood. A somewhat larger group, Ball felt, were strongly opposed to the leg-
islation along the lines proposed on the grounds that the lend-lease program 
v/ould tend to bring on war because it was essentially a war-like act. It 
appeared to Ball, finally, that a majority of Republicans in both houses 
favored aid to Britain but wanted to wait before taking a position, and that 
many of these would vote for the bill if it were amended.^° 
This may well have been an accurate report of the private, views of Repub-
lican congressmen, especially before the voting began. It is impossible to 
tell from the "yea and nay" Votes in the House whether there v/ere three 
attitudes. Republican Representatives voted (l49-ll) in favor of recommiting 
the bill to the Committee v/ith instructions to report it out as a $2,000,000,000 
credit to Great Britain. They voted (135-24) against the bill when it passed 
the House.51 in the Senate, where there were eighteen roll-call votes on the 
bill, three groups might have foraied, but they did not. There were only two—a 
majority of twenty-three who, with few exceptions, voted for a.1,1 the amendments 
^8Ibid., p. 1991 
^Ibid., p. 2144 
50Joseph H. Ball, "This Month in Congress," The Republican. February, 1941, 
pp. 8-9 
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and against the bill, and a minority of five who voted against most of the 
amendments and for the bill. 
Senator Ball reported that there was considerable resentment that the 
President consulted only with the Majority in drafting the bill. He also 
pointed out that Wendell Willkie's support of the bill was not received with 
much enthusiasm. The titular leader's entrance on the scene came with a 
statement issued in New York in v/hich he urged prompt passage of the lend-
lease measure as a step in keeping the United States out of war.-' Willkie 
had consulted with none of the Party leaders before issuing his statement. 
His position raised the whole question of the role of a defeated presidential 
candidate. Colonel McCormick read Willkie out of the party after the Chicago 
Tribune branded him as "Mr. Roosevelt's fictitious opponent...Quisling...fifth 
columnist...New Deal Democrat...barefoot boy of Elv/ood.. .barefaced fraud. "53 
Senator Taft said he saw "no justification in precedent or principle for the 
view that a defeated candidate for President is the. titular leader of the 
party. "-^ Other observers thoiight Willkie may have had some influence on the 
Bridges-Austin-Gurney group, but from an analysis of the voting it would appear 
that the pattern set on the lend-lease issue was merely a continuation of the 
voting records of this group since 1939. In other words, Willkie had no in-
fluence in Congress and did not even seem to embarrass most Republican Congress-
men. He v/as not speaking for the Congressional pa.rty. 
The public opinion polls of the day, however, indicate that perhaps 
Willkie had more support among the "rank and. file" of the party, and the results 
52Newswaek. February 24, 1941, p. 18 
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of the polls on this issue are \cry interesting. On January 21, 19''1, this 
question v/as asked: "If the British are unable to pay cash for v/ar material 
bought in this country, should our government lend or lease war materials to 
Britain to be paid back in the same materials or other goocls after the war?" 
Sixty-two percent of the Republican voters approved, thirty-two percent dis-
approved.-^ In February the question was asked, "Do you think Congress should 
pass the Lend-Lease Bill?" The Republicans answered thirty-eight percent "Yes, 
forty-one percent "No" and tvei-ty-one percent gave a qualified ansv.er.56 While 
it could be argued that the provisions of the bill were in some ways different 
than the conditions set forth in the first question, it seems more likely that 
there v/as an actual shift in opinion. By the time the second poll was taken, 
the Congressional lines had formed, and it was clear that most Republican Con-
gressmen v/ould vote against the bill. Many Republicans evidently felt they 
should follow their party leaders in Congress rather than Mr. Willkie, and 
thus disapprove the bill or qualify their support. 
With the shift of Republican "rank and file" opinion on the lend-lease 
issue came, a shift in Willkie's popular standing. Ey July 26, thirty-eight 
percent of the Republicans poller" did not like Willkie as well as at election 
tin 
time.-'' apparently any party leadership he had during the campaign was rapidly 
passing from his hands. 
As mentioned above, the main thesis of Republican opposition to lend-lease 
was that it went far beyond all aid possible to Britain "short of v°r," that 
it would give President Roosevelt dictatorial powers, that it would amount to 
^Public Opinion Quarterly. Vol. 5, p. 321 (June, 194l) 
5 6IMd., p. 323 
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an abdication by Congress and would be a long step toward intervention in the 
war. Many Republicans, however, v/ho were leaders in the fight against passage 
of the lend-lease bill, conceded with its enactment that Congress and the people 
had decided on a course of action and that henceforth they would support that 
course. Thus the House debate on the seven billion dollar appropriation found 
Mr. John Taber, ranking Republican on the House Appropriations Committee, sup-
porting passage. Republican floor leader Joseph W. Mprtin (Massachusetts) took 
the same position, and the Republicans in the House as a whole voted 105-^5 *n 
favor of the appropriation.5s Only seven Republican Senators opposed passage 
of the money bill.59 
Another issue coming before Congress in the spring of 1941 was the Ship 
Seizure Bill in which the Administration sought authority to seize ships of 
other nations interned in our harbors. The test of strength came on a re-
committal motion in the House and an amendment in the Senate which would have 
forbidden the transfers of the ships of one belligerent to another belligerent. 
The aim of these amendments offered by Mr, Culkin (Republican, of New York) 
in the House and Mr. Vandeuberg in the Senate was another attempt to block aid 
to Britain since the ships in question were French and Italian, and Republicans 
felt that the effort would be made to transfer them to the British Navy. Pro-
ponents of the amendments claimed such a transfer would constitute a prosecutive 
act inviting war. The Administration disclaimed any intention of making such 
transfers but opposed the amendment. In the House all the Republicans but 
thirtren sup icrted the amendment,^ while in the Senate the Republican vote in 
580<mg. Record. Vol. 87, p. 23$J (77th Cong., 1st Sess., V.srch 19, l94l) 
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favor ox the amendment was 22 to 3.^1 On the final votes, fifty Republicans 
in the House and ten in the Senate voted for the bill,°2 
Near the end of the summer, less than four months before Pearl Harbor, 
fifteen Republicans outside of Son̂ -rese issued a "blast" at Administration 
foreign policy, calling upon Congress to atop the drift into war. It is quoted 
here in part, 
"The American people should insistently demand that Congress 
put a stop to step-by-step projection of the United State? into un-
declared war...Exceeding its expressed purpose, the Lend-Lease Bill 
has been followed by naval action, by military occupation of bases 
outside the Western- Hemisphere, by proraise of unauthorized aid to 
Russia, and by othf.r belligerent moves... 
"KB, }iave g o n e a s far a s j_s consistent cither .villi lav/, with, 
sentiment or with security... It [the war) is r.-t purely a world con-
flict between tyranny and freedom. The Anglo-Russian alliance has 
dissipated that illusion,., 
"Few people honestly believe that the Axis is now, or will in 
the future, be in a position to threaten the independence of any 
part of this Hemisphere- if our defenses are properly prepared. 
"Freedom in America does not depend on the outcome of struggle 
aterial power between other nations."^3 
The group who prepared and signed this statement was headed "oy Governor 
Frank Lowden and included Herbert Hoover, Alf Landon, Robert M. Hutchins, John 
L, Lewis, and Charles G. Dawes among its signers. The declaration v/as read 
aloud to a formal caucus of the Republican members of the House, called at the 
instigation of a. group of the most isolationist GOP Congressmen, headed by 
Hamilton Fish, purportedly for two reasons: (l) to condemn Wendell Willkie 
for his support of the Administration's foreign policy; and (2) to outline a 
? 
for mats 
6 1 lilid.., p. 4103 (May 15, 1941) 
62Ibld., p. 4108 
63lfew York Times. August 6, 1941, p. 6 
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guiding Republican policy.0^ After a session of denunciations of the Pres-ident 
and Willkie, the caucus produced a declaration of policy on which all could 
agree: 
"We reallir.n the pledge of our 19^0 Party platform: 'The Repub-
lican party is firmly opposed to involving this nation in foreign 
war.' We approve the restatement of this principle subsequently 
written into the 1940 Democratic platform: 'We will not participate 
in foreign wars and we will not send our Army, Naval, or Air forces 
to fight outside of the Americas except in care of attack.' We 
demand fulfillment of these pledges. 
"We reaffirm the declaration of our Party platform as follows: 
'Cur national defense must be so strong that no unfriendly power 
shall aver set foot on our soil. To assure this strength our 
national economy, the true basis cf America's strength, must be 
free of unwarrented government interference.' 
"The lend-lease policy was prese- ted to the American people 
as a measure short of war. We insist that it be administered as 
a short-cf-war measure..."°5 
This was certainly the most minimal statement possible; the least comn.cn 
denominator of opinion. It would seem rather remarkable that a House caucus 
would so restrict itself on a foreign policy statement uhen agreement among 
House Republicans on so man;/- issues was so widespread. Party regularity on 
roll-call votes had been quite well maintained in mest instances and it would 
seem that it might have been possible to take a strong stand against certain 
specific Administration policies. Perhaps there was a. real fear that Repub-
lican voting had not been with the trend of public opinion even among the 
party's own rank and file. 
Late in 19̂ -1 the Administration asked for the repeal first of Section 6 
and later of Sections 2 and 3 of the Neutrality Act of 1939. This action would 
permit the arming of American merchantmen and their sailing to belligerent 
^"Time. August 18, 1941, pp. 13-14 
^Ibid.. p. 18 
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ports and into combat areas. Republican opinion as voiced in the polls taken 
by the American Institute of Public Opinion v/as initially divided almost 
equally for and against this further relaxation of neutrality. In a. survey 
made in October, forty-nine percent of Republican voters said "yes," and forty-
four percent "no," in response to a question stating t>'e proposed change.0" 
In November fifty-nine percent favored repeal while only thirty-four percent 
were opposed,0? 
A further development of the neutrality debate was the intreduction of an 
amendment to the bill by Senators Warren Austin, Styles Bridges, and Chan 
Gurney for complete repeal of the Neutrality Act. This was apparently an 
attempt by this small interventionist group in the Senate to seize the initia-
tive not only from the rest of the party but from the Democrats as well. At 
least it was so hailed by Mr. Willkie, v/ho supported it by releasing a state-
ment, signed by leading Republicans in forty states—including six Republican 
Governors and twenty-six members of the National Committee in favor of this 
amendment: 
"The requirement of America today is for a forthright, direct 
international policy designed to encompass the destruction of 
totalitarianism by whatever means necessary. This policy should be 
presented to us by our elected lepder forcibly and not in doses 
as if we were children... 
"Millions upon millions of Republicans are resolved that the 
ugly smudge of obstructive isolationism shall be removed from the 
face, of their party... 
"Congress is now considering certain modifications to an act 
called the Neutrality Act. This act was not of Republican origin. 
Whatever purpose it may have served originally, it serves no useful 
purpose now...it in effect constitutes an aid to Hitler...proclaims 
our neutrality in a struggle in which neither the people nor Congress 
have shown themselves neutral...and...is preventing the fulfillment 
£°Public Opinion Quarterly. Vol. 6, p. l52 (Spring, I94l) 
6?Ibid. 
of a policy of aid to Britain and her allies which the American 
people overwhelmingly endorse." ° 
This message was sent to all Republican members of Congress, but its 
effect was slight if not nil. The Republicans on the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee submitted a Minority report in which they opposed outright the whole 
idea of the repeal. 
"1. The arming of our merchantmen will not furnish effective 
protection to the crews, 
"2. The proposal is part of an administration plan to destroy 
our neutrality lavs and to put us into war by subterfuge. 
"3. Experience in this war and the last has shown that arming 
merchant ships is an ineffective way to protect the lives of the 
crews and often does more harm than good. 
"4. It is difficult to see how the Navy could now be able to 
furnish arms and gun crews for merchantmen in view of recent state-
ments to the contrary. 
"5. Under international lav, an armed merchantman is a warship, 
subject to attack without warning."0" 
The original House bill provided for repeal of Section ^ (the arming of 
merchantmen) only. On a roll-call vote to recommit this bill to the Committee 
for further hearings the Republicans voted favorably (ll4-37). When the bill 
came back with the Senate amendments repealing Sections 2 and 3 as well, the 
Republicans voted against acceptance of the Senate version (137-22). 
In the Senate twenty-one Republicans voted solidly for all the limiting 
amendments, against the Committee amendments, and against the resolution on 
final passage. Senators Ball, Bridges, Gurney, and Austin voted exactly the 
opposite on every roll call. Senator Earbour voted once with the majority, 
68Time, November 3, 1941, pp. 16-17 
°9H. Rent. No. 1267. 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (Oct. 15, l94l), p. 10 
and Brewster joined the minority on the final roll call. Senators White ana 
Burton, who were often found with the Austin group, voted solidly with the 
majority. 
Sena.tor Ball's comment on the session a.s a whole seems apt: In so far 
as they can do so, Republican Representatives and Senators in the Congress 
have committed the GOP to the isolationist, America-first camp, and if they 
have their way, the party will stand or fall with that cause in 1942 and 
19^..."' That there would continue to be a division in Republican ranks 
over foreign policy appeared certain. In general those Republicans who had 
consistently opposed the Administration foreign policy v/ere still opposed, 
while those who had supported an interventionist policy were prepared to support 
the latest developments of that policy. The interventionist senators had really 
embraced most of the Administration's program. Each from time to time attempted 
to show how he was really an opponent of the Administration and thus deserved 
to be considered a Republican. But they were not convincing, or at least it 
was impossible to ascertain a position on which they could agree that v/as 
opposed to the Administration's policy. They mi^ht well be foes of Roosevelt 
on other issues, but they were not on foreign policy. Clearly, also, the 
minority v/ould have to be called "bolters" so far as the Congressional party 
was concerned. The majority position of the party in both houses was too 
clear to mistake. The claim of the minority to being Republicans on foreign 
policy had to rest on their opinion that large numbers of Republican voters, 
also, supported the President's course in international affairs. That this 
was a valid claim was indicated froa the results of the polls, a survey of 
?°Joeeph Ball, "This Month in Congress," The Republican, December, 1941, 
p. 18 
Republican leaders,71 and the fact that a number of members of the National 
Committee supported Administration measures which were being bitterly opposed 
by Republican leaders in Congress. In Congress, however, leadership and con-
trol rested with those dedica.ted to keeping America disentangled from the wars 
in Europe and Asia. (Figure VI) (Figure VII) 
?!A poll of more than 9,000 Republican Party leaders conducted by the 
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Figure VI: Republican voting on Foreign Policy Issues in the Senate; 
77th Cong., 1941; as compared with the record of Sen. William 













Figure VII: Republican voting of foreign policy issues in the House 
of Representatives; 77th Congress; 1941; as compared with the 
record of Congressman Noah M. Mason of Illinois 
CHAPTER III 
WAR-TI!-:B COOPERATION 
The Republican leadership responded without question to the challenge of 
Pearl Harbor. It was not necessary for them to make political soundings. The 
Minority Leader of the House of Representatives, Joseph W. Martin, said, "There 
is only one party when it comes to the integrity and honor of the country." 
Charles McNary, Republican floor leader in the Senate, said, "The Republicans 
will all go along...with whatever is done."1 Mr, Hamilton Fish, an ardent 
isolationist, announced that he would take the floor to urge the American 
people to present a united front in support of the Fresident, and, he continued, 
"if there is a call for troops, I expect to offer my services to a combat 
division. ,Ur 
Representative Charles Eaton, later ranking Republican on the House For-
eign Affairs Committee, called the White House to say, "I am an old-time 
Yankee, and when people start shoving us around, I'm ready to shove back. We're 
going to have a united nation now." Other comments were in a similar vein: 
Senator Arthur Vandenberg, an isolationist Presidential aspirant in 1940: 
"I have fought every trend v/hich leads America to needless war. But v/h.en war 
comes to us, I stand for the swiftest and most invincible answer."3 Senator 
Warren Austin, leading pre-war internationalist: "There should be. a vacation 
on politics, and the vote on the war resolution should be unanimous."11' Senator 
Taft said he could see a declaration of war as the only course, 




Mr. Alf Landon wrote to the President: "There is an imperative need for 
courageotis, unified, action by the American people. The Japanese attack leaves 
no choice. Nothing must be permitted to interrupt our victory over the foreign 
foe. Please command me in any way I can be of service."^ Wendell Willkie: "I 
have not the slightest doubt as to what a united America should and will do.ne> 
A New York Times editorial on December 9 summed it upS 
"Congress has spoken—no, thundered—its ansv/er to the madness 
of Japan. With a. swiftness of action never before achieved in the 
whole history of this country and a unanimity of mind and spirit 
which for all practical purposes is complete, the challenge of the 
treacherous fiend that now becomes the mortal foe has been accepted. 
Gone is every sign of partisanship in the Capitol of the United 
States. Gone is every trace of hesitancy and indecision. There 
are no party lines today in Congress."7 
This v/as the situation after Pearl Harbor. It was a high point of national 
unity. There v/as to be a united and non-partisan prosecution of the war. But, 
that was as far as non-partisanship would go. There was to be no bipartisan 
war cabinet and certainly no automatic agreement on vhat kind of a foreign 
policy should grow out of or follow the end of the war. Senator Ball, v/ho was 
observing from the halls of Congress, was cerhaps most aware of this in Feb-
ruary 1942: 
"Although the Japanese attack united America in our war effort, 
it has already become clearly apparent that it did not by any means 
settle the basic foreign policy issue tha.t dominated the national 
political scene and Congress during 1940-1941. That issue has merely 
b6en shelved for the time being, and it is this writer's conviction 
that sooner or later it must be decided by the people acting either 
in a. na.tional election or in the conventions of the great political 
parties... 
"Perhaps so far as the people v/ere concerned this issue was 
decided against isolation by Pearl Harbor. But so far as the political 
5Ibid. 
6lbid. 
7lbid., Dec. 9, I94l, p. 30 
leaders of the people in Congress are concerned, there is plenty of 
evidence that isolationism is not e dead issiie but merely put on the 
shelf until a more opportune time to argue it...so far as this writer 
has noticed, no isolationist leader has pu.blicly, or even privately, 
admitted he or she was in error, and plenty of them privately argue 
that the interventionist policy v/as responsible for Japan's attack.""' 
On December 11 Senator Tobey asked for information on Pearl Harbor losses, 
for a. Congressional investigation of what happened, and for the removal of Mr. 
Knox as Secretary of the Navy, On December l6 Senator Vandenberg wrote a letter 
to President Roosevelt asking his opinion on creating a joint Congressional 
committee to advise with him on the prosecution of the war. Mr. Vandenherg 
said his proposal was r.ot to interfere with the President's prerogative of 
conducting the war but rather to satisfy Congressional responsibility. 
As can be seen from the above statements and actions, the Republicans v/ere 
casting about in the early days of the war to find out what kind of a role an 
opposition party can play under war conditions. On December 2l Representative 
Martin, Hause Minority Leader, called off indefinitely a meeting of State 
Chairman and Vice Chairmen called for January 12 in Washington. In taking this 
action he said: 
"The new cenditions have persuaded me that a postponement of 
that meeting is desirable. A little later conditions will be clari-
fied so that we can better determine the course to pursue...the 
entrance of the United States into the World War has altered the 
political question, 
"The Republican Party will support President Roosevelt to a man 
in the war effort, but it expects Senatorial, Congressional, and 
State elections to be held next year, and it v/ill fight to win. We 
must retain the two-party system,"° 
Senator Styles Bridges of the internationalist group declared in a radio 
broadcast that, "The function of the Republican party at this time should be 
support without hesitation and v/ith all the energies at their command for the 
8Joseph Ball, "This Month in Congress," The Republican, Feb., 1942, 
PP. 17-18 
9New York Times. Dec. 22, 1941, p. 10 
prosecution of this war... We should be the constructive party of the opposi-
tion. This should be done in a way which will not impede the progress of the 
war. I think it essential that v/e have a two-party system in this country, 
and I am going to do my part to make it a strong minority party."!0 
In spite of the urgings of the National Committee Chairman, Joseph W. 
Martin, that Lincoln Day celebrations be turned from Republican Party rallies 
into great patriotic demonstrations, the speeches celebrating Lincoln's birth-
day gave Republican leaders of all shades of opinion an opportunity to discuss 
further what they thought the party could dc in wartime, ilr. Landon, speaking 
to Republican members of the House and Senate, criticized the New Deal's 
handling of the war especially in matters of production.!! He deplored, too, 
the statement of Edward J, Flynn, Democratic National Chairman, in which he 
said that "no misfortune except a. major defeat could befall this country to 
the extent involved in the election of z. Congress hostile to the President."l^ 
Mr. Martin on this occasion agreed with Landon on vigorous support of the 
President in prosecution of the war. Both insisted that the major function of 
members of Congress in wartime, whether they were Republicans or Democrats, 
was to voice constructive criticism which would help the Executive conduct the 
war effort more efficiently and effectively: "I venture to say," Mr. Martin 
added, "no opposition party has ever given more complete support than v/e have 
to President Roosevelt during the war period. While we cooperate with the 
President to win the war, v/e must keep alive the two-party system of 
government.. ."1-5 
10Ibid.. Dec. 9, 1941, p. 39 
11Ibid.. Feb. 12, 1942, p. 21 
l2Radio Address, Feb. 2, 1942 
!3New York Times. Feb. 12, 194:2, p. 21 
55 
On the same day Ilr. Willkie made a speech in which vfs contained a lengthy 
analysis of vrhat he conceived ought to be the role cf the party. Essentially 
his advice was that the opposition offered bv the Republican party ought not 
to be purely negati-e. The party should keep free to develop affirmative pro-
grams uud cooperate v,ith the Administration v/here possible. A negative policy, 
he maintained, "permits the maioiity to dictate not only its own, but its 
opposition's course. It can establish its policies v/ith the assurance that the 
Linority will shew up punctiliously on the other side...Now I want the Repub-
lican party to be a free agent—free to develop its own policies—free to stand 
on the side of sound thinking and right whoever may espouse it, or whoever may 
oppose it... The two-party system can be preserved only if the Republican party 
becomes e :d regains a constructive force. Let us do more proposing thar opposing, 
Let us exercise our freedom bv developing our own policl*. *.. "1^ 
In the course of U.e far the Republicans did, as a matter of fact, devote 
a great deal of attention to developing constructi\e policies. In early 1942, 
however, their attention was turned more exel jsivoly to the elections coming 
up in November. in another Lincoln Day speech Kr. Clarence Budir^ton Inland, 
Fxecutive Director of Publicity of the Republican TVtieral Comiiittee, .-.r̂ ued 
that a wartime recess ii. politics would mean "the destruction of the two-party 
sybter , the erectior of the tyranny of the O-ie-pprty "vsten, and the dis-
appearance of the republic. To rane American believes that elections will be 
suspended, delayed, or abolished for the duration of the war. There will be 
elections. But to state that there v ill be sl^ctiojc, -nd at the same tii.e 
4o urge _.oliticrl ui it '. if to .-t ̂ te an abs-irditv. If there is political unity, 
an election is a fai-ce. "1^ 
14Ibid. , Feb. 13, 1942, p. 1 
IJIbid., p. 15 
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At a meeting of the Republican National Committee in C h i c ^ o , A- r i l 20-21, 
e s t ruggle ensued over the :.-*soluii / r. to ve adopted as p a r t y po l i cy . Several 
of the p a r t y ' s l e ade r s spoke out in advance of the meeting or whet they f e l t 
the comii.ittea's course :>f oc t ion should be . Governor Dev/ey f e l t that the one 
th ing tc be avoided was a s tn iggle over the wording of a l e s o l u t i o n and urged 
only an cu'fort to uni te the pa r ty in support of the war ^i-d develop an "American 
doc t r ine f o r . . . m a i n t a i n i n g the peace t h e r e a f t e r . " 1 0 
Although not present r\t the ireotii:^, 'AX. Wil lkie , however, submitted a 
r e so lu t i on v/hich, in addi t ion to svp^or t in? the. v/f r ?f for t u n t i l an ' 'absolute 
and i r revocable v i c t o r y " v.t.s gained, would a l so pledge the pa r ty to "undertske 
now ^nd in the fu ture whatever j u s t and reasonable i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s 
may be demanded in a modern world reduced in s ize and bound together by a i r -
plane, ~by r ad io , by mass product ion, by a l l the close i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s of inven-
t i o n and indus t ry v/hich v/e Americans have done so much to c r ea t e , to the end 
tha t our own l i b e r t y may be preserved, t ha t f r ee i n s t i t u t i o n s and a f ree v/ay 
of l i f e may be- supported and enccurs-gt-.i. in the r e s t of the world, and the t the 
b l i g h t i n g and dep.tructi.ve process of w-.-r may not again be forced on us and 
f ree and peace- loving peoples of t h i s ea r th by tyrannour Repressors opera t ing 
not by the ru le of law, but by the ru le of force . . . ' ' ! •' 
Senator T a f t ' s proposals were r e s t r i c t e d to s t rong support of the war 
e f fo r t with emphasis on the need for a "vigorous minori ty" with a "vigorous 
and independent p o l i c y . " ! 8 Taft sa id he did not think anyone knew enough about 
l^Ibid., April 22, I9i»2, p. 1°, 
l?Ibid., April 20, 1942, p. 11 
l8IbiJ,.. P- 1 
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what conditions at the end of the war v/ould be to permit a policy statement by 
the Committee on post-war policy. He also expressed his belief that the National 
Committee could not commit the party to any policy. A platform put forward ~by 
Senator C. Wayland Brooks of Illinois and backed by Colonel McCormick, editor 
and publisher of the Chicago Tribune, similarly pledged all to the war effort 
and to the preservation of the two-party system.19 
Meanwhile, the Chicago Tribune spoke up v/ith some sharp words about Mr. 
Willkie's attempt to exert his leadership: 
"While custom gives the party's lact nominee for President the 
privilege of offering his advice, custom does not apply to Mr. 
Willkie. He is not a. Republican. He deserted the principles of the 
party that nominated him even before the election, and any advice 
he may offer can be considered only in the light of the betrayal 
that that desertion involved."2^ 
However, the Willkie sentiment prevailed to the- f^tent that this paragraph 
wa.s included in the final resolution: 
"V/e realise that after this war the responsibility of the nation will 
not be circumscribed within the territorial limits of the United 
States; that our nation has an obligation to assist in bringing about 
understanding, comity, and cooperation among the nations of the world 
in order that our own liberty may be preserved a.nd the blighting and 
destructive processes of war may not again be forced upon the free and 
peace-loving peoples of the earth."21 
Mr. Willkie hailed this declaration as an abandonment of isola.tionism by 
the Republican party, while Taft said that the committee had successfully 
eliminated the reference in the V/illkie proposal to responsibilities which 
sounded to him like another League of Nations. It was known that Dewey had 
instructed his friends on the committee to support the Willkie resolution, and 
after the meeting had adjourned, Dewey said, "I am delighted, of course."2^ 
I9lhid. 
2 0 Ibid. 
21Ibid_., April 21, 1942, p. 13 
22James Hagerty in New York Times. April 22, 1942, p. 18 
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The resolution was favorably greeted by such widely opposed figures a£ Represent-
ative Hamilton Fish and Secretary of State Cordell Hull, 
In a sense, the struggle at Chicago may be considered the openin • up of 
the great new issue destined to dominate Republican (and rational) foreign 
policy thinking through the war and into the port-var years—-the role of the 
United States in world politics following the end of V.orld War II. For some 
time to cone e\rery party meeting, declaration, or vote in Congress dealing 
v/ith foreign affairs would become a test of strength between those who would 
restrict and those who would expand the role of the United States on the inter-
national scene, or later, between those who would oppose and those who would 
follow the Democratic Administration's lead in foreign policy. This study is 
in the main devoted to an analysis of the relative strength of the t'-'O groups 
from year to year as well as to ai> investigation of their maneuvers and 
changing doctrines. 
It has previously been shown that the same two groups existed prior to 
the appearance of this great issue, ^ue division which appeared in Republican 
ranks over intervention before Pearl Hprbor was the framework in v/hich the new 
struggle began. It may have appeared momentarily that the war had obliterated 
not only the cid issue but the old equities. It is true that never again v/ould 
a Republican claim the title of an isolationist in the same cense as did 
Senator Nye, but this same group, net so unwise as to oppose the war effort, 
began immediately to resist the efforts of the interventionists to take advan-
tage of the high tide of internationalist sentiment to commit the party to a 
post-war course of broad participation in world affairs. 
II 
The issue of post-war participation raised at the April meeting of the 
National Committee became immediately important in the choice of Republican 
candidates to run in the November elections. By July of 1.942 the public 
opinion polls showed that seventy percent of avowed Republican voters favored 
the United Stater joining a league of nations after the war, and in December 
tha.t sixty-nine percent favored, taking steps now to set up such an organization 
with our allies.23 
Whether Mr. V/illkie himself wielded a corresponding"'y greater influence 
in the party or not is questionable, but his supporters of the internationalist 
wing felt strong enough to attempt to influence the selection of Republican 
congressional candidates in certain areas. Some of these Republicans v/ere 
said to-feel, that the test of a congressman's suitability to serve in wartime 
should be determined by his pre-war attitudes on certain issues such as neutral-
ity relaxation, selective service, and lend-lease.2"" One may wonder where they 
proposed to find a, very large number of Republican congressmen who had voted, 
the "V/illkie line" on there issues. 
The most notable attempt to unseat an isolationist Republican was in the 
26th district of New York, whare Ht.'iilton Fish v/as seeking renomination. Fish's 
record had been isolationist almost to the uoirt of being pro-Axis. Further, 
he was the ranking Republican member on the House Foreign Affairs Committee 
and v/ould be its chairman were the Republicans to win a majority in the House. 
Both Mr. Deiirey and Mr. Willkie openly opposed Fish's renomination, but he was 
both nominated and elected. As a result of the 1942 elections, the Republicans 
gained eight Senate seats and lost none, giving them a total of thirty-eight. 
Among the new Republican Senators elected, only three found their places 
in the extreme groups on foreign policy. Senators Moore of Oklahoma and Wherry 
23publlc Opinion Quarterly. Vol. 6, pp. 491•and 66l, (Winter, 1942) 
2^W. H. Lawrence, in New York Times, April 19, 1942, IV, p. 7 
of Nebraska joined the group of Johnson, Shipstead, Langer, and Butler v/ho 
steadfastly maintained the extreme non-interventionist position in constant 
opposition to the Administration's efforts to lead the United States into ever 
wider participation in world politics and international organization. Senator 
Ferguson of Michigan, on the other hard, nearly matched the voting record of 
his colleague, Arthur Vandenberg, in the latter's efforts to create a "biparti-
san foreign nolicy in cooperation with the Administration. The remainder of 
the Class of '42 was generally found voting somewhere in the middle of the 
road, although usually favoring the isolationist side. This group included 
Senators Buck of Delaware, Wilson of Iowa., Hawkes of New Jersey, Bushfield of 
South Dakota, Revercomb of West Virginia, and Robertson of Wyoming. House 
Republican strength was increased by the 1942 elections from l65 to 203, a 
strong come-back even for an off-year ballot. 
The voting patterns in the 78th Congrecr show a sharp revercal of those 
of before the v/ar, and for this reason are probably misleading. It is true 
that Pearl Harbor v/as probably the most important single event in the conver-
sion of Republicans from isolationism to internationalism, but it is doubtful 
that there had really been a change of the magnitude reflected in Figures I 
and II. The roll-call vote? of this Congress were few in number and the 
sentiment of wartime wa.s running high. Further, seven of the Senate votes 
used in the compilation corcerned high-level appointments in the State Depart-
ment on which there is normally little opposition, acid if these are excluded 
from the scale, the results are those shown in Figure III, which probably gives 
a more accurate picture of vhp.t was going on in the Congressional party. 
Turning to a closer examination of foreign policy issues coming up in 
Congress during the war, it is evident that there were actually very few 
decisions made in Congress on immediate problems facing the country. Our 
foreign policy was war—all the Republicans with, the exception of Jeannette 
Rankin (Montana), an ardent pacifist, voted for our declaration of vrr ngainst 
Japa.r, Germany, Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania. There were other non-
controversial bills pa.ss.ed through Congress to v/hich the political "conr-f^BUs" 
extended. In addition, there was the reciprocal trade extension in 1943 which 
will be considered later.2-' There were r. variety of other measures touching 
foreign policy in the 78th Congress, including extension of Lend Lease on 
which the Republicans voted as follows: 
In Favor Opposed 
Senate House Senate House 
1943- 33 195 0 6 
1944- 31 156 1 24 
A major issue on which there was considerable debate and several roll-call 
votes v/as the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency, which was largely 
financed by the United States and which distributed aid to stricken areas in 
the war zones. In addition to many Republicans' general opposition to the 
distribution of American funds abroad, there were charges that aid was being 
distributed in some areas of eastern Europe so as to serve the ends of the 
Communist movements in certain countries. 
When the bill to authorize $1,350,000,000 for UNRRA ovcae before the 
Senate in 1944, there was a concerted effort l) to reduce the amount to be 
authorized, and Z) to grant the funds on the condition that none would be used 
for "the pro-notion of any educational, religiour,, or political program in any 
country in which rehabilitation is carried on." The Republicans in the Senate 









Figure I: Republican voting on foreign policy issues in the House 
of Representatives; 78th Congress; 19*0-1944; as compared v/ith 
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Figure II: Republican voting on foreign policy issues in the Senate; 
78th Congress; 1943-1944; as compared with the record of Senator 
William Langer of North Dakota 
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voted (lo-R) against a proposed cut of ;tl,000,000,000 in the amount authorized, 
but supported (23-l) placing the aforementioned, condition on the grant.20 In 
the House Republican voting on roll-call -votes was more favorable than unfavor-
able toward continued strong support of the UHRRA program, although the votes 
were widely scattered between complete opposition and complete support. 
Ill 
The trends of foreign policy opinion in the Republican party during World 
War II, however, cannot, to & very great e::tent, be ascertained by the party's 
roll-call voting in Congress. Contention within the part;-- was largely centered 
on the issue of American participation in international affairs after the end 
of the war. Victories and defeats for one group or the other were measured in 
terms of the wording of resolutions adopted, the views of men chosen to certain 
positions, or the nomination and election of candidates whose leanings were 
toward "isolationism" or "internationalism". The lines v/ere much more fluid 
than before Pearl Harbor, and, as we have seen by voting in Congress, neither 
group could claim that its view represented Republican foreign policy. Trior 
to 194-2 one could at least say with some certainty that the Republican con-
gressional party stood for non-intervention. 
In view of the confusion and the impossibility of predicting on v/hich side 
of an issue a majority of Republicans would be found, it is particularly 
interesting to note the unusual efforts which v/ere made during this period to 
form a long-range, systematic policy on issues which would face the country 
when the war ended, iilvery party gathering felt obliged to declare itself on 
this issue, resolutions were introduced into Congress, and special study groups 
v/ere formed and submitted reports. 
Cong. Record. Vol. 90, pp. 1826-1828, (78th Cong., 2nd Sess., Feb. 17, 1944) 
It has beor. noted above how the main problem in writing a National 
Committee Resolution in the spring of 1942 was to reach an agreement on a 
statement of post-war policy. The Declaration of policy adopted by House Re-
publicans in September of the same year contained a paragraph on the same issue 
which was meaningful only in that it showed clearly the disagreement and division 
within the ranks. -' This statement had been drawn up over a period of mouths 
by a group under the leadership of Representative J. William Ditter (Pennsyl-
vania), Chairman of the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee. In this 
group v/ere Clifford R. Hope (Kansas), Albert E. Carter (California), Everett 
M. Dirksen (Illinois), Richard B. Wiggle sworth (Massachusetts), and John M. 
Robsion (Kentucky), each of whom drew up ten noints which he thought ought to 
be included. The drafts were, then pooled and submitted to the Republican 
Conference v/hich adopted it by what Minority Leader Martin called an "almost 
unanimous" vote. 
When the National Committee met in St. Louis after the election (December 
8), the contest for a new Chairman to succeed Joceph W. Martin v/as fought out 
largely on foreign policy grounds. The early favorite for the position was 
Werner W. Schroeder, Illinois National Committeeman, who had the backing of 
the Chicago Tribune, but there were other contenders including Frank 3. Crannet, 
a Rochester, New York, newspaper publisher and ex-congressman John B. Hollistsr 
of Ohio. A late entrant in the race was Fred Eaker, a.cting committeeman, from 
Washington, who showed surprising strength in the final showdown. 
^'"We recognize that the United States has an obligation and responsibility 
to work with other na.tions to bring about a world understanding and cooperative 
spirit which will have for its objective the continued maintenance of peace. 
In so doing, we must not endanger our own independence, weaken our American way 
of life or our system of government," Quoted from New York Times. Sept. 23, 
1942, p. 3 
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Altl ough V/illkie was not present et the meeting, the party's titular 
leader vas determined to prevent the election of a chairman who was so clearly 
isolationist as Schroeder. He v/as careful not to endorse cny specific candi-
date for fear that his endorsement would he1 p tc solidify his opposition, but 
as the tine for the meeting neared, the internationalists a.pyjeared to be rallying 
to Baker. 
Schroeder earns to the meeting claiming to have S5 or 60 votes, and refusing 
to listen to pl.ea.s from Martin and others that he withdraw to avoid the fight 
that vas almost certain to come from the Willkie forces under the prodding of 
Willkie's assistant, Lemoyne A. Jones. Hour after hour i<-as spent in an effort 
to reach a compromise, but when the voting began in the afternoon of December 3, 
the Committee was split wide open. The first ballot gave Schroeder 40 votes; 
Baker 4r>; Harrison Spangler, Iowa Committeeman, 15; (Jennet 3; Mattingly 
(Missouri) 1; with 4 passes. On the second poll Schroeder slipped to 3?- votes, 
Baker increased his vote to 43, Spangler got 15, Garnet 4, and Mattingly 1. 
This slight shift seemed to doom Schroeder's chances, and Carroll Reece 
of Tennessee, who had voted for him, moved, for a half-hour recess. After 
earnest consultation, Schroeder and Baker ar-ounced. to the reconvened committee 
that they v/ere both withdrawing in favor of Harrison Spangler, and asked all 
their friends to support him. Accordingly the Ic/a/a \<t s unanimously elected, 
and. a triumph for V/illkie v/as proclaimed by the Chicago Tribune, although it 
changed its mind in a later edition and ridiculed any such idea. Others, how-
ever, continued to claim it a- such, including Willkie v/ho s;aid, "A person 
should r.ot boa.pt of victory. "2° 
28?rnv Tork Times, Dec. 3, 1942, p. 1 
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It seemed doubtful, however, that on foreign X'̂ licy viev/s Sparkler was 
a great deal closer to Willkie's ideas than was -"-hroeJcr. The new chairman 
claimed that he b.-d had no part :'.:. lie Isolationist-interventionist debate of 
1941, but he felt that come who opposed entry into the war were activated by 
patriotic r.c lives. He believed tha.t the United States would have certain 
post-v,ar obligations, but he did not know jn^t what t?-.ey would be. 
"...We haven't the same world, with the --odem bomber, that v/e 
had in the days of the 30-knot battleship. You no longer can say 
that the Atlantic and Psciiic Oceans pre moats around America. 
"My job is to build up an army of voters- in the United Statse 
to defeat the New Deal, ard I don't thir.k tb.niv; î r any votes in 
China, or i-ion̂ clia, or Russia that I car. .;« I: for the Republicans."^" 
The Committee itself dodged a. foreign policy debate by reaffirming the 
resolution of the April meeting. Curiously, this reaffirmation v/as i..cved by-
Senator Taft v/ho had. once called the April declaration "a. great mistake. "-^ 
In June of 194 3 the new chairman announced the appointment of a Post-War 
Advisory Council of forty-nine members to develop "a realistic peacetime pro-
gram for American progress."3b In making the announcement, Spangler issued 
the following statement: 
"Although the winning of the war is our first concern., the 
Republican Party is intensely interested in the. tjr.npr.dous problems, 
both, foreign and dcnestic, which will face us when victory comes. 
They will arise as an aftermath of the vpr, accentuated oy our ten-
year debacle under the reactionary New Deal. They will call for 
the wisest statesmanship and the best and most patriotic efforts 
. of all our citizens. 
29Ibid.. p. 26 
30iicuoants of the St. Louis meeting are found in T. R. B. , "The GOP Starts 
to Plan,", NPW Republic. Dec. 21, 1942, pp. 821-323; and in the New York Times. 
Dec. 3, 1942, P. 23; Dec. 4, 19L2, p. 21; Dec. 5, 1942, P. 32; Dec. 6, 1942, 
p. 46; Dec. 7. 194-2, p. 1; Dec. 3, 1942, p. 1; Dec. 13, 1942, Section IV, p. 10. 
31Ibid.. June 1, 1943, p. 1 
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"The problems of lasting world peace must be met courageously and 
realistically. We must approach this in a. spirit of friendly coopera-
tion with the other nations of the world, keeping in mind the welfcre 
of our country. "-?2 
Spangler raid the council was organised with the cooperation of the con-
gressional party's leaders, Senator McNary and Representative Martin. He 
stressed that the group v/as chosen from the "elected" representatives of the 
Republican party, but added that all Republicans v/ould be consulted, including 
Willkie, Landon, and Hoover. In addition to six members of the National 
Committee and the chairmen of the Senatorial and Congressional Campaign Commit-
tees (Senator John G. Townsend of Delaware and Representative J. William 
Ditter of Pennsylvania), there were twenty-four Republican governors, five 
Senators, and twelve Congressional representatives.33 Some sort of a middle 
course had been followed in the selection of the "forty nine", but it was 
generally felt that the pre-war isolationists were predominant. From the 
Senate the balance was apparently quite even. Senators McNary and Austin 
clearly represented divergent positions while Hawkes and Vandenberg (now veer-
ing sharply toward internationalism) could be said to balance each other. 
Senator Taft was from the middle of th* road. From the House of Representa-
tives, however, none of the few pre-war interventionists was chosen, although 
32Ibid. 
33Members of the National Committee were C. B. Kelland (Arizona), K. 
Leonard (Colorado), Mrs. B. Eaur (Illinois), Mrs. ?. C. Hay (Michigan), D. 
Whetstone (Montana), H. A. Smith (later an internationalist Senator from New 
Jersey). The Governors were Warren (Cal.), Yivan (Col.), Baldwin (Conn.), 
Bacon (Del.), Bottolfsen (Idaho), Green (ill.), Tlickenlooper (lov/e), Schoeppel 
(Kans.), Sewall (Me.), Saltonstall (Mass.), Kelly (Mich.), Thye (Minn.), 
Donnell (Mo.), Ford (Mont.), Griswold (Neb.), Blood (N.H.), Dewey (N.Y.), 
Bricker (Ohio), Snell (Ore.), Martin (Pa.), Sharpe (S.D.), Langlie (Wash.), 
Goodland (Wis.) 
Frances P. Bolton (Ohio) and Edith No-arse Rogers (Massachusetts) later had 
internationalist records. Others appointed from the House v/ere the Minority 
Leader, Joseph W. Martin, Jr. (Massachusetts), Albert E. Carter (Colorado), 
Everett M. Dirkeen (Illinois), Roy C. Woodruff (Michigan), Louis E. Miller 
(Missouri), Charles Hallack (Indiana), Clifford R. Hope (Kansas), August H. 
Andresen (Minnesota), Daniel A. Reed (New York), Carroll 2. Reece (Tennessee). 
The Council divided itself into subcommittees for the. study of various 
segments of post-war policy. These were supplied with research and clerical 
aids, and they were to continue their studies over a period of months. The 
Council was to make a. report to the National Committee prior to the 1.944 con-
vention. It v/as believed, that perhaps the nev/ group could keep the smoldering 
intra-party controversy over post-war issues from breaking into full flames 
at or before the convent ion. 3 ̂  Plans v/ere made for a meeting of the Council 
on Mackinac Island in September, and before that time, as well as during that 
famous conference, the ears of the country v/ere deluged (and no d.oubt confused) 
by a steady stream of statements, bold and hedged, on what American post-war 
foreign policy should be. 
That extreme positions v/ould be held by some of the Council members at 
the Mackinac meeting was taken for granted, and the chief problem was, a.s 
always, one of reconciliation. The job of bringing this about seemed, to fall 
chiefly to Senators Vandenberg and Taft. 
There, v/as a wide variety of proposals under corsideration. Senators Van-
denberg and White v/ere the sponsors of a. resolution in the Senate which set 
three, aims : "(l) the prosecution of the war to conclusive victory; (2) the. 
participation of the United States in post-war cooperation between nations 
3%ew York Times. June 1, 194 3, p. 1 
(sovereign) to prevent, by any necessary moans, the recurrence of military 
aggression, and to establish permanent peace with justice in a free world; (3) 
the present examination of thece aims, so far as consistent v/ith the united 
war effort, and their ultimate achievement by due constitutional process and 
v/ith faithful recognition of American interests. "35 
Meanwhile another resolution had be^n introduced into the Senate by Ball 
(Republican, of Minnesota), Burton (Republican, of Ohio), Hill (Democrat, of 
Alabama), and Hatch (Democrat, of New Mexico), and from the coincidence of 
these aien's names it became known as the B2R"2 Resolution. These senators, 
supported by, perhaps, eight or ten others, wanted the Senate to go one step 
further than that envisioned by the Vandenberg-White resolution by endorsing 
an international police force: 
"...an International authority.. .v/ith authority to settle inter-
national disputes peacefully, and v/ith power, including military 
force, to suppress military aggression and to preserve the peace 
of the world."36 
A group known as the Republican Post-War Policy Association, with approx-
imately 300 members and headed by Deneen A. Watson, a Chicago lawyer who had 
been Speaker of the Illinois House of Representatives, favored a strong inter-
nationalist statement. Watson sent an elever.-point program of the essentials 
of a post-war foreign policy which in general favored the utmost degree of 
post-war collaboration among nations. The program included: 
"Establishment of a Council of Nations, with the United Nations 
as a. nucleus, to prevent by force the rise of new forms of aggression 
and to solve by peaceful methods world-wide problems. In this air-
plane-shrunken world, most of our great economic and social problems 
are world-wide.... It is obvious that the loose international relation-
ships of the past which relied upon alliances and balance-of-pov/sr 
politics are no longer adequate. The plain truth of the matter is 
350hicago Tribune. Sept. 5, 194 3, p. 5 
3^Newsweek. Nov. 8, 19^3, v. 35 
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that the world is a large community of nations, approaching unity, 
but without any practical form of government to handle world affairs. 
In the creation of such a Council of Nations, we must start slowly, 
v/ith limited powers, and gradually develop permanent machinery.... 
"Establishment of a World Court to adjudicate international 
disputes. 
"Creation of an international police force to restrain aggression, 
such force to be composed of armed forces of members of the Council 
of Netions, and subject to call of council only when needed...."37 
V/illkie supporters, of course, worked constantly for a similar end, and counted 
among their numbers such Council members as Senator Austin and Governor 'Baldwin 
of Connecticut. 
On the eve of the conference Governor Dewey surprised the Council members 
by proposing an outright continuing military alliance between the United Sta+es 
ard C-.-eat Britain to keep the peace after the end of the war. He said he 
hoped that Russia and China might be brought into a four-way arrangement. 
Immediately this plan had its backers among the Dewey men and threatened, if 
Dewey pressed the point, to spoil the efforts at compromise being made by Van-
denberg and Taft. Taft lost no time in expressing his opposition to the 
Dewey proposal and referred to his own stand againct a British-American mili-
tary alliance. Dewey, however, soon indicated that h? vould not press for 
adoption of this specific suggestion into the conference declaration. 
Lastly, the extreme nationalist wing of the pt-rty was represented on the 
Council by several midv/estern members led by Governor Dv/ight H. Green of 
Illinois and supported by Colonel McCormick of the Chicago Tribune. Green 
announced th?t he hed not come to the conference with any text of a proposal, 
but said that any urogram of post-war action would have to contain safe-guards 
ror our sovereignty, and that any plans would have to be submitted to the 
veterans of the, war: 
37New York Times, Sept. 5, 19-43, p. 1 
"Obviously there murt be correlation between the United States 
and other nations and their peoples, not cnly to prevent recurrence 
of war, but to assure economic and social reconstruction. I hsve 
deliberately chosen to use the word 'correlation' became its internal 
definition means the establishment of mutual or reciprocal 
relationships..."33 
The foreign policy committee at the conference v/t-s corn-nosed of Var.dev.br: g, 
a.c Chairman, Austin, Governors Green of Illinois snd Martin cf Pennsylvania, 
and Representatives Boltun (Chio) and Enton (New Jersey).39 Vandenberg uas 
the mediator and negotiator among the several views presented, and it was 
chiefly his formula v/hich was applied to the drafting cf a resolution. At one 
point in the conference a group of the governors on the Council, apparently-
fearing that the "Washington cabal" v/as too much jn the saddle and that seme 
partisan, yet vague declaration would be adopted, issued a statement calling 
for a positive and non-partisan stand. This "Governors' revolt" vas led by 
Baldwin of Connecticut and vas composed largely of the New England group plus 
Thye of Minnesota. Baldwin proposed that the United States spur.sor a council 
of rations to promote peace after the war, a world court t •> decide justiciable 
disputes between nations, and international military collaboration to enforce 
the decrees of these bodies. 
Following this development, Senator Vandenherg announced that the Committe 
on Foreign Policy would hold open sessiont at which all Council members might 
ask questions and present their views before a final policy statement was 
drafted. To Vanuenberg, however, this apparently was only a temporary delay 
in the working out of his compromise formula. His aim, as he had stated in 
August of this same year, v/as to find: 
38Chicago Tribune. Sept 7, 1943, p. 1 
-^Although Eaton was not appointed to the original Council of Forty Nine, 
he is listed in several accounts as having been active at Mackinac and a 
member of this committee. 
w 
"...a middle ground between those extremists at one end of the 
line who v/ould cheerfully give America away and those extremists at 
the other end of the line v/hc would attempt a total isolation which 
has come to be an impossibility."^ 
The very great extremes represented at this conference were illustrated 
by the Green statement quoted above and a statement by Governor Sewall of 
Maine who said he did not interpret the Mackinac Charter to mean that this 
country v/ould refuse under any and all circumstances to give up a degree of 
sovereignty in affecting an international peace-keeping organization.^1 The 
aim of the isolationists seemed to be to get a declaration against any sacrifice 
of sovereignty and then to define as such a sacrifice any agreement made v/ith 
other nations to submit to jointly-ma.de decisions. On the other hand, many 
internationalists felt we had reached the point where sovereignty in certain 
areas of life must be surrendered to a supra-national authority. It seemed 
entirely possible that the result of these extreme positions would be a non-
committal statement, but Vandenberg's compromise formula was not one of mere 
verbiage such as is so often applied in party platforms to satisfy all factions. 
Vandenberg's was not a. compromise of v/ords, but a middle positicr. in which he 
himself believed, and to which he wanted to commit the party: 
"I am sure (he wrote) v/e can frankly assert our purpose to participate 
in post-war cooperation to prevent by any necessary means the re-
currence, of military aggression and to establish permanent peace with 
justice in a free world so far as this is humanly obtainable. But 
I am equally sure that this ha? to be paralleled by equally forth-
right reassurance to our own American people that ve intend to be... 
vigilant in the preservation of our legitimate American interests... 
I do not believe that these tv/o objectives are incompatible in any 
sense so long as a rule of i-eason' is applied to each.... I think 
we must also emphasize the fact that we intend to maintain our own 
sovereignty in the final analysis. This does not mean that we would 
^°Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., ed., The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg. 
P. 55 
^New York Times. Sept. 8, 194-3, p. 1 
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decline to restrict ourselves in mutual cooperations which are practical 
and useful..."42 
The word "sovereignty" v/as a. bone of contention in drafting the resolution. 
The isolationists wanted it in; the internetionalists wanted it out. The 
final resolution stated it this v/ey: 
"responsible participation by the Unitea Ltates in post-war coopera.-
tive organization among sovereign nations to prevent 'uilitary aggression 
and to attain permanent peace with organized justice in a free world."^3 
Vandenberg wanted the word "sovereign" included and later explained his 
position at the time: 
"V/e yield some element of total sovereignty (in a literal sense) 
every time we make any cooperative treaty with other nations. It has 
been done countless times, and it has never occurred tc anybody that 
we v/ere violating a constitiitional principle (and, of course, we 
weren't). It was only this practical fact which I have sought to 
emphasise in my insistence on the literal word "sovereignty" in the 
Mackinac Charter... I thought I was doing a good Constitutional job. " ^ 
Following the endorsement of an international organization quoted above, 
the Charter continued: 
"In making this recommendation v/e grourd our judgment unon the 
belief that both the foreign policy and the domestic policy of eve re-
count ry are related to each other so closely that each member of the 
United Nations ought to consider b'ith tb* immediate and remote con-
sequences of every proposition with careful regard for (l) its effect 
upon the vital interests of the nation, and (2) its bearing upon the 
forseeable international developments. 
"If there should be a conflict between the two, then the United 
States of America should adhere to the policy which vill preserve 
its constitutionalism as expressed in the Declaration of Independence, 
the Constitution, itself, and the Bill of Rights, as administered 
through our Republican form of Government. Constitutionalism should 
be adhered to in determining the substance of our policies arid shell 
be followed in ways and means of making international commitments."^5 
l2Vandenberg, p. $6 
3̂'Jew York Times. Sept. 7, I9>l3. p. 3 
44vand.enberg, p, 60 
4-%ev; York Times. Sept. 7. 1943, p. 8 
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The idea of an international police force v/as impliedly if not specifically 
rejected: 
"In addition to these things this council advises that peace and 
security ought to be ultimately established upon other sanctions than 
force. It recommends that we work toward a policy w1 ich will compre-
hend other means than war for the determinrtion of international con-
troversy; and the ettainme.it of a. peace tha.t will prevail by virtue 
of its inherent reciprocal interests and its spiritual foundation, 
reached from time to tiur with the understanding of ths peoples of the 
negotiating nations." ° 
Everyone expressed pleasure at the text of the resolution as adopted. 
Governor Green was pleaded v/ith the passage which stressed constitutionalism. 
He regarded this as "an avowal of Americanism as Americanr understand it,"^7 
The Chicago Tribune also rejoiced: 
"The greet conspiracy to stampede the Republicans into the betrayal 
of their country failed utterly because of the firmness of Governor 
Green. At Mackinac he furnished, a rallying point for the general, if 
unorganized common sense of the members of the party's poc-t-wer ad-
visory council.... 
"The declaration for 'responsible participation by the United 
States in post-vsr cooperative organization among sovereign nation?' 
visualized the America of the nationalist Americans. They ^ee the 
strongest nation in the world, and they are conscious of the obliga-
tions to humanity that flow from that power..."^8 
Governors Baldwin and Sewall of the internationalist wing like-wise ex-
pressed satisfaction, although tv3;- sought assurances from Vandenberg that 
some of the vague references to "cooperative organization" really meant a 
definite form of international council, and that the pledge for "organized 
justice" meant in fact some form cf World Court. Vandenberg *rve these assur-
ances. Deneen Watson of the Poet-War Policy Association.voiced his approval, 
and Senator Austin, who rtated that ^P had proposei to file a minority report 
^Ibid. 
^Chicago Tribune. Sept. 8, 1943, p . 1 
4 8 I b i d . . Sept. 10, 194-3, p . 14 
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i f the group hud attempted to "dodge the ques t ion , " s t a ted tha t "wh--?t ve did 
(T"usJuorT-elous, abso lu te ly marvelous. V/e hav» gone fu r the r than we could 
poss ib ly have gone had. v/c continued the f i g h t . ?cr ore th ing , »e got r i d of 
t h a t T erworked word ' c o o p e r a t i o n ' . " ^ Wendell W U M e .-.Id L '.a- 'b. s i : \ . lu 
the r i gh t d i rec t ion ." -& 
Thus, as with so many dec la ra t ions of pol icy, the Mackinac Charter became 
many th ings to many people. I t was, in a sense, t u e f ence-ctradti!ir> tj sor t of 
s tatement , but to Vandenberg, what mounded l i k e o r t r aou le was a p o s i t i o n . The 
extre.--.es or. both s ides of the question had beer, --liminated, Internatio.-i^l co-
operat ion, yes; world s t a t e , no, Cous t ituti 'vr.alie,;,, yes; ir-olal 1 o-iism, no. 
In add!tier, to ivh°l. the antagoiiir-t c of the dp-, bra L<. 'U,?,- i. ront tire Mac! 'i:ac 
Charter , i t Las 'oecr. ha i led by .rcny as Lb,; , -at1- of i so la t ion ism or a r e a l 
t u rn ing -noinc i:: Republican fo re ign policy.-"" I t seems probable that the 
corners had a l ready been turned p r i o r to Mackinac, but cer tc i . r ly ^acirinsc 
seamed to s e t t l e the quest ion as to v/hether the Republicans would support United 
S ta t e s membership in an i n t e r n a t i o n a l o rgan iza t ion . Beyond that probably 
nothing -,/as perraansntly decided. 
IV 
Early in October the House of Representa t ives voted (360-29) for the 
Pulbr ight Resolut ion which was s l i g h t l y more pos i t i ve , but s t i l l qui te vogue, 
on the quest ion of i n t e r n a t i o n a l o rgan iza t ion : 
"Resolved by the House of Repres mutatives Jjh.o ctateme-tj ready tha t 
the Congress hereby expresses i t s e l f as favoring the creat icr . of 
appropr ia te i n t e r n e t i o n n l machinery v/i th pouer adequate to e s t a b l i s h 
?nd to riair.tain a j u r t and l a s t i n g peace a-iong na t ions of the vc r ld , 
^9Kev. York Timf-s, Sept. 9, 1^4-3, p . 3 
5 ° I b i d . , p . 29 
5 1 I b i d . , p . 24 
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and. as favoring participation by the United States therein through 
its Constitutional processes."52 
Of the twenty-nine opposing this resolution, twenty-six v/ere Republicans. 
If this could be taken to mean that all but twenty-six Republicans in the House 
favored a. league of nations, it would indeed be significant. It is more likely, 
however, that it rnuf! be talien to mean, only that all but twenty-six favored our 
participation in "appropriate international machinery," which, might conceivably 
include those v/ho thought that none v/as "aporopriate". 
Following this, the Senate worked out a compromise resolution along lines 
somewhat similar tc the Vandenberg-White resolution introduced previously. The 
compromise suggested by Sena.tor Connally p.nd bearing U s nsm.e included two 
important features of the Republican resolution a.t Mackinac—-sovereignty and 
constitutional process. Attack on the compromise cane not only from the iso-
lationist Republicans, but also from the B2H2 group who wanted a stronger state-
ment in favor of United States participation in a supra-national authority. The 
Resolution v/as, however, finally adopted with minor changes by a vote of 8.5 to 
5. Three of these five were Republicans--Langer, Johnson, and Shipstead. 
In a way this resolution was a more satisfactory stateu'ruit. Surely it 
v/as more specific and may ho taken to indicate support of almost all Republican 
Senators for an international organization of some kind. It v/as the most 
definite commitment yet by Republican leaders of all shades of opinion: 
"...the Senate recognises the necessity of there being established 
at the earliest practicable date a general international organisation, 
based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving 
states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, 
for the maintenance of international peace and security."53 
A final paragraph, of which Senator Raymond Willis of Indiana, vas the author, 
52Newsweek, Oct. 4, 1943, pp. hZ-hh-
-^Text in Vandenberg, p. 64 
stated that any treaty made in pursuance of this resolution must be made only 
"by and with the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States, pro-
vided two-thirds of the Senators present concur,"54 This was aimed at scotch-
ing any attempt on the part of the Administration to seal the country's fate by 
means of an executive agreement, and further, it was designed to defeat the 
efforts of some few Senators to abolish the two-thirds rule for treaty ratifi-
cation. There had been serious proposals to substitute consent to ratification 
either "by a majority of the Senate alone or of both houses. What a different 
climate than that of a decade later in which the Bricker amendment was proposed 
and nearly carried I 
One other very important development on the Congressional scene should be 
briefly mentioned here—the formation and functioning of the so-called "Committee 
of Eight." This was a group of Senators from both parties who met secretly 
and informally in 1944 with the Secretary of State to aid in finding a basis 
on which the Administration could speak with certainty for the United States 
in talks with our allies about the shape of a post-war international organiza-
tion. In March, 1944, Hull appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee to suggest the formation of such a group, no doubt as part of the Ad-
ministration's effort to avoid the charge made against Wilson that he failed 
to consult Congress. 
Senator Vandenberg consulted with Senator Taft on the advisability of such 
a step in an election year. Taft put his ideas into a letter on March 29, 
suggesting that if the cooperation were merely to draw a blueprint for a new 
league, the question was not important. But he added that, if the proposed 
committee were to confer on all matters of foreign policy, Vandenberg should 
5*-Ibid. 
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express willingness to cooperate under certain conditions. These conditions 
Vandenberg accepted and set out in a letter to Connally: 
"None of us would decline for an instant any effective coopera-
tion... We believe there is a serious need for greater liaison...in 
respect to foreign policy... But...the creation of this special com-
mittee should be accompanied by a clear and explicit definition of its 
function and jurisdiction... If it is to deal specifically with the 
application of Cthe committee1 s} studies to our actual peace settle-
ments—and no less an effort would seem to be of much practical ad-
vantage—I respectfully suggest that we should have the understanding 
that we shall be fully informed at all times regarding all the facts 
on which foreign policy depends,..and that the request for this co-
operation should appropriately come from the President himself. 
"It would, of course, be understood that we would not attempt 
or presume to speak for or to bind our minority colleagues to any 
course of subsequent action... If clear and irreconcilable differences 
of opinion should develop,...we would reserve the right to resign,"^ 
As a matter of fact, the President did not issue the invitation, but an agree-
ment was reached, and the first meeting took place in Hull's office on April 25. 
The group consisted of Connally, Barkley, George, and Gillette (Democrats), 
LaFollette (Progressive), and Vandenberg, White, and Austin (Republicans), A 
rather full account of the meetings and history of this group has been given 
by Vandenberg himself; and, since this is almost the sole source of information 
with such authority, no purpose would be served in repeating here what is told 
there.^6 It is necessary only to outline this committee's role to complete 
the over-all picture. 
As was emphasized by Vandenberg, there was no official Republican partici-
pation in this committee. No Senate caucus selected these three Republicans 
55vandenberg, pp, 94-95 
56lbid.. p. 95. See also Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation 1939-1945. 
(State Dept. Pub; No. 3580, Feb. 1950) pp„ 258-260 f£. Shortly after the first 
steps toward forming the Senate group were made, Secretary Hull also met in his 
office with 24 freshmen members of the House of Representatives at their request 
to outline to them steps being taken toward the formation of a postwar inter-
national organization. 
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to sit with Hull. The group was selected by Connally, apparently in consulta-
tion with Vandenberg, The Republicans chosen were obviously selected for their 
views, which were considered to be favorable to some type of international 
organization. All three were members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
but all were junior members. Both Senator Johnson, who was the ranking Minority 
member, and Senator Capper, who was next ranking, were passed over, Vandenberg 
and White were next in line of seniority, but Austin, who was included on 
Connally's own initiative,57 TaxikedL last among the Republicans, below Senators 
Shipstead, Nye, and Davis. Certainly, then, these men were not representative 
Republican Senators. Vandenberg still was calling himself an "insulation!st," 
but it has been shown that his voting record in the 78th Congress had placed 
him very close to the most extreme internationalist Republicans in the Senate. 
Vandenberg was pleased with the lines along which the State Department 
had been planning. He found the Department's ideas very conservative and much 
in line with his own thinking. His major initial point of difference with Hull 
was the time for launching an international organization. Vandenberg wanted 
to wait until a "just peace" had been established, while Hull wanted to go 
ahead immediately. 
A more serious difference of opinion developed in mid-May when Hull wanted 
to take his plan to Churchill and Stalin with an endorsement from the Committee 
of Bight. This Vandenberg felt he could not give for the reason mentioned above, 
and, also, because he felt further study was needed. Finally, he did not feel 
he could pretend, "even by indirection," to commit the next Republican Presi-
dent if there should be one, A long series of discussions followed, and no 
written endorsement was given. 
57lbid.. pp. 90-107 
The committee continued to meet during the week prior to and during the 
Dumbarton Oaks Conference, which was laying the groundwork for a new inter-
national organization. The major question which remained at issue in the Com-
mittee of Bight and which was not settled at Dumbarton Oaks was concerning the 
power of the representatives to the new organization to commit the United States 
to war, Vandenberg would not consent to go this far in removing the power to 
declare war from the hands of Congress.5° 
As a result of the measure of agreement that had been reached in the Com-
mittee of Bight, however, and also in the Hull-Dulles conferences of the cam-
paign period,59 the issues at Dumbarton Oaks were kept out of domestic political 
wrangling. Both Vandenberg and Dulles thought this was of great advantage to 
the Republican party, since it would rob the Administration of its argument 
that it would "break the continuity" of the peace negotiation if Roosevelt 
were to be defeated, 
V 
With the Mackinac Charter the Republicans felt they had seized the initia-
tive on the political scene with regard to post-war planning in foreign policy. 
The party had almost, if not quite, committed itself to a new league of nations 
and hoped thus to quiet fears that a Republican President elected in 1944 
would repeat the debacle of 1921. When Frank Walker, Chairman of the Democratic 
National Committee, called on all to plan now for post-war peace,"0 Vandenberg 
could answer that the Democrats had not gone as far as the Republicans had at 
Mackinac.61 And Republican Chairman Spangler at the National Committee meeting 
58lbid., p. 117 
59see below p. 101 
6°New York Times. Jan. 7. 1944, p, 9 
61Ibid., Jan. 8, 1944, p. 27 
in Chicago in January 1944 boasted that "the Republicans might rightly claim 
that at the Mackinac Conference they had taken the leadership in formulating 
a foreign policy for the nation." 
"The declaration[he said| had received the approval of Republican 
members of the Senate and House, won the endorsement of leading news-
papers, made possible the adoption of the non-partisan Connally 
Resolution, and influenced the terms arranged by Secretary Hull at 
the Moscow conference. 
"To this time the present Administration has not offered to 
the people any such declaration. The foreign policy of the Admini-
stration has not been declared in direct and simple terms..,""2 
The main source of Republican pleasure over the Mackinac Charter, however, 
was probably that it could be used as a basis for the 1944 platform and thus 
avoid a bruising fight just before the campaign opened. At least this was what 
many hoped. The National Committee in January approved the declaration for 
itself. Satisfaction with the declaration, or at least with each person's own 
interpretation of the declaration, seemed universal. As the prospective can-
didates for the Presidential nomination, however, began to fire the opening 
salvos of their campaigns, it was clear that discussion within the party on 
the issue of post-war foreign policy had only begun, and the struggle for con-
trol of the party was more bitter than ever between the internationalists and 
the isolationists. 
Willkie was committed to a general international organization of strong 
powers and openly attacked the Dewey proposal for an Anglo-American alliance 
as a sure way to divide the world in two and prepare for another war. Taft 
decided to support rejuvenation of the old League but declared that the first 
step should be to write an international law by which the nations would agree 
to be governed. Disputes over the law would be settled by a world court, whose 
•Ibid.. Jan. 11, 1944, p. 13 
decisions would be sure to create a climate of public opinion in which the law 
could be enforced. He also favored (in agreement with Winston Churchill) the 
establishment of regional organizations and courts. He had this to say about 
the surrender of sovereignty: 
"We will no longer have a free hand, because v/e will have agreed 
to make war under circumstances found to exist by an international 
body in which we do not have a majority voice. I see no infringe-
ment of sovereignty in undertaking that obligation. However, I think 
the obligation should be carefully defined. The types of law viola-
tion constituting agression should be clear and definite, and the 
method of finding the action of any nation to be aggression should 
be equally clear.""3 
Taft felt that the formation of the new world structure should be delayed 
until the war's end. This was also the position taken by some of the more 
isolationist members of the party, such as Governor Bricker of Ohio, who stated 
that pending the setting up of the final international organization, the United 
States, Great Britain, Russia, and China would agree to keep the v/orld under 
control,^ 
John Foster Dulles, not a prospective candidate for the Presidential 
nomination but a close advisor of Governor Dewey, favored an international 
organization and was the chairman of a. Commission for a Just and Durable Peace 
in the Federal Council of Churches. Dulles emphasized in a speech at Atlantic 
City in February the need to create a system which could accommodate peaceful 
change—following the theme of his pre-war book, War. Peace and, Change:^ 
"To identify peace with the perpetuation of any given status 
quo is wholly unrealistic. There is no force that can be amassed 
sufficient to prevent change in the world. To attempt to do so is 
to attempt the impossible.""" 
g3lbid.. Feb. 6, 1944, Sec. 8, p. 6 
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The 1944 Republican convention was now approaching. Primary elections 
were being held, and one of these was particularly significant. In Wisconsin 
Wendell Willkie lost heavily in his opening contest to Governor Dewey, and, 
following his defeat, announced his withdrawal from the race for the nomination. 
There was much discussion as to just what this meant in terms of mid-western 
Republican sentiment on foreign policy. Neither Dewey nor Staesen, who ran a 
good second, were of the isolationist group, but comparatively speaking, Dewey 
was less of an internationalist in foreign policy than Willkie. 
A platform had now to be written on which any of the candidates might 
stand. Everyone agreed that the Mackinac declaration would form the basis of 
discussion, but each of the leading contenders for the nomination wanted to 
"improve" it by making it accord more nearly with his own views. There was 
much talk of writing a foreign policy plank which would "lift that question 
above any one political party."°7 
As has recently become customary, the preliminary Committee on Resolutions 
met nearly a week prior to the opening of the convention.g8 Senator Taft was 
chosen its chairman. Public hearings were held at which a variety of opinions 
were presented by private organizations. Later, Senator Warren Austin, a strong 
internationalist, was chosen chairman of the Sub-committee on Foreign Policy, 
and a proposed plank, developed by Austin and Vandenberg, was already being 
circulated. 
A major controversy now began to develop on the question of whether the 
use of force to insure international peace would be written into the platform. 
Governor Bricker said he was definitely opposed to it. Governor Sewall of Maine 
folbid.. June 19, 1944, p. 2? 
°°This group, chosen by the Hat'1. Committee, gives way to the regular 
committee which is formally elected by the convention itself. 
said that any declaration which closed the door on the possibility of policing 
the peace would be meaningless. The text being circulated by Vandenberg and 
Austin, while more definite than the Mackinac Charter on the point of joining 
a new league, was ambiguous on this matter of an international police force. 
"We shall achieve [ourj aim through organized cooperation and not 
by joining a world state. We favor responsible participation by the 
United States in a post-war cooperative organization among sovereign 
nations to prevent military aggression and to attain permanent peace 
with organized justice in a free world... 
"Such organization should develop effective cooperative means 
to direct peace forces to prevent or repel military aggression."°9 
The remarkable fact, of course, is that any official Republican declara-
tion could come this near to acceptance of the idea of an internationally con-
trolled military force. It is striking evidence of how high the tide of inter-
nationalism was running. The public opinion polls showed in this period that 
72 percent of those who voted for Willkie in 1940 favored a police force in 
connection with the union of nations, which was favored by 82 percent of them.70 
The Vandenberg-Austin text was adopted unanimously by the Foreign Affairs 
Sub-committee on June 24. Before this action was taken, Senator Ball of 
Minnesota attempted to secure the deletion of the words "and not by joining a 
world state." He also wanted to substitute "free nations" for "sovereign 
nations." Further, Ball would have added to the statement about "peace forces" 
the following: 
"The surest way to achieve maximum justice in the peace settle-
ment is to have the final decisions made by a United Nations asso-
ciation organized for that purpose and applying agreed-upon prin-
ciples. Failing that, we should strive for the widest degree of 
consultation among nations over peace settlements."'1 
69Ibid.. June 23. 1944, p. 1 
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On the other side. Senator Robertson of Wyoming offered a completely new 
plank which read as follows: 
"We pledge United States collaboration with world nations to 
prevent war. We pledge to protect the interests and resources of 
the United States. We pledge to maintain our position of supremacy 
on the sea, on land, and in the air, believing this to be the greatest 
factor for world peace. We pledge that any peace arrived at will be 
in accordance with the Constitution. We oppose an international 
police force. We oppose the international New Deal with the United 
States playing the role of Santa Claus."72 
None of these proposed modifications was made, but Senator Austin did not 
immediately give out the exact text of the draft. On the twenty-sixth a "Gov-
ernors' bloc," comprised of some of the same governors who had made their weight 
felt at Mackinac, came to the forefront once more with a demand that they be 
allowed to inspect the plank.73 At a conference the night before, a sub-
committee made up of Governors Baldwin, Sewall, and Hickenlooper had been 
appointed to make known their wishes to Senator Taft, Their aim was reported 
to be a statement which would include endorsement of the use by the United 
Nations of "economic sanctions backed by force," and a platform closer to the 
Mackinac Resolution. The governors were shown the text and apparently were 
allowed to participate in the final drafting at the level of the Resolutions 
Committee. However, Chairman Taft reported that no significant changes had 
been made. 
Also on the twenty-sixth Wendell Willkie, who had been shown the draft, 
announced in a lengthy statement that he considered the proposed resolution 
ambiguous and was thus disappointed in it. It was a strong attack and came as 
72Ibid. 
^Wills, Vt., Saltonstall, Mass., Edge, N.J., Martin, Pa., Bacon, Del., 
Thye, Minn., Schoeppell, Bans., Griswold, Neb., Willis, Ky,, Warren, Calif., 
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an apparent shock to Willkie backers who had supposed Willkie could accept the 
platform since Austin had so highly praised it. 
"A Republican President fXillkie sai<|J elected under the proposed 
platform in 1944 could, with equal integrity, announce that the United 
States would not enter any world organization in which the nations 
agreed jointly to use their sovereign power for the suppression of 
aggression. 
"The net result would be no international organization. No 
effective international force for the suppression of aggression. No 
peaceful world. Another world war fought in vain. And the youth of 
America once more betrayed."7^ 
Senator Austin immediately came to the defense of the platform. He said 
it was not ambiguous and that Willkie was mistaken in saying that the policy 
of the resolution would result in no international organization: "It expressly 
supports such an organization. It does not support an international integrated 
army. Its military resources are vested in a council-with power to direct them 
in the right regions, to the right places, on the right occasions."7^ 
Others of Mr. Willkie's own sympathizers were quick to defend the plank 
against his attack. Senator Ball said that, on the whole, it was a strong 
commitment by the party to a strong and effective international organization. 
Senator Burton said, "I think we can stand on this platform." Senator Taft 
was more caustic when he said he would be very much surprised if the plank 
adopted by the Democratic Platform Committee suited Mr. Willkie any better 
than that of the Republicans.7" 
So much for Willkie's ideas. Partly on the basis of Willkie's attack on 
the platform, the Chicago Tribune, although noting the "concessions" to the 
7/fNew_ York Times. June 27, 1944, p. 1 
75lbid.. June 27, 1944, p. 13 
76Ibid. 
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internationalist wing of the party, endorsed the platform as "satisfactory."77 
At any rate, all factions now awaited the interpretations of the Presidential 
candidate, Governor Thomas B. Dewey of New York. Although Dewey had been re-
garded as an isolationist in 1940, his recent statements in favor of an out-
right Anglo-American alliance had tended to place him in the internationalist 
camp, or at least to incur for him the enmity of the Chicago Tribune and the 
mid-western isolationists. He was now considered the most likely heir to 
Willkie's supporters. 
Dewey's acceptance speech tended to confirm him as a member of the inter-
nationalist wing, but he did not satisfy in every detail the demands of the 
most extreme internationalists in the party. He said in part: 
"... We are agreed, all of us, that America will participate with 
other sovereign nations in a cooperative effort to prevent future 
wars. Let us face up boldly to the magnitude of that task. We shall 
not make secure the peace of the world by mere words. 
"... We must have as our representatives in this task the ablest 
men and women America can produce, and the structure they join in 
building must rest upon the solid rock of a united American public 
opinion. 
"... Recently the overwhelming majesty of that broad area of 
agreement has become obvious. The Republican party can take pride 
in helping to define it and broaden it. There are only a few, a very 
few, who really believe that America should try to remain aloof from 
the world. There are only a relatively few who believe it would be 
practical for America or her allies to renounce all sovereignty and 
join a superstate. 
"I certainly would not deny those two extremes the right to their 
opinions; but I stand firmly with the overwhelming majority of my 
fellow-citizens in that wide area of agreement. That agreement was 
clearly expressed by the Republican'Mackinac declaration and was 
adopted in the foreign policy plank of this convention."78 
At a press conference Dewey made one clarifying statement to supplement 
his acceptance speech when he said he opposed the establishment of any inter-
national police force recruited from the forces of the United Nations which 
770hicago Tribune. June 27, 1944, p. 10 
78N 6W York Times, June 29, 1944, p. l 
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would operate under international control rather than national control. He was 
also, he said, against surrendering the right of the United States to make war 
on its own. 
The nomination of Governor John W. Bricker for Vice-President again paired 
an isolationist with an internationalist. An interesting development of the 
campaign was the nomination of Bricker as the Vice-Presidential candidate on 
the ticket of the America-First party headed by the Reverend Gerald L. Z, Smith. 
Governor Bricker said he would accept the support of that party, but Governor 
Dewey denounced it. 
Dewey gave out a further statement of his foreign policy views on August 
l6. In it he drew attention to the forthcoming conference at Dumbarton Oaks 
which would open preliminary discussions of a permanent international organiza-
tion. He said that the objective of a world organization was a bipartisan one 
and pointed out that this aim had been repeatedly urged by the Republican 
party. He then went on to say: 
"I have been deeply disturbed by some of the recent reports con-
cerning the forthcoming conference. These indicate that it is planned 
to subject the nations of the world, great and small, permanently to 
the coercive power of the four nations holding this conference... 
"The fact that we four have developed overwhelming power as 
against our enemies does not give us the right to organize the world 
so that we four shall always be free to do what we please, while the 
rest of the world is made subject to our cooperation. That would 
be the rankest form of imperialism... 
"In the kind of permanent world organization we seek, all nations, 
great and small, must be assured of their full rights. For such an 
organization, military force must be the servant, not the master."79 
The following day Secretary Hull denied the allegation made by Dewey, 
assured him that the United States never contemplated establishing a four-power 
Ibid., Aug. 17, 1944, p. 1 
military alliance to coerce the rest of the world, and invited Dewey to come 
himself or send a representative to Washington "in a non-partisan spirit" to 
discuss the security problem with him,"0 Dewey wired Hull his acceptance, 
designating John Foster Dulles as his representative. Hull and Dulles held 
their first meeting on August 23 and on August 25 issued a statement which said 
they had agreed that the subject of future peace should be kept out of politics. 
Dewey later told Arthur Vandenberg, Jr. that the only major issue between him 
and the Administration was on the use of armed force by the proposed security 
organization."1 Neither party had taken a position on this question, and Hull 
and Dulles, therefore, agreed that the issue would not be in the campaign. 
Dulles emphasized, however, that these agreements did not "preclude full public, 
non-partisan discussion of the means of attaining lasting peace.""2 
Thus was foreign policy disposed of in the 1944 campaign and thus was the 
notion of non-partisanship in foreign policy introduced into the political 
scene. Whereas the Committee of Bight had created bipartisanship between a 
few Senators and the State Department with the tacit consent of Senate Repub-
lican leaders, now the party's officially chosen presidential candidate had 
endorsed the idea and set up machinery to make it operate. On the other hand, 
let it also be noted that such an unorthodox idea had never been endorsed by 
any official body of the party—National Committee, Convention, or caucus—and 
thus Dewey's authority to commit the party was certainly open to question. 
At Louisville Dewey gave a full exposition of his foreign policy views. 
He said that we must learn to make peace, as we have learned to make war, a 
non-partisan matter, to be achieved through a united effort. 




"Only through a non-partisan approach to the shaping of a peace 
structure can America achieve unity of purpose. Only with unity of 
purpose can America influence the rest of the world In the manner 
which its real strength has entitled and equipped it. I am deeply 
convinced our peace efforts can and must become a non-partisan effort. 
"I'm happy to say that idea is already at work. I have made a 
practical beginning with Secretary Hull in a bi-partisan cooperation 
to establish an international organization for peace and security. 
Both parties are working together today in this great labor so it can 
go forward year after year, decade after decade, regardless of the 
party in power. 
"...Experts of both parties and members of the Senate of both 
parties are now conferring and will continue to confer as the work 
progresses. So long as I have anything to say about it, I shall 
insist on two things. First, that the American people shall be fully 
informed of our efforts to achieve the peace of the world. Secondly, 
these matters shall never be subjects for partisan political advantage 
by any individual or party either in or out of power."83 
Dewey then outlined his program for America in the years to follow. First, 
he endorsed unconditional surrender followed by punishment of the war criminals 
and the disarmament and occupation of the enemy countries by the Big Four. 
Finally, he said, the long-range task was to establish a world organization 
"in which all nations may share as sovereign equals, to deal with future 
threats to the peace of the world from whatever source, and on a permanent 
basis." 
"Upon certain aspects of the organization we are, I think, agreed. 
There will be a general assembly comprising all peace-loving nations 
of the world. In this general assembly all nations will have repre-
sentation. It's generally agreed, too, that there will be a council 
small enough for almost continuous meeting and prompt action. The 
major nations will participate in the council and the smaller ones 
through selected representatives. 
"This world organization should develop effective cooperative 
means to prevent or repel military aggression and such means should 
include the use of force as well as the mobilization of international 
opinion, of moral pressure and of economic sanctions, however and to 
whatever extent they may be devised. There should be a world court 
to deal with justiciable disputes... 
83New York Times. Sept. 8, 1944, p. 9 
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",.,There'll be for each of us, not only as nations but as indi-
viduals, the daily task of getting along with our neighbors wherever 
they are. 
"By this I do not mean getting along by the philosophy of the 
Washington wasters. They've been proposing that America should try 
to buy the goodwill of the world out of the goods and labor of the 
American people. They propose to buy for themselves international 
power out of our pocket books. 
"To hear them talk, Uncle Sam must play the role of the kindly 
but senile old gentleman who seeks to buy the goodwill of his poor 
relations by giving away the dwindling remains of his youthful earn-
ings. That is no lasting v/ay to win friends or to influence 
peoples.""4 
Dewey could not satisfy all the elements in his party. Many isolationists 
condemned him for his internationalist views, but it was an extreme inter-
nationalist who succeeded in embarrasing Dewey in the worst manner. Senator 
Ball said on September 29 that he had read or listened to all of the Governor's 
speeches and statements, and that to date he had not been convinced "that 
Dewey's own convictions on this issue are so strong that he would fight vig-
orously for a foreign policy which will offer real hope of preventing World 
War III against the inevitable opposition to such a policy.""5 
On October 12 Ball put three questions to each nominee: 
"1. Will you support the earliest possible formation of the 
United Nations security organization and United States' entry therein 
before any final peace settlements are made either in Europe or in 
Asia? 
"2. Will you oppose any reservations to United States' entry 
which would weaken the power of the organization to maintain peace 
and stop aggression? 
"3. Should the vote of the Unites States' representatives 
commit our quota of troops?"8" 
^Ibid. 
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On October 22 Ball announced that while Dewey had answered only the first 
two of his questions satisfactorily, Roosevelt had met all three squarely, and, 
therefore, would receive his support.87 What damage he did to Dewey's cause 
is difficult to ascertain, but Minnesota was lost once more to Roosevelt. In 
addition to Ball's defection, Dewey lost the support of the New York Times. 
and Willkie's support was luke warm, at best. But Dewey went as far toward 
the extreme "world-state" position as he could. In retrospect it is amazing 
how far he did go. Whether a different position on foreign policy would have 
gained him the victory is doubtful. 
Again the Republican party had chosen as its standard bearer a represent-
ative of the eastern and internationalist wing. Again the candidate's views 
were probably more internationalist than those of the congressional party, 
although in the absence of specific issues this cannot be definitely determined. 
Once more defeat returned the party to a minority status where it could well 
afford to hold its differences strongly. Four more years of opposition lay 
ahead. 
87Ibid.. Oct. 23, 1944, p. 1 
CHAPTER IV 
PLANNING THE PEACE 
As a newly re-elected Democratic Administration began to plan for peace 
following World War II, it felt that the Republicans could not, or at least 
should not, be ignored. It was determined that it would not run the risk of 
a defeat such as that sustained by Wilson in 1919-1920. To be sure, Roosevelt 
had a Congressional majority in both Houses which Wilson did not, but he was 
taking no ohances. The Republicans, on the other hand, were not going to sit 
back and watch Roosevelt make his own kind of peace. The basis of this atti-
tude, however, was quite different for different Republicans. Those who mis-
trusted the President almost completely were determined to stay his hand where-
ever they felt he would make unwise decisions. Among other Republicans, the 
primary concern was that their party should not again be held responsible for 
sabotaging the peace settlement. These tv/o attitudes, opposition and coopera-
tion, were often mixed and confused within the same groups and individuals, but 
as before, there was a basic divergence of opinion along these lines in the 
Republican party at the end of the war. More than a divergence of opinion, 
it was a struggle for influence and control in the party. 
At the convening of the 79th Congress in January, 1945, the Republicans 
found their strength in the Senate increased by one (from 38 to 39) but reduced 
in the House from 208 to 190. Two pre-war isolationist Republicans were de-
feated—Senator Nye of North Dakota, whose isolationism had been little tempered 
by events since Pearl Harbor, and Senator Davis of Pennsylvania, who in the 
78th Congress voted somewhat closer to the internationalist position than pre-
viously. New arrivals on the Republican side of the Senate were H. Alexander 
Smith of New Jersey, continuing the internationalist role of his predecessor, 
Warren Barbour; Wayne Morse of Oregon, who was to be considerably more 
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internationalist than Rufus C. Holman whom he replaced; Leverett Saltonstall, 
an internationalist from Massachusetts; Forrest C. Donnell of Missouri, middle-
of-the-roader; Thomas C. Hart from Connecticut, who was appointed to fill the 
seat of Senator Francis Maloney and who v/as somewhat of an internationalist; 
Homer Capehart from Indiana, isolationist; and Bourke Hickenlooper of Iowa, 
middle-of-the-roader. There seems to be little question, then, that the inter-
nationalist wing among Senate Republicans was somewhat strengthened as a result 
of the 1944 elections. 
Furthermore, the two defeated isolationists—Nye and Davis—were members 
of the Foreign Relations Committee. In replacing them, the Committee on Com-
mittees faced this problem. Styles Bridges of New Hampshire had waited eight 
years for a place on this committee and v/as clearly entitled to one of the 
vacated seats. Contending for the other seat and of equal sonority were Chan 
Gurney, a pre-war internationalist from South Dakota, and Alexander Wiley, a 
"war-modified isolationist" from Wisconsin.1 In the 78th Congress Wiley voted 
considerably more isolationist than did Gurney, but in the 79th, their voting 
records were very close. Wiley had apparently planned to get on the Foreign 
Relations Committee by unseating Senator LaFollette, a Progressive from his 
own state.2 The Republican leadership refused to go along with the unseating 
but gave Wiley the second open place on the committee roster. Hiram Johnson 
of California, undaunted in his isolationism, was in 1945 still the ranking 
Republican member. Following his death late in that year, Senator Capper of 
Kansas succeeded to his position while Gurney came on the committee as its 
most junior Republican. Thus was internationalist Republicanism strengthened 
in the Foreign Relations Committee. 
lHThe Foreign Relations Committee," Fortune. May, 1945, pp. 152-156 
2Ibid. 
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Slightly more difficult to assess, but perhaps to be counted as another 
gain for the internationalist wing was the succession of Wallace White to the 
position of Senate Minority Leader, formerly held by Charles McNary, There is 
no doubt, but that White's foreign policy record placed him among the inter-
nationalists, while McNary had never completely deserted isolationism. At the 
same time it is to be noted that TCenneth Wherry of Nebraska, whose isolationism 
exceeded McNary's, became the Assistant Floor Leader, or party whip, replacing 
the internationalist, Warren Austin. Whether any great significance can be 
attached to this shift is difficult to evaluate since many issues besides 
foreign policy enter into the selection of men for these posts. Similarly 
difficult to assess for foreign policy significance was the membership of the 
Senate Republican Steering Committee, headed by Taft. Arthur Vandenberg was 
chosen Chairman of the Republican Conference, a post also formerly held by 
McNary. 
In the case of the House, it is more difficult to find any pattern with 
regard to foreign policy among members defeated or elected in 1944. It was a 
year of general Republican loss, and among the defeated were both isolationists 
and internationalists. The position of ranking Minority member on the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee passed to Charles A, Eaton of New Jersey, a seventy-
seven-year-old former clergyman who was definitely an internationalist. Second 
in rank was Edith Nourse Rogers of Massachusetts, also an internationalist. 
Hone of the members on this committee voted regularly with the extreme isola-
tionists in the House on foreign policy, and at least two other members, Bolton 
of Ohio and Wadsworth of New York, voted with the extreme internationalists. 
In general it may be concluded that the Republican membership on the committee 
was slightly more internationalist than the House itself. (Figures I and II) 
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Representative Joseph Martin of Massachusetts retained the post of Minority 
Floor Leader, but Mr. Martin's voting record was much less close to the isola-
tionist position than it had been before Pearl Harbor, Whether he was leading 
or following his Congressional party to a middle ground cannot here be ascer-
tained, and this is likewise true of Charles Halleck of Indiana who became 
Chairman of the Republican Steering Committee, 
II 
The question before the country was how to arrange the world to keep the 
peace following the war. It was generally agreed that there would be an inter-
national organization, but many questions remained unsettled. There were fears 
on the part of most Republicans, varying only in degree as between isolationists 
and internationalists, that President Roosevelt was not properly looking out 
for American interests in his dealings with the Allies—particularly the 
Russians. 
Senator Vandenberg, who had been gradually emerging as the foreign policy 
leader of Sena/be Republicans, if not all Republicans, delivered at the beginning 
of the new session of Congress a "speech heard round the world." In this 
speech on January 10, 1945• Vandenberg gave a lengthy and carefully prepared 
analysis of the problems facing America on the international scene.3 The 
speech had several important aspects. First, it proposed an Allied treaty 
guaranteeing future disarmament of the Axis Powers: 
"I propose that we meet this problem conclusively and at once. 
There is no reason to wait. America has this same self-interest in 
permanently, conclusively, and effectively disarming Germany and 
Japan... It should be handled as this present war is handled. There 
should be no more need to refer any such actionfuse of force to keep 
the Axis disarmedjback to Congress than that Congress should expect 
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Figure I: Republican voting on foreign policy issues in the House of 
Representatives; 79th Congress; 1945-1946; as compared with the 

























































8 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Figure II: Voting on foreign policy issues of Republican members of 
the House Committee of Foreign"Affairs; 79th Congress. 
to pass upon battle plans today. The Commander-in-Chief should have 
instant power to act and he should act, I know of no reason why a 
hard-and-fast treaty between the major allies should not be signed 
today to achieve this dependable end. We need not await the deter-
mination of our other post-war relationships."^ 
This proposal was probably not the most important aspect of the speech. A 
second part of it was in the nature of a public confession. It was a statement 
of his personal viewpoint that had developed slowly but positively since Pearl 
Harbor: 
"I hasten to make my own personal viewpoint clear, I have always 
been frankly one of those who have believed in our own self-reliance. 
I still believe that we can never again—regardless of collaborations-
allow our national defense to deteriorate to anything like a point of 
impotence. But I do not believe that any nation hereafter can 
"immunize" itself by its own exclusive action. Since Pearl Harbor, 
World War II has put the gory science of mass murder into a new and 
sinister perspective. Our oceans have ceased to be moats which auto-
matically protect our ramparts. Flesh and blood now compete unequally 
with winged steel. Wax has become an all-consuming juggernaut. If 
World War III ever unhappily arrives, it will open new laboratories 
of death too horrible to contemplate, I propose to do everything 
within my power to keep those laboratories closed for keeps,"5 
Thus did Vandenberg reject isolationism. He had done so previously but 
never in quite such unmistakable terms. He wanted America to cooperate, but 
this must be done in a way consistent with our traditions of constitutional 
government and must be done with our own self-interest, enlightened to be sure, 
primarily in mind: 
"I want maximum American cooperation consistent with legitimate 
American self-interest, with constitutional process, and with collat-
eral events which warrant it, to make the basic idea of Dumbarton 
Oaks succeed. I want a new dignity and a new authority for inter-
national law. 
"I think American self-interest requires it. But, Mr. Presi-
dent, this also requires wholehearted reciprocity. In honest candor, 
I think we should tell other nations that this glorious thing which 
we contemplate is not and cannot be one-sided. I think we must say 
hIbid., p. 136 
5IMJL.. P. 135 
again that unshared idealism is a menace which we could not under-
take to underwrite in the post-war world." 
"I hesitate, even now, to say these things, Mr. President, because 
a great American illusion seems to have been built up—wittingly or 
otherwise—that we in the United States dare not publicly discuss 
these subjects less we contribute to international dissension... But 
I frankly confess that I do not know why we must be the only silent 
partner in this grand alliance. There seems to be no fear of disunity, 
no hesitation in Moscow, when Moscow wants to assert unilateral war 
and peace aims which collide with ours. 
"There seems to be no fear of disunity, no hesitation in London, 
when Mr. Churchill proceeds upon his unilateral way to make decisions 
often repugnant to our ideas and our ideals. Perhaps our allies will 
plead that their actions are not unilateral; that our President, 
as Bevin said, has initialed this or that at one of the famous Big 
Three conferences; that our President, as Churchill said, has been 
kept constantly 'aware of everything that has happened,' in other 
words, that by our silence we have acquiesced. But that hypothesis 
would only make a bad matter worse. It would be the final indict-
ment of our silence—the final obituary for open covenants..." 
"... Yet it cannot be denied that our government has not spoken 
out—to our own people or to our allies—in any such specific fashion 
as have the others."" 
Particular attention is given to this speech here for several reasons. 
First of all it received wide acclaim when it was delivered as the culmination 
of Vandenberg's own revolution in thinking and as an expression of the thinking 
of the American people. Second, it outlined Vandenberg's main concerns on the 
threshold of the post-war era; and third, it stated a position which came 
nearer to being acceptable to more Republicans, both in Congress and out, than 
any other put forward to that time. It was a position of highly responsible 
opposition at a time when many Republican leaders were still failing either 
to be responsible or else forgetting to oppose. In his efforts to lead the 
party away from isolationism and to defeat the efforts of those who would have 
crippled our participation in international cooperation, Vandenberg did not 
blind himself or fear to call attention to the weaknesses he saw in the 
6Ibid., pp. 132-133 
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Administration's handling of foreign policy. This placed him in a very strong 
position with a Republican party seeking to define its foreign policy stand and 
with an Administration seeking to carry the country with it into new realms of 
international activity. It became increasingly certain that both his party and 
the Administration would look to him for leadership in expressing the broad 
consensus of American opinion which they, for various political reasons, either 
could not or would not express. Perhaps both felt they v/ere "using" him for 
their own ends, but the result was to place Vandenberg in a very enviable 
position indeed. 
On February 13 the State Department announced that Vandenberg, among others 
mentioned below, had been named a delegate to the United Nations Conference on 
International Organization at San Francisco starting April 25. Thus was Van-
denberg to continue his role of close cooperation with the Administration in 
working out the details of the post-war settlements. Vandenberg did not immedi-
ately accept. He, along with many other Republicans, was concerned with what 
was happening at Yalta where the President was then meeting with Stalin and 
Churchill. 
The agreements reached at Yalta were not all made public in this country 
until 1947* but the decisions with regard to Poland were announced immediately. 
The three allied leaders agreed on reorganization of the provisional (Lublin) 
government which the Russians had set up in liberated Poland. The government 
was to be broadened to include democratic leaders of Poles abroad (such as the 
exiled leaders in London) in order to form a new National Unity government which 
would be pledged to hold free elections as soon as possible. But it was also 
announced that "boundaries of the new Poland were discussed, and it was agreed 
that the eastern frontier should follow the Curzon line except for certain 
specified digressions. It was agreed that Poland was to receive substantial 
accessions of territory in the north and west."7 This seemed to make it clear 
that the Soviet Union would retain control of Polish territory east of the 
Curzon line. 
The only other announcements of the Conference results were that the Atlan-
tic Charter had been reaffirmed, that certain problems of the organization of 
the United Nations had been solved, and that some of the agreements reached 
were not to be revealed at this time. The Republican reaction was necessarily, 
fpr the moment, restricted to discussion of these subjects, and the main points 
of criticism were (l) the sacrifice of Polish territory, (2) the idea that our 
Executive, sitting in secret sessions with foreign leaders, could commit the 
United States to arrangements of the type made for Poland, and (3) the secrecy 
which surrounded the meetings and their results. 
On the first point the major concern was among those to whom Polish-Ameri-
can support was politically important. One of these, however, was Vandenberg, 
and his was an important voice. No official party statements were issued at 
this time on the Yalta Conference, and criticism was chiefly, although not com-
pletely, restricted to speeches in Congress. It should also be noted, however, 
that Republican criticism was not universal, and that not only Senator Warren 
Austin, a regular administration supporter, but former President Herbert 
Hoover had kind words for the Yalta meeting. Hoover said he believed that it 
comprised "a strong foundation on which to build the world."8 
Another Yalta agreement was made known to Vandenberg as he entered into 
preparation for the San Francisco Conference. That was the plan that the 
U.S.S.R. and the United States would each have three votes in the new League 
7lbid.. p. 147 
%£Jt York Times. February 13, 1945, p. 1 
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assembly. It became increasingly clear that Roosevelt had made a firm commit-
ment in this regard and that the delegates to San Francisco had little choice 
except as to whether the United States would insist upon her three. Vandenberg 
was extremely upset about this, because he felt it was another concession to the 
Soviet.9 
Several Republicans were to play a part in the San Francisco Conference. 
In addition to Vandenberg*Representative Charles A. Eaton of New Jersey, ranking 
Minority member of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, was appointed as a 
delegate. Harold Stassen, former Governor of Minnesota, was also appointed, and 
among the official advisers to the delegation were Charles P. Taft, brother of 
the Senator, and John Foster Dulles, whom Vandenberg thought the most valuable 
man in the entire group. 
The Senate Republican Steering Committee decided that Vandenberg would not 
go to San Francisco as a representative of the Senate GOP. Vandenberg was re-
ported to have agreed with this policy and felt it was proper for him to go 
only as an individual.10 
Vandenberg continued before and during the Conference to press for the 
idea of getting the word "justice" into the Charter. At his insistence the 
American delegation agreed to propose giving the Assembly jurisdiction over 
"measures to establish justice; foster observance of human rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms; encourage the development of rules of international law; and 
recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of situations likely to violate 
the principles of the United Nations as declared by them on January 1, 1942, wll 
^Vandenberg, pp. 159-162 
10New York Times. Feb. 19, 1945, p. 23 
11Vandenberg, p. 163 
One of the few times that any domestic political considerations entered 
into the San Francisco discussions was on June 4 while a solution of the dead-
lock over the veto power was still being sought, Stassen, Dulles, and Vanden-
berg met and agreed that this question involved a fundamental issue in the Ad-
ministration 's foreign policy and that the Republicans had no right to dictate 
this for President Truman. They felt the whole thing ought to be put up to him 
for decision, and that they would reserve their right to speak for themselves 
as Republicans if the policy proved unsatisfactory. They also agreed, however, 
that they could not go along if there were to be any surrender on this point.12 
In the meantime Congress was passing on another international agreement 
which some of the Republicans had a hand in making. Three Republican members 
of Congress had been part of the United States delegation to the Bretton Woods 
Conference on post-war international economic policy. Senator Charles Tobey 
of New Hampshire, Representative Jesse P. Wolcott of Michigan, and Representa-
tive Chauncey W, Reed of Illinois were among those who created at Bretton Woods 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, Tobey and Wolcott were 
ranking members of the Senate and House Banking Committees, respectively, and 
Reed held a corresponding position on the House Coinage Committee. 
The decisions of the Conference were submitted to Congress as an executive 
agreement. A billCH.R. 221l) was introduced (l) to authorize United States 
membership in the Fund and the Bank, (2) to authorize the President to appoint 
our governors and representatives, and (3) to authorize the United States' sub-
scription of funds. Hearings were held by the House Banking and Currency 
Committee in March, April, and early May. In spite of the fact that Republi-
cans had helped in the drafting of the agreement, their support was by no means 
assured. Representative Wolcott worked out several changes in the bill to gain 
12Ibid., p. 203 
wider support in his party and cautioned against haste in House action. When 
the Committee voted to report, Republicans Smith of Ohio, Sumner of Illinois, 
and Buffett of Nebraska were opposed. These three representatives also led 
what opposition there was on the floor of the House. They were mainly opposed 
to the International Monetary Fund which was to make short term loans for re-
habilitation. An amendment proposed by Jesse Sumner, Illinois Republican, would 
have stopped authorization of the Fund, but it was defeated on a division vote 
(120-18). Following that, Representative Sumner moved to recommit the bill 
with instructions to drop the Fund. This was defeated on a roll call (326-29)» 
with the Republicans opposed to recommittal (122-29). The bill was passed by 
the House (345-18) on June 7, the Republican vote being 138 to 18 in favor of 
passage,13 
The Senate Banking and Currency Committee reported the bill favorably on 
July 6 by a vote of 14 to 4 with the Republicans divided evenly, four in favor 
and four opposed. The latter group—Senators Taft, Butler, Millikin, and 
Thomas—filed a Minority report which gave their reasons for voting as they did. 
They felt that (l) it was a great expenditure with negligible benefit to the 
United States, (2) the United States would have only 27-35 percent of the 
voting power while providing a much larger share of the money, (3) it would 
create ill will and lead to depression, (4) neither of the proposed plans would 
handle the present emergency, and (5) the system would set up managed currencies 
throughout the world. ^ 
Senator Taft led the opposition on the Senate floor, first by attempting 
to postpone the bill until after the Conference on the United Nations Social 
and Economic Council had been held or until after November 15, 1945. This 
^Oong. Record. Vol, 91, p. 5731 (79th Cong., 1st Sess., June 7. 1945) 
^ S . Rept. No. 452, 79th Cong. 1st Sess. (July 6, 1945) Part 2 
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proposal was rejected (52-31^ with the Republicans supporting it (28 to S). 1^ 
The Committee amendments to the bill were accepted, but all others were defeated, 
including (l) an amendment providing that no currency could be bought by one 
country of another from the Fund until all currency restrictions were removed, 
and (2) a proposal by Ball to suspend membership in the Fund for any country 
still having currency restrictions after three years. The first of these was 
rejected (53-23), but supported by the Republicans (21-12); the second was 
defeated (46-29), while the Republicans favored it (25-7). The Senate passed 
the bill (61-16), with Republicans voting favorably (19 to 14).^ 
It can be seen that the Republicans were not completely satisfied with 
this venture into international economic planning. The House Republicans were 
quite favorable after certain changes had been made in the bill, but the GOP 
Senators were badly divided. 
It was a different story with the United Nations Charter presented to the 
Senate by Vandenberg and Connally, both delegates to San Francisco. On this 
issue the Republicans had learned a lesson. They would not bear again the 
stigma that had attached to their opposition to the League of Nations, The 
Foreign Relations Committee held hearings for just one day before reporting 
the Charter favorably on June 9 (21 to l), Hiram Johnson dissenting. The 
debate was held on June 23 with only a few timid questions being raised about 
our obligations under the Charter. Eighty-nine Senators voted to consent to 
ratification, while only two, Langer and Shipstead, voted "nay." Hiram 
Johnson was unable to attend the session but was announced against the 
resolution.17 
^Cong. Record, Vol. 91, p. 7680- (79th Cong., 1st Sess., July 18, 1945) 
l6Ibid.. pp. 7779-7780 
17Ibld., p. 8190 (July 28, 1945) 
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This "declaration of peace" was nearly as unanimous as the war resolutions had 
been four and one-half years before. 
Considerably less unity was displayed when Congress came to consider the 
United Nations Implementation Bill. This was a measure to define certain 
powers of the President granted by ratification of the Charter and to provide 
for the appointment of United States representatives to the United Nations. In 
spite of pleas for unity by Vandenberg and Connally, controversy arose on the 
floor of the Senate where some of the isolationists objected to the broad powers 
to be given to the Chief Executive. Senator Donnell spoke all one day in 
opposition and offered an amendment to require a two-thirds Senate vote on all 
military agreements between the United States and the United Nations. This 
was rejected (57-14), with the Republicans voting (15-13) against the 
amendment.1 
A Democratic isolationist, Burton K. Wheeler (Montana), proposed to amend 
the bill to require Congressional consent in each case where United States 
troops were to be used. Rejection of this proposal was by a vote of 65 to 9, 
the Republicans concurring in the rejection (21-7).1° Taft offered an amend-
ment to instruct the United States delegation to refuse to vote in any dispute 
unless the decision reached by the Security Council was in accord with "inter-
national justice as well as international peace and security." This, too, was 
rejected by the Senate (40-18), but supported by the Republicans (17-6).20 
Other proposed amendments, all of which were rejected, were (l) a proposal 
by Millikin to eliminate diplomatic status for Security Council representatives, 
(Republicans: 13 "yea," 10 "nay"); (2) another Millikin amendment which would 
l8Ibid.. p. 11303 (Dec. 3, 1945) 
19Ibid.. p. 11405 (Dec. 4, 1945) 
20Ibid., p. 11407 
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have required Senate approval for all appointments to the United Nations, (Re-
publicans: 18 "yea," 4 "nay"); (3) another amendment by Taft which would "urge" 
the Security Council to take immediate action to limit armaments and prohibit 
weapons such as the atomic bomb and poison gas (Republicans: 12 "yea," 15 
"nay"). In spite of their support of some of these limiting amendments, the 
Republicans voted (23-6) for passage of the bill which cleared the Senate (65-7) 
on December 4, 1945.21 
The bill was reported to the House on December 12 with three amendments: 
(l) members of Congress who serve as delegates would receive no pay nor require 
Senate confirmation; (2) substitute representatives to the Economic and Social 
Council or to the Trusteeship Council might be designated without consent of 
the Senate; (3) confirmation would be required for representatives to certain 
special agencies which bad been exempted by the Senate version. On the floor 
the Committee amendments were accepted, and full bipartisan support was given 
the bill. It was passed by a vote of 344 to 15 with the Republicans concurring 
(150-14).22 
Here again we have the pattern repeated which was observed in the voting 
on the Bretton Woods agreement. House Republicans lined up consistently with 
the Administration, while in the Senate the GOP was divided, A majority of 
Senate Republicans supported the Administration on the final vote, but on sev-
eral of the limiting amendments a majority of them opposed the bipartisan 
position. The striking feature about this voting pattern is that it represents 
an almost exact reversal of the situation immediately preceding Pearl Harbor 
when House Republicans were almost unanimously opposed to the Administration, 
21ibid., p. 11409 
22Ibld.. p. 12288 (Dec. 18, 1945) 
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and only a minority of the Senate GOP voted to support the Administration, 
The same pattern was repeated on the bill to extend the Lend-Lease Act for 
another year from July 1, Unanimity in the House Foreign Affairs Committee was 
achieved when the Administration accepted a Minority condition that nothing in 
the act could be "construed to authorize the President to enter or carry out 
any contract or agreement with a foreign government for post-war relief, post-
war rehabilitation, or post-war construction."23 
On the floor of the House an amendment by Representative Robert F. Rich, 
Pennsylvania Republican, which would have required Congressional approval of 
all lend-lease settlements was rejected on the plea by Representative James W. 
Wadsworth, New York Republican, that it would be impossible as a practical 
matter for Congress to undertake this. Aside from this, there was virtually 
no direct opposition in the debate and the bill was passed (354-28), with the 
Republicans supporting it (l40-27).2^ 
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee retained the House compromise and 
reported the bill with the following modification: "Except that a contract or 
agreement,..in which the United States undertakes to furnish to a foreign govern-
ment defense articles...and which provides for the disposition on terms of sale 
prescribed by the President,..after the President determines they are no longer 
necessary for use by such government in promoting the defense of the United 
States, shall not be deemed to be for post-war relief, reconstruction, or re-
habilitation,"^ Taft proposed an amendment to delete this modification on the 
grounds that it would nullify the original compromise. This amendment was 
23lbld.. p. 2124 (March 13, 1945) 
24Ibid., p. 2152 
25s. Rent., No. ]JQ, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (April 5. 1-945) p. 2 
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defeated (39-39), but the Republicans supported Taft (34-2).2& The Republicans 
also supported (19-13) an amendment offered by William Langer to prevent sending 
any farm equipment abroad, but this was defeated (47-28).27 
In addition to these measures, the Republicans strongly supported our ad-
herence to the Food and Agriculture Organization, the extension of UNRRA, and 
the authorizations for this activity. 
Ill 
In December, 1945, after a series of meetings, the Republicans in both 
houses agreed on a policy statement to be presented to the National Committee 
as a tentative program on which to conduct the 1946 Congressional campaign. 
Members of the two houses caucused separately to pass judgment on the program 
and then appointed a "conference committee" of three Senators and four Represent-
atives to work out "minor changes" in the phraseology of the two drafts.28 On 
this "conference committee" were Taft, Vandenberg, and Millikin from the Senate, 
with Martin, Halleck, Brown, and Wigglesworth. Following a meeting of this 
group, Halleck gave out the conference statement: 
"Republican members of Congress, supplementing the 1944 Repub-
lican platform, present this statement of our aims and purposes... 
"In foreign affairs we shall continue to strive to avoid par-
tisanship. But we shall also seek to avoid secrecy, inefficiency, 
and drift. 
"To this purpose we dedicate the following statement: 
"We support the United Nations Organization for international 
peace. We look with particular hope to the General Assembly as the 
'town meeting of the world,' wherein the organized conscience of 
mankind shall find effective expression in behalf of peace with justice. 
26Cong, Record,, Vol. 91, p. 3247- (79th Cong., 1st Sess., April 10, 1945) 
27Ibid., p. 3255 
28New York Times. Dec. 6, 1945, p. 18 
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"We support the indispensable inter-American system as a regional 
part of the international organization, 
"We will engage in essential international relief as a humani-
tarian obligation and to prevent chaos through misery. We demand 
sound management and protection against exploitation in this connection. 
We will assist other nations to rehabilitate themselves under arrange-
ments consistent with intelligent American self-interest and over-all 
limitations that shall not jeopardize our own economic recovery and 
stability, 
"We believe in fulfilling to the greatest possible degree our 
war pledges to small nations that they shall have the right to choose 
the form of government under which they shall live and that sovereign 
rights and self-government shall be restored to those who have been 
forcibly deprived of them. We deplore any desertion of these prin-
ciples. 
"We will seek to find common policies with the other great powers, 
but we reject great-power domination of the world and the thesis that 
world peace requires us to endorse alien doctrines or abandon efforts 
to seek justice for the weaker peoples of the world. 
"We advocate ultimate international agreements to stabilize mili-
tary establishments. We demand open diplomacy, at home and abroad, 
and free communication throughout the world. 
"We consider that the maintenance of a strong, solvent, free 
America is the basis of our greatest contribution to world order,"29 
Three days later the National Committee, meeting in Chicago, unanimously 
adopted this declaration. As a compromise with those from the middle and far 
west who were less ready to support such an internationalist program, the Com-
mittee authorized its Chairman, Herbert Brownell, to appoint a sub-committee 
to receive suggestions from party members throughout the country to supplement 
this statement,3° 
The significance of this highly important policy statement lies not only 
in its words. It is the only time in the period under study with the exception 
of 1950, that the Republicans in both Houses adopted a joint statement, and 
that the Congressional party and National Committee endorsed a single declaration. 
29lbid. 
30Ibid., Dec. 9, 1945, p. 1 
While unanimity was achieved in the National Committee, it is doubtful that 
this was the case in the Congressional caucuses, although the opposition could 
not have been very strong. 
The resolution itself not only came nearer to expressing a unified Repub-
lican policy than is usually achieved; it was more meaningful in terms of 
current issues than most such statements. This resolution gave the first 
official party endorsement of bipartisanship. It was not an endorsment of any 
of the particular mechanisms by which bipartisanship was being achieved, nor of 
the Republicans who were achieving it, but it did pledge the party to "avoid 
partisanship." Neither the Congressional party nor the National Committee can 
take the place of the Convention as a formal policy-making body, but when the 
only place the party can act on national policy is in Congress, certainly the 
Congressional group must be given a strong voice in determining party stands. 
In January, 1945, National Committee Chairman Herbert Brownell had said, in 
announcing that the National Committee would not at that time make a policy 
statement, that Congressional Republicans would shape Republican policy.31 
Now the National Committee was confirming that position by adopting, verbatim, 
the Congressional declaration. 
What were the major points of this important pronouncement? 
1. The United Nations organization was unqualifiedly endorsed. 
2. Special importance was attached to the General Assembly, and great-
power domination of the world was rejected, 
3. International relief and rehabilitation were endorsed with certain 
caution as to their administration. 
4. A veiled criticism of Russian policies, and American accession to those 
31Ibid.. Jan. 22, 1945, p. 1 
policies, toward the small nations of Eastern Europe, A reference to the 
Polish settlement at Yalta was no doubt intended. 
5. International arms control was advocated. 
6. A further criticism of the Yalta Conference was made in the "demand" 
for open diplomacy at home and abroad. 
This comparatively uncritical statement stands in rather sharp contrast 
to the one adopted by the Committee four months later. The Committee met on 
April 2, 1946, in Washington for the purpose of electing a new chairman to lead 
the party into the 1946 Congressional elections, Herbert Brownell, Governor 
Dewey's selection for Chairman in 1944, was replaced by Representative Carroll 
B, Reece of Tennessee. Brownell had inevitably been associated with Dewey's 
internationalist views, while Reece was a pre-war isolationist whose selection 
as National Chairman was considered a victory for Taft and Bricker. Harold 
Stassen indicated his displeasure at the selection but accepted it after 
saying that the issue of isolationism versus internationalism was not likely 
to recur while Reece was Chairman, 
The resolution endorsed by the Committee the same day was a definite change 
from the sweet tones of the December statement. It deplored the "incoherence 
and inefficiency of Administration handling of foreign affairs," It noted a 
"growing tendency by the Administration to pay lip service only to the United 
Nations and the inter-American organization" while pursuing its own purposes 
"without consulting with other states." 
It further demanded: 
"That the State Department be so reorganized that it may possess 
cohesion and unity of purpose that only those persons who believe in 
the American way of life and are loyal to the American government shall 
be employed in the Department. 
"That the President and the State Department demonstrate their 
trust in the UNO and in our own hemisphere organization and consult 
with other states before acting in matters of interest to a number of 
states, 
"That only Americans known for their devotion to our form of gov-
ernment be appointed to the various posts of representation in the UNO, 
and that they be given time and facility for study and the preparation 
of their positions. Let the United States act in the council of the 
UNO in a manner commensurate with our world position and prestige and 
give thereby direction, constructive purpose, and vitality to the UNO. 
"That our Administration leadership demonstrate through UNO in 
behalf of such nations as Poland the same zeal which is now so evident 
with respect to oil-rich Iran."32 
Two points of this resolution are noteworthy. A much more critical note 
is set than four months earlier, but, interestingly enough, the major point of 
criticism is of too little consultation with foreign powers, too much, unilater-
alism, and lack of the usê  of the United Nations. Is this to be regarded as a 
tongue-in-cheek type statement, or had the extreme internationalists in the 
party called the tune? The second significant aspect is the first official 
party questioning of the loyalty of State Department employees. This attack 
was to expand to be the overriding issue in domestic politics in the early 
fifties. 
Almost simultaneously with the Committee meeting, Harold Stassen proposed 
and organized the Republican Open Forums. These meetings, held in most states 
and many communities, discussed public issues of the day and were "polled" on 
their opinions by the National Advisory group headed by Stassen. As a program 
of national significance the idea quickly faded, but the first "poll" indicated 
that three-fourths of those participating viewed the United Nations as the 
proper agency for discussion of all matters concerning Soviet Russia and felt 
the United States must strongly back United Nations' decisions.33 
32Ibld.. April 1, 1945, p. 1 
33Ibid.. May 8, 1946, p. 6 
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In the meantime the Administration was continuing to submit for Congression-
al approval its plans for American participation in post-war international or-
ganizations. Representative Chester E. Morrow, (Republican, of New Hampshire) 
who had served as a delegate to the preparatory meetings on the formation of 
the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, was 
chosen to present the bill for approval of that organization to the House. 
Committee hearings revealed almost complete unanimity as to our adherence, and 
the committee report was unanimous. Certain minor amendments were adopted on 
the floor. An amendment proposed by Representative Wadsworth of New York and 
adopted by the House limited our delegation to five, while another proposed by 
L. H. Smith of Wisconsin required Senate confirmation of the delegates. The 
House approved the bill on a roll call vote (264-41). The Republicans supported 
passage (l06-37).3^ The Senate passed a slightly altered version of the bill 
which was accepted by the House by a voice vote on July 4. 
Following this action the Senate took up the matter of our acceptance of 
compulsory Jurisdiction of the World Court as embodied in Article 36 of the 
Statute of the Court. The chief controversy arose over whether or not the 
Court could decide whether an issue brought before it was or was not a domestic 
one. Domestic issues were to be beyond the jurisdiction of the Court. Senator 
Connally offered an amendment to specify that the United States would decide. 
It was adopted (51-12), with the Republicans supporting it (l9-2).35 Senator 
Millikin proposed an amendment which would have gone one step further to ex-
clude cases from the Court where the United States had not agreed to the 
34conjg.. Record. Vol. 92, pp. 5530-5531 (79th Cong., 2nd Sess., May 23, 1946) 
35lbM., P. 10697 (Aug. 2, 1946) 
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applicable International Law, This was defeated (49-11), and the Republicans 
opposed Millikin (l5-6).36 The Senate accepted for the United States the 
Court's compulsory jurisdiction by a vote of 68 to 12, the Republicans concurring 
(l9-2).37 Tbus what three Republican Presidents and Roosevelt had failed to 
bring to pass was accomplished in a few days with virtually no opposition. 
The major foreign policy issue to come before Congress in 1946, however, 
was on the British Loan agreement. With Great Britain in dire financial con-
dition, the Administration proposed to lend her $3.75 billion, plus $650 * 
million in settlement of Lend-Lease. The bill was introduced on January 3 and 
sent to the Senate Banking and Currency Committee where hearings were held 
from March 5 to March 20. The witnesses appearing were preponderantly favorable, 
with some opposition, however, from certain pre-war isolationist groups. The 
bill was favorably reported on April 10. 
The debate was long,and there were numerous Republican attempts to defeat 
or cripple the bill. It was obviously a measure to which bipartisanship did 
not extend. This is not to say that many Republicans did not support the loan, 
but the party in Congress was badly split with a majority in both Houses 
opposed to it. Because it was an issue not covered by any sort of bipartisan 
arrangement, the voting patterns were probably more revealing of the status 
of the foreign policy division in the party than was the voting on any of the 
measures (chiefly concerning international organization) where Republicans 
played a role in the planning and pre-legislative stages. 
There were eleven roll call votes in the Senate. A review of the proposed 
amendments and the degree of Republican support will give some idea of the views 
36lbld.. p. 10705 
37Ibid.. p. 10706 
and tactics of the bill's opponents. Following some opening skirmishing, 
Senator McFarland (Democrat, of Arizona) offered an amendment proposing that in 
return for the loan to Britain, we get permanent possession of the British 
bases we had been operating. This was defeated, (45-40), but was supported by 
the Republicans (20-17).38 Taft next came forward with a proposal which was 
similar to the one he had offered during the pre-war Lend-Lease debate. He 
proposed to give (not loan) Britain $1,250 million. This went down (50-16), 
with only six Republicans supporting it,39 Capehart proposed a loan elf $1.5 
billion, available only to offset the unfavorable British trade balance with 
the United States from 1946-1950. He was defeated (55-25),- and the Republicans 
opposed his amendment (21-l6).^° 
Senator Knowland next offered an amendment under which the United States 
would loan the money only when production exceeded consumption in the United 
States and Federal income exceeded expenditures. This was defeated (59-19), 
and Republicans opposed it (19-15)•Z*'1 Mken wanted to delay the loan until 
England could show the end of blocked sterling, but he was defeated on this 
(54-19), and opposed by his GOP colleagues (19-15).42 The Republicans, however, 
supported (21-15) &n amendment offered by Senator Ellender of Mississippi and 
Johnston of South Carolina which would have required that 90 percent of the 
money loaned be spent in the United States. This was defeated (52-20).^3 
38Ibid.. p. 4601 (May 8, 1946) 
39lbid., p. 4744 (May 9, 1946) 
40Ibid., p. 4696 
4lIbid.. p. 4719 
42Ibid.. p. 4723 
43ibid.. p. 4803 (May 10, 1946) 
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A more polarized voting pattern than that of the Senate Republicans on this 
issue can hardly be imagined. On the voting as a whole the greater strength 
appears to have been with the internationalist*, but on the final vote, eighteen 
Republicans voted against passage and only seventeen in favor. 
The House Banking and Currency Committee reported the bill favorably on 
June 13 by a vote of 20 to 5» In the committee hearings strong opposition had 
been voiced by Mr. Jesse Jones and by the elder statesman, Bernard Baruch. On 
the floor there were many amendments, following the same line as in the Senate, 
and an unusual number of speeches on both sides. On the final day of debate 
Everett Dirksen of Illinois offered a motion to recommit the bill with instruc-
tions to the Committee to prepare an amendment requiring security from Great 
Britain for the loan. This was defeated (219-154), but the Republicans voted 
in favor of recommittal (124-58). Following this, the bill was passed (219-
155). with the Republicans opposed (l22-6l) . ^ 
The general picture of Republican voting as seen in Figure I (above) and 
Figure III probably ought to be compared with that of the 77th Congress (l94l-
1942) rather than that in the 78th Congress (1943-194*0. In the latter years, 
as indicated earlier, the war spirit combined with the lack of basic foreign 
policy issues probably gives a false picture of Republican Congressional atti-
tudes. The pattern for 1945-1946, the first post-war years, shows a marked 
increase in the strength of the internationalist group when compared with pre-
v?ar voting. As seen above, the Republicans supported quite strongly the par-
ticipation of the United States in international organization—a mark, no doubt, 
of the idealism which had seized the country on this issue. The negative 
attitude on the British loan, however, indicates that Republicans thought inter-
national organization alone ought to keep the peace, and that there was little 
^Ibid., p. 8956 (July 13, 1946) 
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necessity to play politics outside the United Nations, especially where it 
would involve the expenditure of billions of dollars. There was no clear sign 
in 1945-1946 that the GOP might not be content with a very minimum participation 
by the United States in world affairs, support for the United Nations notwith-
standing. 
The Republican victory at the polls in 1946 gave the Republicans control 
of Congress for the first time in sixteen years and created that rare situation, 
possible only in American government,—a legislature and executive of different 
parties. The Senate in January 1947 had 51 Republicans and 45 Democrats; the 
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Figure III: Republican voting on foreign policy issues in the Senate; 
79th Congress; 1945-1946; as compared with the record of Senator 
William Langer of North Dakota 
CHAPTER V 
FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EIGHTIETH CONGRESS 
No Republican senator was defeated in the 1946 elections, and thirteen 
new party members were elected to give the GOP a majority of fifty-one to 
forty-five.1 The Republican "Class of '46" has been the subject of several 
derogatory characterizations, particularly as an isolationist group, but no 
one label is adequate or fair for these widely-varying newcomers. On foreign 
policy issues in the 80th Congress Senators Jenner, Kem, Dworshak, Malone, and 
Williams did, to be sure, vote quite consistently with such isolationists as 
Butler and Wherry. This certainly gave added strength to that wing of the 
party which stood outside and opposed to the "bi-partisan camp, and to this ex-
tent 1946 was a contrast to 1944 when the elections had so strongly bolstered 
the internationalists. Near the middle-of-the-road position were Senators 
Ecton, Bricker, Cain, Watkins, and McCarthy, while Senators Ives, Martin, and 
John Sherman Cooper were generally sympathetic with the Administration and Re-
publican leaders of the bipartisan foreign policy. (Figure I) 
There were no changes in party leadership in the Senate as the Republicans 
passed from the Minority to the Majority position. Wallace White became the 
Majority Leader; Kenneth Wherry, the whip; Eugene Millikin retained the Chair-
manship of the Republican Conference; and Taft, the Chairmanship of the Repub-
lican Policy Committee. The dominant Republican, however, in terms of foreign 
In Indiana Jenner was nominated by the Republicans in place of Senator 
Willis; in Wisconsin McCarthy defeated Senator LaFollette for the GOP nomination; 
in Kentucky Cooper replaced Republican Senator Stanfill; the following Democra.ts 
ware replaced by Republicans: Briggs by Kem in Missouri, Gossett by Dworshak in 
Idaho, Carville by Malone in Nevada, Tunnell by Williams in Deleware, Wheeler 
by Ecton in Montana, Huffman by Bricker in Ohio, Mitchell by Cain in Washington, 
Murdock by Watkins in Utah, Mead by Ives in New York, Guffey by Martin in 
Pennsylvania 
policy was Arthur Vandenberg, Although Arthur Capper had been the ranking Re-
publican member of the Foreign Relations Committee, he chose to assume the 
Chairmanship of the Committee on Agriculture and leave the chair of the former 
committee to Vandenberg, Vandenberg also was elected President pro tempore of 
the Senate, and the combined prestige and influence of the two positions gave 
his opinions great weight and served well to enable him to guide bipartisan 
foreign policy legislation through the upper house. It would appear that the 
informal division of power between Taft and Vandenberg, the latter following 
the former's lead in domestic policy, and vice versa, must have rendered White's 
leadership more nominal than real. 
The remaining members of the Committee on Foreign Relations were White 
(Maine), Wiley (Wisconsin), Smith (New Jersey), Hickenlooper (Iowa), and Lodge 
(Massachusetts). There was not an isolationist in the group, although Senator 
Wiley offered somewhat less support for the "bipartisan program than the others. 
Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., who had opposed United States intervention prior to 
World War II, returned after serving military duty as an ardent advocate of a 
policy of American leadership in world affairs. 
Regarding the relative strength of the isolationist versus the inter-
nationalist wing of the party in the 80th Congress, an analysis shows that 
thirty-two Senators voted with the extreme internationalists on at least one-
half of the roll-call votes, while only seventeen voted with them on less than 
one-half the votes. This is to be compared with comparable figures of fourteen 
as against tv/enty-two in the 78th Congress. Allowing for all the inaccuracies 
of such a rough comparison, this would seem, nevertheless, to be a strong 
indication that the internationalists were in a more powerful position with 
2Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., ed., Tfeg. Private Papers o£ Arthur Vandenberg. 
PP. 318-319 
respect to their Senate colleagues than at any time since World War I. (Fig-
ure I) 
In the House of Representatives, where the Republicans held a majority of 
244 to 191, Joseph W, Martin of Massachusetts was elected Speaker, and Charles 
W. Halleck of Indiana was chosen as Majority Floor Leader. The latter was 
elected unanimously after Clarence J. Brown (Ohio), Thomas A. Jenkins (Ohio), 
and Everett M. Dirksen (Illinois) withdrew, and after Halleck had been indorsed 
for the position by Governor Dewey.3 Charles A. Eaton (New Jersey) became 
Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, which had thirteen other 
Republicans on its roster. Analysis of the voting records of these Congressmen 
shows that the committee was quite heavily weighted with internationalists who 
tended to support the bipartisan foreign policy, although there is no evidence 
that any influence other than the operation of seniority achieved this result. 
(Figure III) Considering the House as a whole the percentage of Republican 
Congressmen voting with the extreme internationalists increased from 30 percent 
in the 79th Congress to 55 percent in the 80th. (Figure II) 
The Republicans had not been elected to Congress on any particular kind of 
a foreign policy program. Aside from the National Committee resolution of 
April, 1946, there was no platform, but it was repeatedly stated by individual 
candidates and by the Republican leadership that the bipartisan foreign policy 
would be supported. It can, in fact, be argued that the Republicans would not 
have won if they had failed to convince the country that they would not desert 
that policy. Vandenberg was the commanding figure in this respect, but Taft, 
too, had voiced the opinion that foreign policy would not be an issue in the 
-̂ It is not clear whether Dewey's endorsement had any real effect on this 
selection. If so, it would be an unusual instance of successful intervention 
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Figure I: Republican voting on foreign policy issues in the Senate; 
80th Congress; 1947-1948; as compared with the record of Senator 
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campaign, and in a post-election statement had given support to bipartisan-
ship.^ 
There was criticism, of course, in various quarters and on various issues. 
The Yalta decisions and the management of the State Department were subjects of 
attack together with a general grumbling about appeasement of Russia. There 
was some criticism of our United Nations policy, but practically no criticism 
of the United Nations itself nor suggestion of the possible dangers of full 
American participation. As has been shown above, the Republicans in general 
cooperated in, and approved of, the post-war settlements; that is, the peace 
treaties and the setting up of international organizations. This phase of our 
foreign policy, however, was coming to a close as the 80th Congress convened, 
and although grave new problems were arising, the Republicans had no immediate 
goals in mind for America's role in foreign affairs. 
Early in the first session, Vandenberg reaffirmed his ideas on American 
foreign policy in a speech in Cleveland. Asserting that '< bipartisanship had 
been established in the United Nations work and in planning European peace, 
Vandenberg said: 
"This record cannot be misread at home or abroad. We have em-
braced the United Nations as the heart and core of united, unpartisan 
American policy. We will be faithful to the letter and the spirit of 
these obligations. In my view, this will be true no matter what ad-
ministration sits in Washington, and it will remain true to whatever 
extent the United Nations themselves are faithful to our common 
pledge."5 
But at the same time Vandenberg indicated that a permanent bipartisan 
policy covering all the world had by no means been established. He criticized 
the delay in calling a conference of the Pan-American states for negotiation 
ISHL York Times. June 1, 1946, p. 3 
^Vandenberg, pp. 333-336 
of a hemispheric defense treaty under the Act of Chapultapec. He also urged 
that the United States "shift its emphasis" from a policy of seeking unity in 
China between the communists and non-communists to one of affirmatively aiding 
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in seeking a coalition of all non-communist parties 
under the new constitution of China.° 
Vandenberg's views were of the greatest importance in learning what Repub-
lican foreign policy behavior would be, Taft had said that while he did not 
believe that Vandenberg claimed to represent the GOP at the Big Four Foreign 
Ministers'1 Conferences, he did feel that Vandenberg represented a majority of 
Republican opinion.' 
Vandenberg's enormous prestige as well as his strategic organizational 
position in Congress cast him in a role of very great influence. His voice was 
often the deciding one in determining Congressional action, and he was con-
tinuously consulted by the Administration at various, if not all, stages of 
policy formation. Indeed, it often appeared as if the Administration were 
utterly dependent on him to make its policy decisions effective. Only at his 
own insistence was he relieved from his additional role of an American repre-
sentative to various international conferences, and even then he was sent to 
the inter-American meeting at Rio de Janeiro, which he had so long urged. Van-
denberg did not feel that he should be a "Co-Secretary of State," and he often 
stated the difficulties of Congressional representation at the international 
conference table: 
"...I am increasingly impressed with the difficulties confronted 
by 'Congressional' representatives because of their dual capacity. 
Of course, it will always be true that a man cannot serve two masters. 
7ISiL York Times. June 1, 1946, p. 3 
Yet that is precisely what I undertake to do—for example—when I, as 
a Senator, sit in the General Assembly as a delegate, I am helping to 
make decisions for the United Nations which must pass in review before 
the American Congress. Having participated in the United Nations in 
helping to make the decisions, I am not a 'free agent' when I return 
to the Senate to function in my 'congressional' capacity. Indeed, it 
could be a most embarrassing and difficult situation in the event that 
I did not approve of some decision made by the United Nations. I 
should dislike to oppose in Congress anything to which I had given my 
consent (if only by reluctant acquiescence) in the United Nations."® 
The extent to which the Administration consulted Vandenberg was very great, 
but even on issues such as Greek-Turkish aid, where he did not feel the consul-
tation was all that it might have been, Vandenberg saw eye-to-eye with the 
State Department on a major part of the legislation confronting the 80th 
Congress, 
If Vandenberg's efforts were a factor contributing to executive-legislative 
cooperation in foreign policy, there was a counteracting factor in the powerful 
Republican desire for reduced spending and reduced taxes. Always in the picture 
when the billion-dollar aid bills were up for consideration was this GOP cam-
paign pledge which seemed to fade further and further from fulfillment with 
every new foreign policy program. The Administration and Vandenberg had to 
face a Congress committed to the idea that too many American dollars had already 
gone abroad in Lend-Lease, UNNRA, the British Loan, and a half dozen lesser 
programs. When the record of the 80th Congress in this regard is read, it is 
not difficult to understand why Vandenberg thought Truman might have chosen 
a happier term than "do-nothing" to apply to that Congress, 
II 
The new Senate lost no time in unanimously confirming General George 
Marshall as the new Secretary of State to succeed James F. Byrnes. Vandenberg 
had grown used to working with Byrnes, but pledged continuing cooperation with 
8Vandenberg, pp. 330-331 
Marshall. Two weeks later, however, in a somewhat less cooperative spirit, the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee voted to make a detailed study of the State 
Department's organization, personnel, and policies. The word "investigation" 
was deliberately avoided, and the announcement was accompanied by a statement 
pledging cooperation "to the fullest extent" in a bipartisan foreign policy.9 
A few days later Marshall offered his cooperation in the study of the State 
Department. 
On February 27, 1947, Vandenberg and certain other Congressional leaders 
were called to the White House, where Mr. Truman and Secretary Marshall laid 
before them a top-secret picture of impending disaster in Greece and, in only 
slightly lesser degree, Turkey. Britain, herself in extreme economic distress, 
now was forced to pull out of Greece and to end economic and military aid. 
Greece was threatened by civil war with the Communists, who were supported 
from Yugoslovia, Bulgaria, and Albania, Economic collapse was at hand and the 
Greek army's morale was deeply shaken, Vandenberg realized immediately that 
this problem was "probably symbolic of the world-wide ideological clash between 
Eastern Communism and Western Democracy; and it., {might) easily be the thing 
which requires us to make some very fateful and far-reaching decisions,"10 
Vandenberg disliked this "crisis diplomacy"—typified by a summons to the White 
House, alarming diplomatic reports, and an urgent plea by the President for 
action. He believed that a continuing policy developed through continuing 
consultation with Congress would largely ob*iate the necessity for this crisis 
method, "But it must be remembered," he admitted, "that the whole thing was 
precipitated on our government so suddenly that there really was very little 
%ew_ York Times. Jan. 28, 1947, p. 15 
^Vandenberg, p. 340 
opportunity for preliminary consultations and studies."11 It was nonetheless 
true that the Republican majority was placed in the position of following 
Truman's leadership. 
The President took his case to Congress on March 12 in an address to a 
special joint session. He called for American assistance to. support free 
peoples who were resisting attempted subjugation. He requested $400,000,000 as 
an initial grant in economic and armed aid. Vandenberg and Eaton promised their 
support with certain conditions. Senators Bushfield (South Dakota) and Butler 
(Nebraska) announced their opposition. Senator Taft was for the "fullest 
debate" and on April 11 announced his position as follows: 
"I intend to vote for the Greek and Turkish loans for the reason 
that the President's announcements have committed the United States 
to this policy in the eyes of the world, and to repudiate it now 
would destroy his prestige in the negotiations with the Russian gov-
ernment, on the success of which ultimate peace depends. 
"I do not regard this as a commitment to any similar policy 
in any other section of the world, or to the continuation of the same 
policy in Greece and Turkey when peace negotiations are completed. 
"In so far as the loans ere for reconstruction and rehabilitation 
we are only doing in Greece what we are doing elsewhere. In so far 
as they help preserve order, I think they must be justified as a 
means of maintaining the status quo during the period while the 
sound basis for peace in Europe is being worked out. 
"I am in thorough accord with the Vandenberg amendment proposing 
that we withdraw whenever a government representing the majority of 
the people requests us to do so, and whenever the United Nations 
find that action taken or assistance furnished by them makes the 
continuance of our assistance undesirable. I believe we should, 
in any event, withdraw as soon as normal economic conditions are 
restored."12 
With Vandenberg taking the Administration's point of view, Taft's position 
may perhaps be taken as more representative of the GOP in Congress—or at least 
11Ibid., p. 339 
12New York Times. April 11, 1947, p. 1 
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nearer to the middle of the road. The Vandenberg modification to which Taft 
last referred was based in part on the Michigan Senator's feeling that the 
Administration had made a mistake in making no mention of the United Nations 
in the draft bill. He corrected this omission by successfully urging the State 
Department to formally notify the United Nations Security Council that: 
"The program of economic assistance contemplated by the United 
States is of an emergency and temporary character. The United States 
believes that the United Nations and its related agencies should 
assume the principal responsibility, within their capabilities, for 
the reconstruction of Greece...the United States is giving momentum 
to the United Nations by its present policy.,."13 
In addition Vandenberg tied the United Nations into the program through 
several references in the preamble to the fact that the United Nations had, 
through its various agencies, recognized the seriousness of the situation in 
Greece, 
Using a somewhat unusual legislative technique, Vandenberg urged all mem-
bers of the Senate to submit to him their questions about the program for trans-
mittal to the State Department. The 400 questions submitted were consolidated 
into 111 enquiries, and both questions and official answers were published. 
When the bill came to the floor of the Senate, Vandenberg made a lengthy 
speech in its favor, and was joined in his support by Senators Ball (Minnesota), 
Morse (Oregon), Ferguson (Michigan), Lodge (Massachusetts), Flanders (Vermont), 
Baldwin (Connecticut), Brewster (Maine), Smith (New Jersey), Cain (Washington), 
and Capehart (Indiana). The GOP opponents of the bill who felt strongly enough 
to speak against it were Senators Malone (Nevada), Wherry (Nebraska), Williams 
and Buck (Delaware), Bushfield (South Dakota), Brooks (Illinois), Kern (Missouri), 
Dworshak (Idaho), Hawkes (New Jersey), Revercomb (West Virginia), and Robertson 
(Wyoming). A motion by the last-mentioned Senator to table the bill was 
^Vandenberg, p. 345 
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defeated by a vote of 67 to 23. and the bill passed by the same vote on April 
22, 1947. l k 
In the House the opposition was led by Lawrence Smith (Wisconsin), who 
submitted his minority views saying that the bill was uncertain as to scope 
and cost, that it by-passed the United Nations, and that it might lead to war,15 
The bill was delayed a week in the evenly divided Rules Committee, and this was 
followed by a long debate from May 6 to May 9. Charles Eaton (Republican, of 
New Jersey) and Sol Bloom (Democrat, of New York) managed the support of the 
bill, and a motion to strike out all after the enacting clause was defeated 
(127-37). The bill was passed (after the amount to be authorized had been 
reduced) on a roll call (287-IO8), with the Republicans divided 127 in favor 
and 94 against.16 
During the consideration of this measure the political atmosphere was fur-
ther charged when Gael Sullivan, Executive Director of the Democratic National 
Committee, publicly called Carroll Reece, Republican National Committee Chair-
man, to join in a two-party statement endorsing the "Truman Policy" in Greece 
and Turkey. Sullivan repeatedly used Vandenberg's name in his letter to Reece 
and In a follow-up public statement. Vandenberg told the Senate that ^bipartisan 
foreign policy was gravely endangered when it got into the rival hands of "par-
tisan national committees." He said: 
"Bi-partisan foreign policy is not the result of political coercion 
but of non-political conviction. I never have even pretended to speak 
for my party in my foreign policy activities... I have never made any 
semblance of a partisan demand for support, and I never shall. What 
WSaU£, Record. Vol. 93. pp. 3792-3793, (80th Cong., 1st Sess., Apr. 22, 
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I decline to do myself, I cannot permit the Executive Director of the 
Democratic National Committee to attempt in my name."1? 
Almost at the same time that the Greek-Turkish Aid Bill was under con-
sideration. Congress was dealing with another foreign aid measure in the form 
of the bill for the Relief for War Devastated countries. The House Committee 
on Foreign Affairs reported this bill favorably on April 15 accompanied by a 
minority report which criticized the amount of aid contemplated and the plan 
to include the European states now considered to be Russian satellites. This 
minority report, it should be noted, was not by members of the Minority party 
in the House; that is, the Democrats, but rather by three Republicans—Chiper-
field of Illinois, Jonkman of Michigan, and Smith of Wisconsin.18 
In the floor debate Jonkman proposed an amendment to cut the amount in-
volved from $350,000,000 to $200,000,000. ThiB was passed in the House by a 
vote of 225 to 165, with the Republicans voting for passage (190-36). *-9 A 
substitute bill was then brought forward which would have prohibited the use 
of any funds in the Russian satellites. Karl Mundt (South Dakota) moved to 
amend this substitute to permit the use of funds for the satellites if the 
governments involved would consent to having all supplies distributed by an 
American mission. Both the amendment and the substitute were accepted by a 
vote of 324 to 75. with 225 Republican "yeas" and two "nays." The bill in 
this form passed the House April 30 (333-66), with Republicans supporting 
passage by a vote of 181 to 45.20 
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The Senate committee reported the resolution with the full $350 million 
and with no mention of Russian dominated countries as different from any others. 
The Senate version did, however, provide for administration of all aid by 
American missions and stipulated that 94 percent of all goods supplied be pur-
chased in the United States. On the Senate floor an amendment to cut the aid 
to $200,000,000 was defeated (l64-19), the Republicans opposing the cut (32-
12). 1 This vote came after a statement by Vandenberg that this would be the 
last relief measure. An "anti-Russian" amendment was also defeated by a voice 
vote, after which the Senate voted to pass its version of the bill (79-4), with 
the Republicans voting 42 to 2 in its favor.22 
A conference committee favored the Senate version, and when the bill was 
returned to the House, Mr. Jonkman moved to recommit it. This motion was de-
feated (205-170), although 146 Republicans favored recommital as against 72 who 
opposed it. On final passage the bill received 288 favorable votes of which 
127 were Republican. The most notable feature in the Congressional action on 
this bill was the contrast between strong Senate support and initial opposition 
in the House to the program. A majority of the Republicans in the House were 
prepared to condemn the bill to committee rather than pass it in its final 
version, although a slim majority voted for its passage. In the Senate, how-
ever, the attempt to cut the amount authorized was opposed by a healthy majority 
of the Republicans (32-l8\ and final approval in that form was never in doubt. 
The powerful influence of Arthur Vandenberg in the upper house is probably the 
explanation for this contrast. 
Another illustration of this influence was the overwhelming approval given 
to the peace treaties with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, to which there 
21Ibid.. p. 5245 (May 14, 1947) 
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had been some initial opposition. There was opposition to the treaties from 
both parties during the floor debate, but the Senate gave its consent to ratifi-
cation by a vote of 79 to 10, the Republicans concurring (42-7),23 
III 
The overriding foreign affairs issue in the 80th Congress was the Marshall 
Plan—that is, the gigantic program of foreign economic assistance which became 
formalized as the European Recovery Program. The manner in which this program 
was launched by our government—politically divided against itself, as it was— 
is the major foreign policy story of this chapter. 
By the early summer of 1947 it seemed obvious that the economic problems 
left in the wake of the war could not be solved by the kind of emergency relief 
the United States had been granting up to that point. In spite of UNRRA, the 
Greece-Turkey program, and the relief bill discussed above, Europe was not 
recovering. Communist pressure in France, Italy, Czechoslovakia, and Finland 
was increasing. Britain's supply of dollars, essential to industrial recovery, 
was at the vanishing point. Freak weather of alternate drought and storm was 
paralyzing European agriculture and mining. Hunger, unemployment, economic 
stagnation, and resultant despair all contributed to political unrest. 
The seriousness of the situation was not at first realized outside of the 
Administration. The Republicans in Congress took no initiative in mapping 
a program to meet the danger, chiefly because they did not know of the danger 
until the Administration presented them with a program to combat it. The State 
Department, however, was quick to take leading Republicans into its confidence, 
once it had decided something had to be done. Secretary Marshall presented the 
problem and hint of a solution in a commencement address at Harvard University 
23Ibid.. p. 6409 (June 5. 1947) 
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on June 5, 1947. After describing the grave crisis which appeared to exist, 
Marshall said: 
"It is already evident that before the United States Government 
can proceed much further in its effort to alleviate the situation and 
help the European world on its way to recovery, there must be some 
agreement among the countries of Europe as to the requirements of the 
situation and the part those countries themselves will take in order 
to give proper effect to whatever action might be undertaken by this 
government. The initiative, I think, must come from Europe. 
"The role of this country should consist of friendly aid in the 
drafting of a European program and of later support of such a program 
so far as it may be practical for us to do so. The program should be 
a joint one, agreed to by a number, if not all, of the European 
nations."2^ 
It became now a matter of translating Marshall's idea into a program, which 
meant the coordination of the efforts of more than a dozen governments, the 
hammering out of a program acceptable to the United States, and the steering of 
whatever was proposed through a maze of international and domestic politics. 
The urgency of the program was very great. When the State Department sent 
John Foster Dulles to France to assess the danger of a communist attempt to 
seize power, or the possibility of an outbreak of civil war between the leftists 
and the Gaulists, he reported that prompt economic help—interim aid pending 
the inauguration of a long-term program of assistance—was essential to the 
French and perhaps necessary to avert armed violence. 
Dulles and Marshall soon brought Vandenberg into the consultations, and 
he agreed to help. He had already announced on June 13 that he endorsed the 
over-all approach. In this statement, read to a meeting of the Senate Repub-
lican Policy Committee, Vandenberg also proposed that President Truman appoint 
a bipartisan council of "our ablest and most experienced citizenship" to study 
the abilities of the United States to support such a program as was contemplated. 
24vandenberg, p. 375 
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"Current discussion, in and out of official life, is directed 
toward new foreign programs of large post-war American rehabilitation— 
as distinguished from direct relief—to prevent social and economic 
collapse in many parts of the world. It is a good thing that these 
discussions are under way in the open. But they should not be mis-
understood at home or abroad. At home, they should not invite 
anxieties that we shall rush into imprudent and inadequately reasoned 
plans. Abroad, they should not be taken as evidences that our foreign 
friends can depend upon us as a substitute for depending on themselves... 
"I endorse the importance of facing this problem on an over-all 
basis instead of dealing with anticipated crises, one by one...but 
equally I recognize that intelligent American self-interest immediately 
requires a sound, over-all inventory of our own resources to deter-
mine the latitude within which we may consider these foreign needs. 
This comes first because if America ever sags, the world's hopes sag 
with her."25 
The suggestion of a review of our capabilities was approved by the Under-
secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Mr. William L. Clayton, and on June 22 
President Truman announced creation of three committees to do the job, A nine-
teen-man committee, carefully balanced among industry, labor, agriculture, and 
the professions, was formed under the chairmanship of W, Averell Harriman, then 
the Secretary of Commerce. This was the committee to review the whole problem 
of foreign aid and to determine "the limit within which the United States may 
safely and wisely plan." In addition. Secretary of the Interior Julius A. Krug 
headed a group to study the state of the nation's resources, and Edwin G. Nourse, 
Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, headed a study group 
on the Impact of foreign assistance upon the domestic economy. 
The legislative branch was not to be outdone in thoroughly studying the 
problems involved before determining what course of action should be taken. 
With the increasing need for dollars in large quantities to support our foreign 
policy, the House reached a new ascendancy as a force in determining that policy. 
The Foreign Affairs Committee of the House undertook to investigate the whole 
problem, and, in addition, the House made use of a special select committee to 
25lbld.. p. 376 
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go to Europe to see what was involved in this crisis. This committee, known 
as the Herter Committee, was formed from certain members of several of the 
committees whose field of interest would be involved in the kind of project envi-
sioned by the Marshall Plan. Such a committee had been proposed by Represent-
ative Christian Herter of Massachusetts as early as April to provide a wider 
and larger view of our foreign policy, but was not actually appointed until 
July. It represented a cross section of House opinion on foreign policy. This 
committee made several suggestions for the improvement and implementation of 
the European Recovery Program but basically approved of launching a program of 
this nature. 
The first Issue at hand was a proposed stop-gap aid bill for France and 
Italy to keep them solvent and free until the spring of 1948, by which time a 
long-range recovery program could be worked out. Congressional reaction was 
uncertain in spite of the full cooperation of Senator Vandenberg and Congress-
man Eaton. Senator Taft, without whose cooperation Vandenberg was much less 
powerful, showed signs of opposition to the program. In late July he spoke 
at Columbus, giving a good deal of attention to foreign policy: 
"In the field of foreign policy, the Congress has done its best 
to cooperate with the policies of the President. We realize that 
the Constitution and existing law confer upon the President almost 
complete power over the foreign policy of the United States, In 
general I believe Congress should hesitate to interfere unless that 
policy involves us in the danger of an unnecessary war or proposes 
to drain the resources of our tax payers and our productive labor 
to an unreasonable degree, 
"I believe it is a field where Congress should not, except with 
great provocation, give foreign countries a picture of a divided 
America. I am not happy about the country's foreign policy... 
"Our German policy has wrecked the economy of Europe and now 
we are called upon for cash from our taxpayers to remedy the break-
down. The whole policy has created.an impossible situation which 
only a strong executive policy can hope even to alleviate. Certain-
ly it is beyond the power of Congress which cannot initiate foreign 
policy. Congress went along this year with the Greek-Turkish loan 
and with the relief for Europe made necessary by the stupidity of 
our previous policy... 
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"No country has ever been so generous as the United States in 
affording aid to others. We have made dollars available to foreign 
countries in almost unlimited amounts with little restriction of the 
use to be made of them. We have thus permitted the rising of many 
domestic prices. Certainly we are interested in reasonable loans to 
enable foreign countries to go to work and help themselves, but I 
believe these loans, hereafter, should be confined to actual goods, 
machinery, and equipment necessary to enable the countries which 
secure them to restore their own productive ability. Certainly we 
must move very cautiously and be sure that additional loans really 
furnish incentive to the foreign peoples involved to work harder to , 
support themselves and are not too burdensome on our own taxpayers." 
As late as November, 1947, Vandenberg spoke of having "trouble with Bob 
Taft," which he thought was due to the "presidential fever." 
The urgency of the crisis raised the possibility of a special session of 
Congress late in the year. There was a good deal of initial opposition to this 
idea at first among Republican members of Congress, but the session was con-
vened in mid-November. Joint hearings on the Interim Foreign Aid Act were held 
with the members of the House and Senate Foreign Affairs Committees participating. 
The bill, Jointly sponsored by Senators Connally and Vandenberg, was reported 
by the Senate committee with little change from the Administration's proposal, 
although it is to be noted that before submitting their requests, the State 
Department had already cut Italian aid from $575,000,000 to $227,000,000, the 
French request from $459,000,000 to $328,000,000, and the Austrian aid from 
$87,000,000 to $58,000,000. By the time the Senate floor debate began, it was 
evident that there would be little opposition on the final vote. Even Taft 
announced that he would vote for it, but there was still considerable opposition 
to certain aspects of the program. A proposed amendment to cut the whole amount 
of the bill to $400 million was supported by twenty Republicans, including Taft, 
but Vandenberg mustered twenty-seven GOP votes against it, and it was easily 
defeated. 
'New. York Times. Aug. 1, 1947. p. 8 
A similar group of Senators backed a series of amendments to eliminate 
local currency funds and to provide for giving away certain surplus United 
States commodities. These were rejected by voice vote, as was a Democratic 
move to tie the program to the United Nations. It is to be remembered that in 
the Greek-Turkish aid program it was Vandenberg and other Republicans who were 
concerned about bringing the United Nations into the picture. By a voice vote, 
also, an amendment offered by Kern of Missouri to assure that the United States 
got full credit for all aid was carried. The bill was passed by a vote of 83 
to 6, with the Republicans supporting it (44-3).2? 
The House version of the bill which was reported on December 2 differed 
from the Senate measure at several points. First, China was included in the 
aid program; second, there was provision for more off-shore procurement; third, 
there would be an FBI investigation of all employees administering the aid; 
fourth, the amount was pared to $590,000,000, but the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation was authorized to advance $150,000,000 pending the actual appro-
priation. 
In the debate on the floor, opposition came from the extreme isolationists 
in the Republican party such as Noah Mason of Illinois, Clare Hoffman of Michi-
gan, and Leo E. Allen of Illinois. The inclusion of China encountered little 
opposition, although there was an amendment proposed (and defeated) to limit 
this aid to $100. Another amendment which was defeated would have struck out 
the provision for incentive goods. This was opposed by all of the Herter 
Committee except August H. Andresen of Minnesota and by most of the Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, but was defeated by a teller vote of only 145 to 132.28 
27Cong, Record. Vol. 93. p. 10980, (80th Cong., 1st Sess., Dec. 1, 1947) 
The opposing Republicans were Langer (N. D.), Moore (Okla.), and Robertson 
(Wyo.); the Democrats were McKellar (Tenn.), O'Daniel (Texas), and Taylor (Idaho) 
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Two amendments to cut the amount of aid and one to increase it were de-
feated, and the bill was passed by a voice vote. In the conference committee 
China aid was left in, and there were numerous other modifications to the bills 
of both Houses. The Senate passed this compromise by a voice vote, and the 
House by a vote of 313 to 82, with the Republicans favoring passage (l6l to 
70).29 
Work could now get under way on the long-range foreign assistance program 
envisioned by the Marshall Plan. The Republican role in the passage of this 
plan into law can only partially be told by the way the GOP voted in Congress. 
This was not a case of the Administration presenting a full-blown proposal to 
a waiting legislature. As a matter of fact, this was seldom the case in the 
80th Congress, but on this program, particularly, the Republican leadership, 
as well as what was known of Republican opinion, was in large measure respon-
sible for the kind of legislation placed before the lawmakers. 
Dulles had been sent on a special mission to France and was present at 
the Paris meeting of the Big Four in 1947. Vandenberg had been consulted from 
the very beginning and had played a large role in deciding what Congress should 
be asked to do. Other Republican Congressional leaders had been consulted as 
well. There was little doubt but that Vandenberg would have personally supported 
almost any steps asked for, but it was not his job merely to give vigorous 
support. He had first to suggest to the Administration what he felt could be 
pushed through on Capitol Hill and then to work to gain support for the proposed 
program among his Congressional colleagues. 
After the President's message on December 19, 1947, there v/as the usual 
variety of comments. Senator White said, "The President's figures will be 
sustained." Kem stated, "I shall be unable to follow the President further 
29lbld.. PP. 11412-11413 (Dec. 15, 1947) 
in this foreign venture," Taft asserted that the idea of committing the country 
for four or five years was not possible. One year at a time was all he could 
see, while McCarthy felt that we should demand military bases in return for the 
aid. 
From January 8 to February 5 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a 
series of hearings that must have been among the most exhaustive in Senate 
history. Every shade of opinion had its chance for expression. Vandenberg was 
anxious for just this kind of a national debate. Meanwhile, a group of twenty 
Republican Senators, called the "revisionists," were meeting in a downtown 
hotel in Washington. The group was composed of Senators Ball, Brooks, Capehart, 
Robertson, Jenner, Kem, McCarthy, Knowland, Bricker, Buck, Cain, Ecton, Hawkes, 
Malone, Reed, Revercomb, Williams, and Young, Although the group claimed they 
were not out to kill the program, but merely to avoid a split in the party over 
this issue, they were definitely the isolationist group. In the end nine of 
this group voted for, and ten against the bill, while Hawkes was announced in 
opposition. Members of this group, however, offerred most of the amendments 
proposed in the Senate, 
Chiefly arising out of Vandenberg's soundings in Congress and his work with 
the Administration, several modifications in the program had been agreed upon 
before the bill reached the Senate floor. The administration had originally 
favored a four-year authorization of $17,000,000,000. Vandenberg first suggested 
that the four-year authorized ion be made general and that the first appropria-
tion be made for the period from April, 1948, to July 1, 1949, and that it be 
for $6.8 billion dollars. In the Senate committee this was further modified 
to make it a one-year appropriation of $5.3 billion. This was no change in the 
scope of the program or the rate of expenditure. The Senate, committee also 
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adopted the recommendations of a Brooking Institution Study on the administra-
tion of this program, following which the bill was reported unanimously. 
It had been at Republican insistence that the Administration had proposed 
setting up a new agency outside the State Department to carry out this program, 
and the Brookings Institution made further suggestions for setting it up on a 
"business-like" basis. The major conclusions reported by Brookings were (l) that 
a new agency should be established having close relations with, but separate 
from, the Department of State; (2) that the agency have a single head with 
cabinet status; (3) that the agency should have a noncorporate form, but should 
be exempted from certain existing legal restrictions on salaries and personnel; 
(4) that the head of the agency should have an advisory board appointed by the 
President to aid the administrator, but not to interfere with administrative 
aspects of the program. 
The floor debate in the Senate lasted from March 1 until March 13, with a 
total of sixty-nine Senators participating. Vandenberg led the supporters of 
the bill, while the main opponents were Malone, Langer, Ball, Kem, and Rever-
comb. As the debate proceeded, there was some evidence that events in Europe, 
principally the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, were gaining support for the 
bill. 
Among the more controversial amendments which were proposed were the 
following: 
1. An amendment sponsored by Glen Taylor (Democrat, of Idaho) which 
would have channelled all aid through the United Nations was rejected by a vote 
of 74 to 13, Republicans voting 39 to 1 in opposition.31 
3°The Brookings Institution, Report to the Committee of Foreign Relations. 
United States Senate, pp. 15-20 
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2. A Taft amendment to reduce the amount of the authorization from 
$5.3 billion to $4 billion was rejected by a vote of 56 to 31. but the Repub-
licans opposed it by only 24 to 23.32 
3. Senator Capehart's substitute bill providing relief funds and 
loans for reconstruction through the RFC was rejected (22-68), with the Repub-
licans opposed to it (29-19).33 
4. An amendment by Brooks of Illinois to make the European Recovery 
Program's special representatives abroad more directly responsible to the Ad-
ministrator of the program and less to the Secretary of State was supported by 
the Republicans (21-20), but the Senate as a whole rejected it (52-25).3^ 
On the last day of the debate the bill was passed by a resounding majority 
of 69 to 17, and Republicans supported the bill by a vote of 31 to 13.35 
Consideration of ERP in the House stretched from December 17 to March 31, 
and the bill which emerged had some significant additions. By Administration 
request, the House committee added $570,000,000 for China and $275,000,000 for 
Greece and Turkey. The Republican members of the committee decided that the 
best way to proceed would be by an omnibus bill including the aforementioned 
sums for areas outside the scope of the main European Recovery Program. The 
Democrats on the committee had some fear that this would delay the program, 
but the Republicans contended that there was so much sentiment for Greek-Turkish 
aid among their members that the effect of the combination would assure smoother 
sailing for the bill. In addition, during the hearings, sentiment developed 
32Ibid.. p. 2708. (Mar. 12, 1948) 
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for military as well as economic aid to China, The bill was reported with all 
these features including an amount for the International Children's Fund. 
Although there were many amendments offered on the floor, none which would 
have had a major effect on the scope of this bill was adopted against the wishes 
of its sponsors. The bill was passed on the last day of March, with all the 
added grants of aid included, by a vote of 329 to 74, and with the Republicans 
supporting it (l71-6l).36 
The Senate in the meantime had voted aid bills for Greece and Turkey 
($275,000,000) and for China ($363,000,000 for economic and military purposes). 
A Conference Report combining all of these bills as a compromise measure was 
accepted in the Senate by voice vote, and in the House by a vote of 318 to 75, 
with the Republicans voting in the same proportions as previously,37 
There were two postlogues to this successful climax for the EBP, both of 
which held possibilities for severely damaging the effectiveness of the program. 
The first arose over the choice of an administrator for the new Economic Cooper-
ation Administration. It was understood from the early consideration of this 
bill that the administration of this program would be organically independent 
of the State Department and that it would be run on "a sound business basis." 
These were strong selling points for supporters of the bill in Congress. It was 
also considered important that the head of the new agency should come from the 
outside business world with strong industrial credentials and not "via the 
State Department." For this reason, in his discussion with the Administration 
over this matter, Vandenberg rejected first the Undersecretary of State for 
Economic Affairs, William Clayton, and later, Dean Acheson, then outside the 
government and practicing law. Vandenberg apparently then urged the appointment 
36lbid.. p. 3321 (Mar. 23, 1948) 
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of Paul G. Hoffman, President of Studebaker Corporation, and was successful in 
obtaining hie nomination and confirmation. 
Another crisis for the program came in June when the House, led by John 
Taber, Chairman of the Appropriations Committee, ordered a $2,160,000,000 cut 
in the first year's appropriation. Only by the most vehement appeal to the 
Senate Appropriations Committee and the Senate itself was Vandenberg able to 
have the greater portion of the funds restored and thus save the program. 
IV 
The launching of the full-scale European aid program was undoubtedly the 
most noteworthy achievement of the 8oth Congress, but there were other signifi-
cant developments, not the least of which was the Vandenberg Resolution. One 
cannot be certain whether even the Senators who voted on this resolution were 
aware of what long-range potentialities it contained. It is likewise difficult 
to be certain of the exact birthplace of the ideas involved in this generally-
worded resolution. It may have been as far back as the San Francisco Conference 
when Article 51 was formulated. That article set forth that nothing in the 
Charter should impair the "inherent right of individual and collective self-
defense if an armed attack occurs," and until the Security Council had taken 
measures to maintain peace. In addition Articles 52, 53. and 54 of the Charter 
permitted the existence of regional arrangements for dealing with problems of 
international peace and security, and the Rio de Janeiro Conference of Western 
Hemisphere nations had drafted a hemispheric defense treaty under these 
articles. 
Now in 1948 the intransigence of the Russians was becoming more and more 
apparent, and by their frequent use of the veto in the United Nations Security 
Council they were frustrating the hopes for that organization as a peace-keeping 
device. Many solutions were being proposed for this problem, among which were 
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suggestions for world government and removal of the veto, either in whole or in 
part. Vandenberg saw possibilities in the aforementioned portions of the Charter, 
Working together with the Undersecretary of State, Robert A. Lovett, Van-
denberg sought to define the problem and move toward a solution. As later re-
called by Lovett, the problems were reduced primarily to: (l) formal expression 
by the Senate in favor of removing the United Nations veto from all questions 
involving the pacific settlement of disputes and the admission of new members 
to the United Nations; and (2) a mechanism through which the United States 
could proceed to the support of such regional and collective arrangements as the 
Western Union Treaty signed at Brussels. Lovett and his staff of experts, with 
the cooperation of the staff of the Foreign Relations Committee, produced several 
draft resolutions, the preferred draft running to three or four pages. 
Following this, Vandenberg, first with the aid of Lovett, and finally with 
Marshall, Dulles, Congressional leaders, and the high military command, perfected 
the draft. The result was a Senate resolution advising the President to seek 
security for the free world through United States support of mutual defense 
arrangements to operate within the United Nations Charter but outside the 
Security Council veto. It also advised the President to attempt to strengthen 
the Charter through curbs on the veto itself and by providing a United Nations 
police force together with the regulation and reduction of armaments under a 
dependable guaranty against violation. 
The text, as finally adopted by the Senator, read as follows: 
"Whereas peace with justice and the defense of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms require international cooperation through more 
effective use of the United Nations: therefore be it 
"Resolved, that the Senate reaffirm the policy of the United 
States to achieve international peace and security through the United 
Nations so that armed force shall not be used except in the common 
interest, and that the President be advised of the sense of the Senate 
that this government, by constitutional process, should particularly 
pursue the following objectives within the United Nations Charter: 
"(l) Voluntary agreement to remove the veto from all questions 
involving pacific settlements of international disputes and situations, 
and from the admission of new members. 
"(2) Progressive development of regional and other collective 
arrangements for individual and collective self-defense in accordance 
with the purposes, principles, and provisions of the Charter. 
"(3) Association of the United States by constitutional process, 
with such regional and other collective arrangements as are basdd on 
continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, and as affecit its 
national security. 
"(4) Contributing to the maintenance of peace by making clear its 
determination to exercise the right of individual-or collective self-
defense under Article 51 should any armed attack occur affecting its 
national security. 
"(5) Maximum efforts to obtain agreements to provide the United 
Nations with armed forces as provided by the Charter, and to obtain 
agreement among member nations upon universal regulation and reduction 
of armaments under adequate and dependable guaranty against violation. 
"(6) If necessary, after adequate effort toward strengthening 
the United Nations, review of the Charter at an appropriate time by 
a General Conference called under Article 109 or by the General 
Assembly."38 
After careful examination, the Foreign Relations Committee on June 10 re-
ported the resolution unanimously in favor of passage, and on June 11 the one-
day debate was held. After an explanatory statement by Vandenberg, the Michi-
gan Senator submitted to questioning. The Senate rejected (6l-6) an amendment 
proposed by Senator Pepper of Florida which would have deleted all reference 
to the possibility of American aid.39 The Republicans opposed this amendment 
by a vote of 31 to 3, and they voted (32-2) in favor of the resolution which 
was adopted by the Senate (64-4),^° A few weeks later, Under-secretary Lovett 
3 8 1 2 ^ , p p. 6053-6054 (May 19, 1948) 
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sat down at the State Department with the Ambassadors of Canada, Britain, France, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, and the Luxembourg Minister to begin discussions which 
led eventually to the North Atlantic Treaty. 
V 
In all his efforts on behalf of . bipartisanship in foreign policy Vanden-
berg firmly believed, or at least said he firmly believed, that he was aiding 
the Republican cause more than he was helping the Democrats: 
"Bi-partisan cooperation in Foreign Policy (which involves no 
remote suggestion of withholding vigorous and vigilant criticism 
when and where deserved) is not only 'good patriotism' in my book; 
it is also the best kind of Republican politics, ft^-1 
Thus Vandenberg had an additional reason for sharing the general Republican 
confidence that 1948 was their party's year to regain control of the Executive. 
The 1946 victory was looked upon as a stepping stone to the White House, and 
Vandenberg felt that the Congressional party's behavior on foreign affairs had 
justified the feeling that the Republicans were well prepared to assume control 
of the nation's foreign affairs in a responsible manner. 
Vandenberg had the additional satisfaction of knowing that many Republicans 
wanted to nominate him for President, In fact, he felt obliged to devote a 
good bit of attention to keeping out of the race. He had early determined 
that he did not want the nomination, but he found that "this business of not 
running for President is a tough one—if you really mean it."^2 In spite of 
all his efforts, his name was placed in nomination at Philadelphia, and he 
received several votes on the first ballot. 
The Senator's primary avowed interest, however, was in the foreign policy 
plank in the Republican platform. He prepared a rough draft of what he con-
sidered an acceptable statement on foreign affairs and sent it to Dulles with 
^Vandenberg, p. 555 
42Ibid.. p. 421 
these words: 
"Please give it a quick review—add or subtract—delete or ex-
pand. I think it is very necessary that we get something down in 
'black and white1 without too much delay, because I think it is quite 
obvious now that a serious effort will be made in the Resolutions 
Committee at the convention to upset any sort of an enlightened for-
eign policy and return to the 'good old days' when it took two weeks 
to cross the Atlantic, "^3 
Vandenberg confided to friends that he could be precipitated into the race 
for the nomination if (l) it was necessary to block adoption of an isolationist 
foreign policy plank; or (2) if Governor Green's (Illinois) keynote address to 
the convention presages a knockdown battle between the isolationist wing and 
those backing the " bipartisan foreign policy approach: 
"Philadelphia: My chief interest in this convention at all 
times was the platform. I was prepared to fight to the finish— 
on the convention floor if need be—to protect the GOP against a 
reversion to 'isolationism' or against desertion of the peace plan, 
including 'collective security' and the European Recovery Program... 
"It wasn't necessary—thanks to the superb job done by Senator 
Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., as Chairman of the Resolutions Committee— 
thanks also to the fact that it was speedily evident that nobody 
was willing to do serious battle for the antediluvian McCormick, 
Chicago Tribune, point of view. 
"Before Lodge (Bless Him J) went to Philadelphia, he asked me 
for a working paper on a foreign policy plank. I gave it to him. 
He put it all the way through his sub-committee and his full com-
mittee and the Convention practically Intact. I think it is of 
historical importance to nail down this fact, 
"Thus it will be entirely apparent that the final platform draft 
on foreign policy is in almost the verbatim pattern of the original 
working paper which I gave to Chairman Lodge and also to ex-Governor 
Brucker of Michigan, who was on the Resolutions Committee. 
"Before he presented the working paper to his Committee, Senator 
Lodge, with typical acumen, added four or five more extreme state-
ments (all in harmony with this theme) for the express purpose of 
giving the little coterie of isolationists on his Committee something 
to knock out. One was a tacit condemnation of the House Republicans 
for having voted for European Relief and then against necessary 
appropriations for it. In due course, the 'extras' were knocked 
4-3lbid.. p. 428 
down, just as Lodge had planned, and he emerged with what I consider 
to be a miraculous performance..."^ 
Vandenberg's account of the birth of the 1948 Republican foreign policy 
plank seems to be an essentially accurate as well as an "inside" report. One 
interesting note added by Anne O'Hare McCormlck in the New York Times is the 
report that the choice of Lodge for Chairman of the Resolutions Committee was 
made by Robert Taft. The very fact of Lodge's appointment seemed to indicate 
that the internationalists would dictate the foreign policy plank to a large 
extent. 5 
After the sub-committee had unanimously adopted the Vandenberg plank, the 
scene shifted to the full Resolutions Committee where the major attack on the 
plank by the isolationists was made. Depsite this attack, however, the full 
committee did not change the proposals substantially. The details of the fight 
were not made public, but Lodge said that while there had been changes in the 
language of the sub-committee's version, he did not feel they weakened the 
stand on foreign policy. Two fairly significant changes were made: (l) a 
strengthening of the statement on the protection of Israel's boundaries as 
defined by the United Nations and favoring American aid to that new country; and 
(2) deletion of any reference to efforts by the United Nations looking toward 
international control of atomic energy. Only the Illinois members voted against 
the adoption of the revised plank, and they said they would not carry their 
fight to the floor. 
In his diary Vandenberg made a parallel-column compilation of the final 
platform draft and of his own work. Only certain portions of this are re-
printed in his Private Papers, but these are interesting as an indication of 
how closely his text was followed: 
^Ibld.. pp. 428-429 
^5New York Times. June 23, 1948, p. 26 
PLATFORM 
We dedicate our foreign policy to the 
preservation of a free America in a 
free world of free men. With neither 
malice nor desire for conquest, we 
shall strive for a just peace with 
all nations. 
We shall erect our foreign policy on 
the basis of friendly firmness which 
welcomes cooperation but spurns appease-
ment. We shall pursue a consistent 
foreign policy which invites steadi-
ness and reliance and which thus avoids 
the misunderstandings from which wars 
result. We shall protect the future 
against the errors of the Democratic 
Administration, which too often has 
lacked clarity, competence or consist-
ency in our vital international rela-
tionships and has too often abandoned 
justice. 
We believe in collective security 
against aggression and in behalf of 
justice and freedom. We shall support 
the United Nations as the world's best 
hope in this direction, striving to 
strengthen it and promote its effective 
evolution and use. The United Nations 
should progressively establish inter-
national law, be freed of any veto in 
the pacific settlement of^international 
disputes, and be provided with the 
armed forces contemplated by the Char-
ter. We particularly commend the value 
of regional arrangements as prescribed 
by the Charter; and we cite the Western 
Hemispherical Defense Pact as a useful 
model. 
We faithfully dedicate ourselves to 
peace with justice. 
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MY TEXT: 
We dedicate our foreign policy to the 
preservation of free America in a 
free world of free men. With neither 
malice nor conquest aimed at any other 
power on earth, we shall strive for 
an honorable and just peace with all 
nations. We shall omit no efforts to 
this end. 
We shall erect our foreign policy on 
the basis of friendly firmness which 
welcomes cooperation but declines 
appeasement. We shall pursue a con-
sistent foreign policy which invites 
reliance and which thus avoids the 
misunderstandings from which wars too 
often flow. Thus we shall protect 
the future against the errors of the 
past when the Democratic Administra-
tion has too often compromised with 
our ideals and too often lacked clar-
ity, competence, or consistency in our 
vital international relationships. 
We believe in collective security 
against aggression and in behalf of 
justice and freedom. We shall support 
the United Nations as the world's best 
hope in this direction. We shall 
strive to strengthen the United Na-
tions and promote its effective evolu-
tion and use. The United Nations 
should progressively establish inter-
national law. It should control 
atomic energy. It should be freed of 
any veto in the pacific settlement of 
international disputes. It should be 
provided with the armed forces con-
templated by the Charter. We partic-
ularly commend the utility of regional 
arrangements as prescribed by the 
Charter; and we point with pride to 
the Western Hemispherical Defense 
Fact as a useful model. 
Our faithful dedication is to peace 
with justice and honor.^6 
'Vandenberg, pp. 429-430 
It was an internationalist plank from beginning to end, At no time during 
the period previously covered by this study had the internationalists so easily 
written in the platform so nearly what they desired. Criticism of the Admini-
stration was relatively mild and the following statement on "bipartisanship was 
included: 
"We are proud of the part that Republicans have taken in those 
limited areas of foreign policy in which they have been permitted to 
participate. We shall invite the Minority party to join us under the 
next Republican Administration in stopping partisan politics at the 
waters' edge,"^" 
It is perhaps further indicative of the power of the internationalists at the 
1948 Convention that the-nominations for President and Vice-President did not 
result in what Vandenberg called a "hybrid ticked." Of course the foreign 
policy views of the candidates are only one factor in their selection, but they 
are nonetheless one factor. In 1940 Willkie's interventionist views had been 
balanced by McNary*s non-interventionist views. In 1944, Dewey, who favored 
full participation by the United States in post-war international affairs, was 
teamed with Bricker, who was of the isolationist camp. 
The night in 1948 when Dewey was nominated the new candidate called a 
conference of about twenty Republican leaders in his hotel suite to discuss a 
Vice-Presidential candidate. Vandenberg states that he argued his view on the 
matter directly with Dewey: 
"I was entirely frank in urging Dewey not to build a hybrid 
ticket—not to choose a V. P. who was not in full harmony with the 
platform and with his own consistent support of international co-
operation,., I argued that we could not go to the country with a 
ticket which did no more than personify the split on this issue 
among Republicans in Congress, I recommended either Stassen or 
Warren, "48 
^Proceedings. Rep.. Natl. Oonv.. 1948, p. 193 
•^8Vandenberg, p, 440 
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What effect this admonition had is difficult to say. Dewey later said, 
"I was scrupulous not to express a preference... At Philadelphia Warren was 
genuinely the unanimous choice of the group."^9 i n s0 far as he had expressed 
himself on international affairs Warren was an internationalist, and on foreign 
policy, at least, there was nothing hybrid about the 1948 Republican ticket. 
It was not expected that Dewey, who had helped to father the idea of non-
partisanship in international affairs in 1944, would make foreign policy a major 
issue in the 1948 campaign. Early in the campaign Dewey drew a distinction 
between the phases of American foreign policy that had been the subject of bi-
partisan collaboration and those on which Republican leaders had not been con-
sulted in advance. He indicated that those in the latter class would be the 
subject of major criticism in the Presidential campaign. He listed the Greek-
Turkish policy, the discussions at the Potsdam conference, the "entire China 
policy or lack of policy," and the handling of the Pakistan situation as falling 
in the latter category. As to the European Recovery Program, Dewey said that 
in the form in which it was enacted it conformed very largely to the views of 
Republican leaders. This statement was taken to indicate that the ERP would be 
exempt from attack. 
The "bipartisan policy in general, he felt, had been limited to the forma-
tion of the United Nations and American participation in it. In the same state-
ment he urged John Foster Dulles, his close adviser on foreign affairs, to 
accept the part in the United Nations General Assembly (meeting at Paris) which 
had been offered him by the Department of State.^ 
49Ibid.. p. 441 
5<>New York Times. Ju ly 2, 1948, p . 1 
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A week later a statement of a slightly different tone was issued by the 
Republican National Committee, It was a twenty-six page document written by 
Representative Charles Halleck on "Accomplishments of the Republican Congress.w 
This statement accused the "New Dealers" of "fumbling and bungling" in our for-
eign relations, stated that thirty-two billion in foreign aid was the root 
cause of domestic high prices, and averred that most of our problems stem from 
"the betrayal at Quebec, Yalta, Teheran, and Potsdam." On most foreign policies, 
Halleck wrote, the so-called ^bipartisan foreign policy has been "a myth, because 
our Republican leaders were not consulted,"51 This document would have to be 
considered as- official Republican policy although not a forecast of what a Re-
publican Administration's foreign policy would be, A month later, however, the 
National Committee refused to use a document submitted to it entitled "Demo-
cratic Duplicity and Appeasement in Foreign Policy Administration."52 
In September Vandenberg issued a statement on behalf of himself, Dewey, 
and Dulles stating that America was united on foreign policy. It was a send-off 
to John Foster Dulles as he left for Paris, as well as by way of comment in the 
face of the blockade of Berlin by the Russians in Eastern Germany: 
"Regardless of political differences at home, we are serving 
notice on the world that America is united to protect American rights 
everywhere and through firmness in the right to seek peace with 
justice for ourselves and the other peace-loving peoples of the world. 
"It is of the greatest importance that other nations which do 
not understand our political system should not be misled by our 
political campaign at home. We shall be in internal controversy 
regarding many phases of foreign policy. But we shall not be in 
controversy over the basic fact that America is united against 
aggression and the foes of freedom. 
"I am happy to say that Governor Dewey and I have discussed 
these matters many times, and one of the reasons I confidently 
5llbid.. July 10, 1948, p. 6 
52ibid.. Aug. 15, 1948, Sec. IV, p. 7 
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look forward to his election as President of the United States is 
the fact that he deeply believes in this concept and will stoutly 
sustain it over the years that lie ahead,"" 
Dulles later, announced that he was going to the United Nations Assembly 
not only in his official capacity as an American representative but also as a 
Republican "with the approval and support" of Mr, Dewey, He said the Government 
had arranged separate communications facilities whereby he could inform Dewey 
quickly of important developments and "get the guidance of his views."5^ 
It is apparent from such statements as these not only that the Republicans 
were confident of victory, but that these Republican foreign policy leaders 
were beginning to think very seriously about the problems they would face if 
they became responsible for American foreign policy. So sure was Vandenberg 
of victory that on several occasions during the campaign he wrote Dulles to 
counsel extreme care against prejudicing the "incoming" Republican administration 
by campaign foreign policy statements resulting in commitments which would have 
to be met after election day. 
Dulles agreed basically with this approach, but felt that Dewey was en-
titled to some latitude because he was, after all, running for a political 
office. "I hope you will be tolerant," he wrote, "of the exigencies of the 
campaign and of political influence from which Mr. Truman does not divorce him-
self and from which the Governor cannot wholly divorce himself,"" 
It was true that Truman made slight reference at any time in the campaign 
to the part played by the Republicans in transforming his foreign policy into 
working policies. He continuously attacked the 8oth Republican Congress as the 
54lbid., Sept. 18, 1948, p. 1 
55vandenberg, p. 448 
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worst or second worst in history. Vandenberg was much disturbed because he 
felt Mr. Truman failed to draw a line between domestic issues, which might be 
fair targets for political attack, and the area which he (Vandenberg) regarded 
as lying within the :bipartisan foreign policy area. To Vandenberg the accom-
plishments in foreign affairs of the 80th Congress constituted "the most amazing 
record of constructive cooperation ever written in any Congress," and he thought 
it was responsible for the country's substantial unity in its foreign policy 
voice.5° Vandenberg later made a radio address mainly to answer the Administra-
tion's attacks, although he also discussed his cooperation with the Department 
of State on the Berlin blockade and other pressing matters during the campaign. 
In October the campaign-conscious nation was startled by the rumor that 
Mr. Truman intended to send Chief Justice Vinson to Moscow as his personal 
emissary to Stalin to talk peace. The proposal was blocked by the Secretary of 
State and others, but caused a great flurry for several days. It was regarded 
as a campaign blunder on the part of the President, and soon brought a statement 
from Governor Dewey. While there apparently was some division among Dewey's 
advisers on whether to exploit this "colossal error," it was decided not to do 
so. Instead Dewey said the following: 
"The people of America wholeheartedly and vigorously support 
the labors of our bi-partisan delegation at Paris and specifically 
its Insistence on a prompt lifting of the blockade of Berlin. 
"The nations of the world can rest assured that the American 
people are in fact united in their foreign policy and will firmly 
and unshakably uphold the United Nations and our friends of the 
free world in every step to build and preserve the peace. "^7 
Other Republicans were not so charitable, and on the day following the 
Dewey statement, Taft at Nashville attacked the Truman proposal to send Vinson, 
56rbid.. p. 448 
57New York Times. Oct. 11, 1948, p. 1 
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saying it had weakened our position with regard to Russia, discrediting both 
the United Nations and Secretary Marshall. But Taft also was looking forward 
to future responsibilities when he said in the same speech: 
"Republicans in Congress under the able leadership of Senator 
Vandenberg have cooperated with the President whenever they have been 
allowed to do so, and they have shown their complete ability to take 
over the conduct of foreign affairs even in the midst of a war."*8 
Certainty of success lasted up through an early morning edition of the 
Chicago Tribune on the first Wednesday after the first Monday in November. Then 
the GOP faced four more years in the wilderness, and a new period opened which 
would bring significant developments in foreign policy in the Republican Party. 
58Ibid.. Oct. 12, 1948, p. l 
CHAPTER VI 
THE REPUBLICANS AND THE COLD WAR: EUROPE 
It will be the purpose of this chapter and the one which follows to trace 
the record written by the Republicans on the foreign policy issues growing out 
of the great conflict between East and West that has become known as the Cold 
War. This conflict began in 1945 and was intensified during the years of the 
80th Congress. The attempts of the American government, under divided control, 
to meet the early thrusts of the Soviet have been shown in the preceding chapter. 
It now remains to study the Republican attitudes on those foreign policy measures 
undertaken by the second Truman Administration, locked in a struggle with the 
Russian world which took many varied forms. Following this narrative it will 
be in order to examine the Republican record to see what it meant (l) in terms 
of the relative strengths of the internationalist and isolationist wings of the 
party, and (2) in terms of bipartisanship in foreign policy. 
American aid to Europe in various forms had been continuous since 1939, 
although the purposes of the aid had shifted from time to time. Prior to our 
entry into World War II, we were the "arsenal of democracy." From 1941 to 1945. 
in addition to massing our own gigantic forces, we continued military aid to 
our allies, both democratic and communist. Beginning before VJ day and con-
tinuing into 1948, Congress appropriated many millions for direct relief aid 
and rehabilitation in the wartorn areas of Europe. This aid was originally 
granted without thought to political considerations, but soon fell under heavy 
criticism when it was felt that the Communists were making political capital 
out of our money in certain areas of eastern Europe. In 1946 Great Britain 
was the recipient of a $3.5 billion dollar loan designed to save her from 
bankruptcy immediately following the close of hostilities. Economic and 
military grants to Greece and Turkey were voted when it appeared as though 
Western hegemony was in danger in those states. 
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By 1947. when it appeared that the economies of western Europe were not 
recovering even with relief grants and that political unrest was the immediate 
result, the gigantic European Recovery Program was launched to aid these coun-
tries in developing their manufacturing and agriculture to a point where internal 
needs could be met, and export markets could be developed. Once this was 
accomplished, it was hoped by some that America could finally end the seemingly 
endless drain of her resources in aiding Europe. The program was fairly launched 
in 1948 with a $5.3 billion dollar appropriation for a period of fifteen months. 
It will be remembered that Republican support in Congress for the program was 
strong, and under the leadership of Senator Vandenberg and other GOP bipartisan 
leaders, both House and Senate Republicans recorded sizable majorities in favor 
of the new plan,1 
The 1948 Republican platform had this to say on the subject of foreign 
economic aid: 
"Within the prudent limits of our ovra economic welfare, we shall 
cooperate, on a basis of self-help and mutual aid, to assist other 
peace-loving nations to restore their economic independence and the 
human rights and fundamental freedoms for which we fought two wars 
and upon which dependable peace must build. We shall insist on 
businesslike and efficient administration of all foreign aid."2 
Early in 1949 Congress began to consider the terms tinder which the ERP 
would be extended. The Economic Cooperation Administration was eminently 
successful in obtaining the funds it requested to continue the program. The 
request was for $1.15 billion for the last quarter of the Government's 1949 
fiscal year and $4.28 billion through fiscal 1950. The Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee accepted the bill as presented with one exception. It approved an 
addition to the preamble proposed by Alexander Wiley (Republican, of Wisconsin) 
which called for the rapid unification of Europe. This change was opposed by 
•^Figures A and B 
2Proceedings, Rep. Na t l . Conv., 1948, p . 192 
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Chairman Connally, but the Committee unanimously reported the bill as amended. 
For the first week the floor was held by Republican opponents of the bill, 
and these opponents proposed several amendments designed to limit or defeat 
the purposes of the ERP. Other Republicans, as well as the Administration 
leaders, defended ECA and stressed the need to continue American aid. The 
attack on the ERP came in the series of amendments mentioned above. It was a 
Republican attack, and yet less than half of the Republicans in the Senate 
supported this opposition. Vften SenatorWherry (Republican.of Nebraska) moved to 
cut the ERP's second-year authorization by 15 percent, the Senate defeated his 
amendment (68-14), and only 14 of 41 Republicans voting supported the move.3 
A Taft-Russell amendment to reduce the proposed authorization by 10 percent 
gained the support of only 18 out of 41 Republicans, and the Senate as a whole 
defeated the proposed cut by a vote of 54 to 23. Senator Ellender (Democrat, 
of Mississippi) proposed that 25 percent (instead of 5 percent) of the counter-
part funds in each Marshall Plan country be allocated to the United States for 
the purchase of strategic materials. Counterpart funds were the payments by 
the recipient countries in local currencies which were made to match the dollar 
allotments from the United States, and Ellender's amendments would, have had 
the effect of diverting one fifth of these funds from their intended purpose. 
The whole Senate rejected this (22-56) as did the Republican side (l4-23).^ 
Ellender next offered an amendment to prohibit the use of these counterpart 
funds in any country for government administrative expenses or for payment of 
interest on or retirement of national debt. On this proposal the Republicans 
3Cong. Record. Vol. 95. p. 3682 (8lst Cong., 1st Sess., Apr. 1, 1949) 
4Ibid., p. 3699 
5Ibid,, p. 3848. (Apr. 5. 1949) 
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voted favorably (l9-17)» although the Senate as a whole rejected the amendment 
(27-55).6 
Among amendments from the Republican side was one by Senator Baldwin,(Re-
publican, of Connecticut) to withhold aid from any participating country which 
violated a treaty with the United States. This provision was rejected (22-59), 
but the Republicans supported it (21-15).7 McCarthy (Republican, of Wisconsin) 
proposed an amendment to withhold assistance from any country where BCA funds 
were used to discriminate against American nationals or Where any racial or 
religious discrimination was practiced in the distribution of funds. Rejection 
of this amendment was by a vote of 45 to 33, but Republicans favored the pro-
posal by a vote of 28 to 9. Both of these amendments were designed to stop 
certain alleged mistreatment of American nationals in French Morocco who were 
protected under a treaty of 1912. Senators Cain, Washington Republican, and 
Bridges, New Hampshire Republican, cooperated to introduce an amendment to 
eliminate completely the ECA authorization for fiscal 1950 «ad to substitute 
"such sums as the appropriations committees...shall recommend." Quite aware 
that the program would receive much less friendly treatment at the hands of 
the appropriations committees, the Senate overwhelmingly rejected this (15-67), 
only 12 out of 36 Republicans voting favorably.9 The only other amendment on 
which the Republicans voted contrary to the Senate as a whole was on one backed 
by Bridges and McCarran, Nevada Democrat, which would have required that all 
shipments to Europe be "appropriately labeled," presumably with some American 
emblem. The Senate rejected this (26-57). but the Republicans supported the 
amendment (23-13).10 
6Ibid., p. 3850 
7Ibid., p. 3872 
8Ibid.. p. 3877 
9Ibid., p. 3989 (Apr. 6, 1949) 
l-Olbid., p. 4133 (Apr. 8, 1949) 
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When the extension bill came to the final vote, even the solid core of a 
dozen-or-so Republicans which had led the opposition was broken up, and only 
six voted against its passage, while two were paired in opposition.11 It can 
thus be said that less than half the Republicans in the Senate in 1949 favored 
ending or in any major way reducing the scope of the European Recovery Program, 
and that only a handful were absolutely opposed to the bill in any form. 
The House Committee on Foreign Affairs gave the bill no less favorable 
treatment than had its Senate counterpart. The bill was unanimously reported, 
although somewhat later the minority members of the committee published a 
report which indicated that they had favored the "package approach" to this 
problem; that is, including the aid authorizations for all areas in one bill. 
It also voiced criticism of America's China policy. 
The House version of the bill did, however, cut $50,000,000 from the 1950 
funds, but this was later restored in conference committee. In the House de-
bate, three attempts were made to reduce the amount authorized for the ERP, but 
all were successfully defeated on division votes with only rather minor support 
for the cuts. The House passed its version of the bill by a vote of 355 to 49, 
with the Republicans concurring by a margin of 125 to 38.13 Republican support 
in the House for the second year of ERP can be compared with 1948 in Figure B. 
By 1950 the "single package" approach to foreign economic aid had returned 
to favor, and the result was the Foreign Economic Assistance Act. Five Programs— 
IMJL»* P» 4147 The twelve Senators most consistently supporting the 
limiting amendments to this bill were Bricker (Ohio), Cain (Wash.), Ecton 
(Mont.), Jenner (Indiana), Kem (Mo.), Langer (N. D.), Wherry (Neb.), Williams 
(Del.), Watkins (Utah), Young (S. D.), Butler (Neb.), and Malone (Nev.). 
1 % Rent. No_. 222, 8lst Cong., 1st Sess., (Mar. 25, 1949), pt. 2 
130ong. Record. Vol. 95, p. 4422 (8lst Cong., 1st Sess., Apr. 12, 1949) 
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ERP, Point IV, Aid to Korea, to China, and to the United Nations Children's 
Fund—v/ere rolled into one bill authorizing $3,127,450,000 in aid. This chapter 
will consider only those sections dealing with European economic aid. 
Joint Senate and House committee hearings were held on this bill followed 
by separate additional hearings in each House, The House committee reported 
the bill on March 22, recommending $1.95 billion dollars for ECA. This was one 
billion dollars less than had been requested by the Administration, but the 
House Committee proposed to furnish the balance in surplus farm commodities. 
The amendment which resulted in this cut was offered in committee by Vorys 
(Republican, of Ohio) and was adopted by a vote of 10 to 7 which cut across 
party lines. 
Consideration by the whole House began on March 24 after the Representatives 
had approved six hours of general debate by a vote of 262 to 22, the Republicans 
voting 96 in favor, 15 against.l4 Mr. Fulton (Republican, of Pennsylvania) 
moved to restore the one-billion dollar cut. Mr. Case (Republican of South 
Dakota) amended this proposal to reduce the restoration by $250,000,000. This 
reduction was accepted, and the Fulton amendment was adopted. The result was a 
restoration of $750,000,000, adopted by a standing vote of 178 to 8?.^ Follow-
ing this, another attempt to cut $500,000,000 from the program was defeated 
(137-152). It was then voted that one billion of the two and seven-tenths 
billion dollars granted to the Marshall-Plan countries must be used to buy 
United States farm surpluses. 
l4Ibid., Vol. 96, p. 4053 (8lst Cong., 2nd Sess., Mar. 4, 1950) 
15lbid.,pp. 7538-7539 (May 23, 1950) 
^Ibld.. p. 4552 (Mar. 31. 1950) 
It must be remembered that on the roll call to pass the Foreign Economic 
Assistance Act all the programs were under consideration. In view of the fact, 
however, that funds for the ERP comprised more than three-fourths of the money 
involved, it is fair to assume that the final vote chiefly reflected the 
attitude of the House on European aid. The House vote was 287 to 86 in favor 
of the bill, while the Republican division was favorable by 78 to 69.1" The 
sharp contrast of this Republican vote with that of the earlier years is shown 
clearly in Figure B. It should be remembered, also, that the bill had been 
somewhat modified along lines proposed by the Republicans before it came to 
the final test. 
The Senate Foreign Relations committee voted (ll-o) to approve the full 
$2.95 billion for ECA, and the bill was reported March 22. On the floor 
Senator Kem (Republican, of Missouri) proposed an amendment to cut the amount 
authorized by the bill by one billion dollars. This was overwhelmingly defeated 
by a vote of 62 to 17 and rejected by the Republicans by a vote of 24 to 12.l8 
Opponents of the bill as reported tried now to shave $500,000,000 from the 
total program under an amendment proposed by Taft. The vote on this was 40 to 
40 which meant defeat since proffered amendments are automatically rejected on 
tie votes. The Republicans, however, lined up behind this proposed cut (30-
6), 1 9 and on an amendment by Bridges to reduce the bill by $250,000,000, enough 
Democrats joined Republicans to put it across by a vote of 47 to 33 (Republicans 
20 
33-3). Following their efforts to reduce the amount of money involved. 
3-7Ibid., p. 4553 
l8IbidJ., p. 6442 (May 5, 1950) 
l9Ibid.. p. 6445 
20Ibid., p. 6448 
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Republicans swung behind the bill on the final vote and were counted 24 to 7 ia 
21 favor of passage. 
The Republicans in both houses were unhappy about the conference committee's 
version of the bill. In the House Republicans objected to the increase in the 
amount over what the House had authorized and voted against adoption of the 
conference report (74-63).22 in the Senate, Republicans objected to the 
guarantees offered to American investors abroad and switched from support to 
opposition by voting (27-9) against adoption of the conference report.23 This 
last vote, however, probably cannot be taken as indicative of the Senate GOP 
attitude toward the entire program. 
Before Congress was once again called upon to dispose of European economic 
aid, a Congressional election had intervened to increase GOP strength in both 
the House and the Senate. With this election had come a new wave of economy-
mindedness. In addition, there was a major shift in American thinking on aid to 
Europe. Whereas the Marshall Plan and the European Recovery Programs of 1948-
1950 were designed to strengthen the economies of western Europe and thus to 
increase their political stability and improve their world economic positions, 
the new emphasis was on military aid. With the birth of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization, both Congress and the Administration came to consider the 
most pressing need of Europe to be military forces to resist aggression which 
might be iminent. 
The aid bills of 1951 and 1952, therefore, were entitled Mutual Security 
Acts and reflected the growth of military as contrasted to economic aid. In 
21Ibid.. p. 6490 
22lbid..pp. 7538-7539 (May 23, 1950) 
23Ibid., p. 7725 (May 25, 1950) 
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the first of these (l95l) the Administration asked for a total of $8.5 billion 
for both military and economic purposes, approximately $2,2 billion of this 
being for economic assistance. The House Foreign Affairs Committee proposed 
to cut $651,250,000 from the total figure, and also suggested the creation of a 
new Mutual Security Agency, By a vote of I87 to 177 the full House cut another 
$350,000,000 from the economic portion of the aid, the Republicans favoring 
this reduction by a vote of 149 to 14. On final passage the vote was 260 to 101, 
but the Republicans were divided 8l against, to 80 for the bill.24 
During the hearings in the Senate, Taft, Chairman of the Republican Policy 
Committee, said that the request for military aid could not be cut very much, 
but that he felt that the economic aid could be reduced by one-half. The 
Senate committee unanimously agreed on $7,535,750,000 as a total figure, but 
when the debate opened, Everret Dirksen (Republican, of Illinois) immediately 
pushed through an amendment cutting $250,000,000 more from the economic aid 
portion of the bill. The vote was 36 to 34, and the Republicans lined up behind 
the Senator from Illinois by a vote of 26 to 5.2-* The Republicans supported 
Dirksen again (26-7) when he attempted to increase the reduction to $500,000,000, 
but this move was defeated by the Senate as a whole (4l-3l).2° Again, despite 
these efforts to limit the scope of European economic aid, the Republicans were 
found voting overwhelmingly (22-5) in favor of the bill on final passage when 
the Senate itself carried the bill (6l-5).27 
The conference committee reached a compromise figure somewhat closer to 
the final House bill and decided to retain the provision for a Mutual Security 
^Ibid.. Vol. 97. P. 10954 (82nd Cong., 1st Sess., Aug. 31. 1951) 
25lbid.. p. 10885 
26lbid.. p. 10928 
27lbid., p. 10954 
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Agency. The conference report was accepted by the Senate (56-25) after it re-
jected (48-30) a motion to recommit the bill. The Republicans favored recommital 
(28-8), but subsequently voted (19-18) in favor of accepting the conference 
report.28 The compromise version was accepted in the House by a vote of 230 to 
98» but Republicans voted for rejection (78-76).29 It appears that the Repub-
licans in the Senate were very much in favor of a Mutual Security Program but 
definitely opposed to continued economic as distinguished from military aid, 
while at least half of the House Republicans were hostile to the entire pro-
gram, especially the economic aid portion of the bill. 
In 1952 the emphasis in European aid was even more on military assistance. 
The term "economic aid" had been dropped completely, and the bill spoke only 
of "military aid," and "defense support." The total amount authorized for 
Europe under the last category was $1,282,433,000, which represented a consid-
erable reduction from the $1,637,300,000 recommended by the Administration. 
The House committee voted to cut the recommended European defense support 
figure by only 10 percent, but the House itself later agreed to an additional 
cut of $615,300,000 in the economic aid funds for Europe. This reduction came 
on an amendment by Vorys, Ohio Republican, and was supported by House Repub-
licans by a vote of 160 to 10. On the vote for passage only 78 Republicans 
voted "yea," while the "nay" vote was 89.3° 
In the Senate Foreign Relations Committee one billion dollars was cut from 
the bill, which represented approximately a 12.6 percent reduction on each 
item. Voting for the reduction were all the Republicans (save Lodge, who did 
2BIbid.. pp. 12479-12484 (Oct. 2, 1951) 
29Ibid., p. 12720 (Oct. 5, 1951) 
3°Ibid.. Vol. 98, pp. 5915-5917. (82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., May 23, 1952) 
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not vote) and four Democrats. Approval of the bill after the reduction, how-
ever, was by a vote of 12-0. 
The Senate took up the foreign aid bill May 5 but considered it only 
briefly. On a motion by William F. Knowland (Republican, of California) the 
Senate voted (40-33) to send the legislation to the Armed Services Committee for 
further study.31 Knowland argued that with 70 percent of the aid for military 
purposes his committee had a "direct and vital interest in the bill." He said 
it should consider whether the bill should be cut beyond the one billion slash 
made by the Foreign Relations Committee. The Republicans voted for Knowland's 
motion (37-2). In spite of the fact that the Armed Services Committee was 
considered less friendly than Foreign Relations, the former group reported the 
bill out unchanged. 
The only roll-call vote taken directly on the economic or "defense support" 
section of the bill was on an amendment by Ellender, Mississippi Democrat, to 
cut this portion by $500,000,000. The Senate defeated this proposal, but the 
Republicans supported it by a vote of 27 to 10.3Z On several other votes 
Republicans supported moves to reduce the over-all authorization, but on the 
vote for final passage, GOP Senators voted (29-5) in favor of the bill. 
s 
Figures A and B show clearly the trend of Republican behavior in Congress 
on the continuing issue of general European economic assistance. During the 
five years charted, the Republican voting shifted from strong support of the 
program in 1948 and 1949 to strong opposition in 1951 and 1952. In part, no 
doubt, this change can be attributed to a growing opposition to all phases of 
Democratic foreign policy, but there was also a distinct disenchantment with 
31Ibid... p. 4774 (May 5, 1952) 
32lbld.. p. 6107 (May 28, 1952) 
the idea of economic as distinguished from purely military aid. Again there 
was the factor of economy, and the feeling that the economies of Europe (some 
of them socialistic) were no longer in any more need of our dollars than were 
we. 
As a part of this general question it is interesting to look at Republican 
attitudes toward aid to two countries not within the scope of the European 
Recovery Program—Spain and Yugoslavia. Many Republicans had been critical of 
our policy (undertaken in concurrence with a United Nations policy) of the 
removal of our ambassador from Spain, As the tensions between ourselves and 
the communists became greater after 1947, more and more Republicans saw no 
reason why we should ostracize this pre-eminently anti-Communist state from the 
community of the free world. During 1949 such leading Republicans as Taft, 
Wherry, Mundt, and Brewster made statements favorable to the re-establishment 
of free diplomatic relations with Franco. 
During consideration of the Foreign Assistance Bill in 1950. an amendment 
to include $50,000,000 in aid for Spain was sponsored by Senators Brewster, 
Maine Republican, and McCarran, Nevada Democrat. It was defeated (42-38), but 
21 Republicans supported the move while only 14 opposed it.33 in the appro-
priation stages another amendment was introduced in the Senate to provide an 
ECA grant of $100,000,000 to Spain. This was amended to make the aid in the 
form of a loan from the Export-Import Bank, and in this form was agreed to. 
On this roll call 31 Republicans voted for such a loan, while only four voted 
against it.-'1' In conference committee this figure was reduced to $62,500,000, 
33lbid., Vol. 96, p. 5855 (8lst Cong., 2nd Sess., Apr. 27, 1950) 
^Ibid., p, 11469 (Aug. 1, 1950) 
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and in this form it was passed. The language of the appropriation bill was such 
that it issued a "directive" to the President to loan this money to Spain. 
President Truman called such a "directive" unconstitutional, and said he would 
consider it merely as an "authorization," and contended he already had such 
authority. In each of the Military Assistance Programs of 1951 and 1952 funds 
were appropriated for military, economic, and technical aid to Spain, and al-
though there were no direct roll-call votes on this issue, all indications are 
that Republican support remained high for cooperation with Spain. 
In 1950 the President asked that Congress provide $38,000,000 in relief 
aid for Yugoslavia. The Senate approved this request by a vote of 60 to 21 
after it had rejected a motion by Senator Knowland to recommit the bill.35 On 
the roll-call for recommital, 34 Republicans voted favorably and five against, 
but on the vote to approve the aid to Yugoslavia, Republicans voted (24-l'4) in 
favor of such aid. A significant fact here is that had the five Republicans who 
voted against recommittal abstained or voted for recommittal, the bill would 
have been defeated. Thus it would appear that Republicans were more inclined 
to favor economic assistance to a non-democratic country on the Right than to 
a non-democratic country on the Left, even though the latter was anti-Russian, 
for the moment at least. 
II 
Turning now to the steps which culminated in an almost complete shift from 
economic to military assistance to Europe, it is necessary to return to the 
origins of the North Atlantic Pact. It will be remembered that the Senate in 
1948 overwhelmingly approved the Vandenberg Resolution which drew attention to 
the possibility and, indeed, the desirability of forming regional groupings 
35Ibid., p. 16402 (Dec. 11, 1950) 
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"inside the [United Nations]charter, but outside the veto" under the terms of 
Article 51.3° i n a ghort time the Administration had taken the initiative in 
entering into such a grouping in Western Europe for defensive purposes. There 
was already in existence the Brussels Pact under which Great Britain, France, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg had agreed to stand together if attacked 
and had begun in a small way to build up military forces. 
It was now proposed to create a larger grouping to include not only more 
states of Western Europe (Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Portugal, and Italy), but 
to bridge the Atlantic and include Canada and the United States. This historic 
pact, the first military alliance in our history, was signed in Washington on 
April 4, 1949, and was subjected to scrutiny by the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee beginning April 27. 
During the negotiations leading up to the treaty, the Senate Committee had 
been kept informed by the new Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Acheson. On Feb-
ruary 18 and again on March 8 the Secretary met with the committee to review 
in detail the draft language agreed upon by the negotiating parties. Both Van-
denberg and Connally worked for modifications of the State Department's pro-
posals in two particular rsspects. One was in Article 5. the operating clause, 
which pledged the signatories to regard an attack against one or more of them 
in Europe or in North America as an attack against all. Each nation would have 
pledged itself to take action, including the use of armed force, to restore the 
security of the North Atlantic area. The Senators insisted upon changing this 
to an obligation to take such action "as it deemB necessary, including the use 
of armed force." 
36see above p. 159 
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Secondly, Vandenberg, Connally, and other committee members urged that a 
cover-all provision be added to the treaty providing that the Pact would be 
ratified and its provisions "carried out by the parties in accordance with 
their respective constitutional processes." The purpose of this vas to make 
clear that Congress should not be by-passed. 
After sixteen days of hearings the committee not only recommended ratifi-
cation (l3-0), but included in its report specific praise for the Executive for 
its efforts to work closely with Congress in developing this policy. By the 
time the Pact was sent to the Senate floor for debate so much discussion had 
already taken place that there was little left to say. Vandenberg and Connally 
opened the debate with impressive addresses. The major opposition speech was 
made by Senator Taft who, together with a handful of Republicans, attacked the 
obligation of arms aid and the proposed military implementation of the bill. 
It will be remembered, however, that regional arrangements were specifically 
endorsed by the Republican platform of 1948 and, therefore, the opposition was 
on somewhat shaky ground. Three reservations were introduced: In the first 
place, Wherry, Taft, and Watkins wanted the Pact to state specifically that no 
obligation was to be understood for the United States to furnish arms. This 
was rejected by the Senate by a vote of 74 to 21, but 18 Republicans supported 
the reservations, while 25 opposed.37 Secondly, Watkins alone introduced a 
reservation stating that the United States assumed no obligation to assist 
another party by arms without consent of Congress. The Senate voted down this 
proposal (84-11), and only 10 Republicans voted "yea," while 33 opposed it.38 
370ong. Record. Vol. 95. p. 9915 (8lst Cong. 1st Sess., July 21, 1949) 
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Finally, Watkins tried to get the Senate to adopt a reservation limiting the 
military obligations of the United States. This last proposal stated that 
Congress was under no obligation, not even moral, to use armed forces under 
this Pact. Only eight Senators (seven Republicans) were with Watkins on this, 
while 87 Senators (36 Republican) voted to reject this proposed reservation. 
The final Senate vote on the North Atlantic Treaty was (82-13) in favor of 
passage, the Republicans concurring (32-ll).° 
Whatever degree of bipartisanship and legislative-executive cooperation 
was operative in the Senate's handling of the North Atlantic Pact was largely 
lost in the debate over how to implement the Pact. As mentioned earlier, 
Vandenberg had specifically reserved judgement on the follow-up arms program, 
because he felt the early plans of the Administration indicated it was going 
ahead too rapidly. He was very much interested in establishing the principle 
of cooperative action against aggression contained in the Pact, but he feared 
that too much immediate emphasis on the arms program might touch off a renewed 
armament race between the East and the West. 
Then in July, 1949, without any advanced bipartisan consultation, Truman 
sent to Congress a legislative request fora$1.45 billion arms program to 
strengthen not only the signatory nations to the North Atlantic Treaty but cer-
tain other nations as well. The major objections among many legislators were 
<l) that the bill ignored the machinery set up in the treaty for handling aid-
that is, the "advisory council" and "defense committee" which had not yet been 
established; and (2) that the bill gave the President "unprecedented" powers to 
run the program completely on his own, or as Vandenberg put it, "to sell, loan, 
or give away the entire defense establishment to anybody at anytime on any 
39Ibid. 
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terms."^° What was wanted, Vandenberg thought, was a very brief interim bill 
to demonstrate our good faith pending the development of an integrated arms 
program as directed by the Pact itself. 
After a warning of rejection by both the Senate Foreign Relations and 
Armed Services Committee, the proposed bill was withdrawn and a new draft sub-
mitted which sharply curtailed the President's authority and tied the arms aid 
more closely to North Atlantic defense and the United Nations. The new version 
requested military aid in the amount of $1.4 billion. Consultation with Van-
denberg and Dulles (then in the Senate) continued at various stages during Con-
gressional consideration. 
After extensive hearings the House Foreign Affairs Committee made thirty-
four alterations in the bill, most of them minor, and reported the revised 
measure favorably. Four groups of members reported minority views at different 
stages giving their opinions on how to meet the problem. A bipartisan group 
composed of Richards, South Carolina Democrat, Vorys, Ohio Republican, Judd, 
Minnesota Republican, and Burleson, Texas Democrat, favored an interim six-
months program of only half the amount proposed. In the meantime these Repre-
sentatives thought the Europeans should come up with a long-range program. They 
also felt that the real deterrent to Russian aggression was less apt to come 
from a program such as the one envisaged than from American air power with the 
atomic bomb. 
Representative Fulton, Pennsylvania Republican, and Javits, New York Re-
publican, also favored the interim approach, while Representatives Chiperfield, 
Illinois Republican, Smith, Wisconsin Republican, and Jackson, California Repub-
lican, criticized the "controversial nature of the bill," and the fact that 
*°Arthur H, Vandenberg, Jr., ed., Thg. Private Papers of Arthur Vandenberg. 
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much of the testimony on behalf of it came from military spokesmen. This 
latter group concluded their statement by saying: 
"...We feel impelled to appose bill H. R. 5895 on the basic 
ground that the method of assistance proposed in the bill is not 
consonant with the major objectives of United States' policy, the 
security of the United States and that of friendly free nations... 
",.,the mechanism of ground force defense, relied on in the 
proposed legislation, is outmoded and would be grossly inadequate 
in the face of vastly superior Soviet forces, 
"The assistance provided under the provisions of the legislation 
would.,.impede essential economic recovery of that area. 
"...Western Europe can be defended only by air power."*1'1 
The fourth minority report was from Representatives Vorys, Judd, and John Davis 
Lodge (Republican, of Connecticut) and was a criticism of the Administration 
for omitting China from the proposed legislation.^2 
On the floor of the House an amendment was adopted which reduced the amount 
of direct appropriations to NATO countries to $580,495,000. Republicans 
favored this reduction overwhelmingly (l37-8),^3 arLCjL when the vote on final 
passage was taken, the GOP members lined up (94-5l) against the bill.^ 
In the Senate the bill was taken under consideration by a joint committee 
composed of the membership of the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Armed 
Services Committee. With some Senators balking at the $1.1 billion to be fur-
nished Treaty countries, and Secretaries Acheeon (State) and Johnson (Defense) 
adamant that it could not be whittled, Senator Vandenberg set forth a formula 
which became the compromise solution. It proposed reducing the immediate cash 
^ H . Rent. No.. 1265. 8lst Cong., 1st Sess. (Aug. l6, 1949), pp. 62-67 
^2Ibld.. pp. 68-70 
^Oong. Record. Vol, 95. p. 11807 (8lst Cong. 1st Sess., Aug. 18, 1949) 
^Ibid.. p. U808 
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outlay to nearer $500,000,000 with the remaining $600,000,000 being used to 
back up contracts awarded by the government as part of the Military Assistance 
Program, This solution was accepted although the total amount involved was 
somewhat reduced. The final vote on the entire bill in the joint committee 
was 20 to 3»with only Democrats George, Russell, and Byrd opposed. 
On the floor two major attempts were made to reduce the amount authorized 
for this program, and both were rejected. The first was by Senator George, 
Georgia Democrat, who proposed a reduction of $200,000,000 and the second was 
an amendment introduced by Knowland, California Republican, for a cut of 
$100,000,000. On both roll calls only ten Republicans opposed the reduction, 
while 23 voted for it, but on final passage Republicans supported the measure 
(19-14). •* The Republicans then in both houses were somewhat less than en-
thusiastic about the arms aid program, A majority of the House Republicans 
were against the bill in any proposed form even after it had been reduced in 
size. Senate Republicans wanted the authorizations in the bill reduced, and 
almost half of them voted against passage of the bill. 
The change of attitude a year later on the Military Aid Program was 
striking. The amount requested was $1,222,500,000 for the second year. The 
bill was approved (12-0) by the two Senate committees and was reported without 
amendment. The debate opened June 23, immediately following the Korean attack, 
and lasted only forty-eight hours. The Administration pressed for immediate 
passage in view of the deteriorating world situation, and after an initial 
reluctance, the Republicans agreed to go along. The bill passed the Senate 
on June 30 by a vote of 66 to 0, and twenty absent Senators said they favored 
4^Ibid.. p. 13168 (Sept. 22, 1949) 
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the legislation. The position of six Republicans was unknown, but with these 
exceptions, Republican approval was unanimous.^"6 
The House acted with equal dispatch. The Foreign Affairs Committee endorsed 
the bill (24-0), no amendments were offered on the floor, and passage was by a 
vote of 362 to 1, the sole dissenting vote being cast by Vito Marcantonie* of 
New York, while Robert Rich of Pennsyl-vania voted "present. "^7 This phenomenon 
can only be explained by the outbreak of fighting in Korea and the threat of 
world war which was felt to be present. 
The Mutual Security Acts of 1951 and 1952 have been discussed briefly in 
connection with European economic aid which they contained. These acts merged 
the two previous programs of economic assistance and military aid into one 
bill. It was noted that Republican hostility toward these acts was mainly 
directed toward their economic aspects, but by 1951 the great unanimity of 
support for military aid had also broken up. In 1951 more Republicans in the 
House voted against continuing the program than voted in favor of it. In the 
Senate Republicans voted (22-5) for the bill on the final vote,^8 but earlier 
voted (l6-13) in favor of cutting the military aid figure by $350,000,000, 
(28-1) to reduce it by $250,000,000, and (26-3) in favor of cutting out 
$37.000,000.^9 
The degree of hostility thus ranged from a desire for a slight reduction 
in the amount to outright opposition to the whole program. House Minority 
Leader, Joseph W. Martin, stated that there was a strong GOP inclination to 
^°Ibid., Vol. 96, p. 9546 (8lst Cong., 2nd Sess., June 30, 1950) 
k7Ibid.. p. 10646 (July 19, 1950) 
^Ibid.. Vol. 97, P. 10954 (82nd Cong., 1st Sess., Aug. 31. I95l) 
^Ibid.. pp. 10935-10954 
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cut up to a billion dollars from the bill, while others, such as Representative 
Usher L. Burdick felt the program was not necessary at all. 
In 1951 Congress authorized approximately one billion dollars less than 
the Administration haA requested, while in 1952 the over-all reduction was 
nearer to $1.5 billion. Much the same pattern was to be noted among Republi-
cans in the latter year. The degree of House Republican opposition was slightly 
greater on the passage of the bill (89-78), and in the Senate larger GOP major-
ities were recorded in favor of proposed reductions in the amount authorized. 
In the upper chamber Republicans voted (22-8) to cut one billion dollars from 
the bill, (26-10) to reduce the amount by $500,000,000, (33-10) in favor of 
cutting $400,000,000 and (33-l) for a reduction of $200,000,000.^° When the 
reduced authorization came to a final vote, however, Senate Republicans voted 
(29-9) for its passage.51 
In summary it can be said that while Republican support for military aid 
held up somewhat better than that for economic aid, there was a perceptible 
and continuing trend (with the exoeption of 1950) toward less support for all 
European foreign aid in the last four years of the Truman Administration. 
There occurred during 1951 another debate on the manner in which the 
North Atlantic Treaty should be implemented and how far the United States should 
commit itself to the defense of Europe. The issue was the President's proposal 
to send four divisions of American troops to be stationed in western Europe, 
and the resulting public discussion became known as the "Great Debate.8 This 
"Great Debate" began with the "troops to Europe" issue, but before it was 
5°Ibid.. Vol. 98, pp. 6107, 6098, 6l43 (82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., May 28, 1952) 
51Ibid., p. 6157 
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finished, it had embraced virtually every phase of American foreign policy and 
the conduct of the war in Korea. 
Two events launched the "Great Debate" immediately after the convening of 
the first session of the 82nd Congress. On the second day of that session 
Representative Frederic R. Coudert, Jr., New York Republican, introduced a 
resolution banning the use of future appropriations to send United States 
troops overseas unless Congress gave its specific consent. The resolution was 
intended to "avoid commitment of the United States by executive order in...wars 
in distant parts of the world without the knowledge and authorization of 
Congress."52 
The next day Senator Robert A. Taft, Ohio Republican, Chairman of the 
Senate GOP Policy Committee, launched a vigorous attack on the Administration's 
foreign policy in a 10,000 word speech in the Senate. Taft accused the Admini-
stration of formulating foreign policy from 1945 to 1951 without consulting 
Congress or the people. He ran the gamut of American policy in those years and 
attacked the Korean war, the huge aid programs, and among other things, he said 
he felt "we had better commit no American troops to the European continent at 
this time." Taft did not let it rest at that but stated his whole theory of 
American foreign policy in almost every area.53 Three days later (January 8) 
President Truman delivered his State of the Union Message, which was chiefly 
a foreign policy address. On the subject of European defense he said that 
"strategically, economically, and morally, the defense of Europe is part of 
our own.defense..,. None of (these] countries, including our own, has done enough 
yet, but real progress is being made."5^ 
520pn&. Quarterly Almanac. Vol. 8, p. 220 
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54 Ibid. 
192 
On the same day Senator Kenneth S. Wherry, Nebraska Republican, the 
Minority Floor Leader, introduced a resolution which demanded in the name of 
the Senate that no American ground troops be sent to western Europe pending 
determination by Congress of a policy on that matter. The following day (Jan-
uary 9), after conferring with John Foster Dulles in a Grand Rapids, Michigan, 
hospital. Senator Vandenberg issued a press statement warning the nation against 
a deadlock in foreign policy. He urged a meeting of loyal minds on this issue 
as quickly as possible. 
But that very evening Senator Taft continued his debate with the Admini-
stration in a speech before the National Press Club. Taft said he was willing 
to sit down v/ith the President or anyone else to try to work out a middle-of-
the-road, ten-year preparedness program within the limits of our economy. At a 
press conference the following day Secretary Acheson said he would be glad to 
talk with Taft or any other Republican on foreign policy. "I'm glad to know 
it," Taft said when informed of this comment, but he added that he was not eager 
to talk with Acheson. He suggested that any foreign policy conversations should 
include the three Senate leaders: Taft, Millikin (Chairman of the Republican 
Conference), and Wherry, Republican Floor Leader, However, he said he would 
not decline a personal invitation if it were extended. 
On January 11 a debate arising out of the Wherry Resolution took place in 
the Senate where William F. Knowland, California Republican, and George W. 
Malone, Nevada Republican, spoke for the GOP, Knowland suggested that the 
United States provide ten American divisions for every sixty to be provided by 
the other NATO nations. And Henry Cabot Lodge, Massachusetts Republican, who 
also spoke, said that the United States "should not commit one single soldier 
to Europe without an ironclad agreement that the dispatch of that soldier means 
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the automatic commitment of a very much larger number of European soldiers."55 
At a late afternoon press conference the same day the President said there 
was no question about the authority of the Chief Executive to send troops any-
where in the world. He said, however, that the Administration always consults 
with Congressional leaders before making foreign policy decisions. Truman also 
said it was his intention to include some United States forces in General 
Eisenhower's European Command, and that if Congress tried to restrict appro-
priations, he would take the issue to the American people. 
On January 15 Senator Taft said the nation was facing a "constitutional 
crisis" and called upon Congress to reassert its right to pass on fundamental 
principles of foreign policy. He said that unless we were prepared to set up 
a dictatorship in the United States, Congress should pass on President Truman's 
authority to send American troops to Europe. It will be remembered that 
Wherry's resolution was similar to a reservation proposed to the North Atlantic 
Treaty by Senator Arthur Watkins, Utah Republican, when the Senate was consider-
ing the Pact in 1949. Watkins proposed at that time that the United States 
assume no obligation for the security of the North Atlantic area and that it 
give armed assistance to any other party to the Pact only upon authorization of 
Congress. This proposal was rejected by the Senate at that time by an 11 to 84 
ballot.56 
On January 24 the Wherry resolution was sent to the Committees on Foreign 
Relations and Armed Services without further debate or vote. The next day the 
Senate Democratic Policy Committee agreed to urge these committees to draw up 
an "affirmative" resolution supporting the President's plan to send troops to 
55lbid.. p. 222 
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western Europe. All action, however, was delayed until after General Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, newly appointed NATO Commander, had reported to Congress February 1. 
Eisenhower, in general, supported the Administration's plan for aid in arms and 
men to Europe, and such Republican Senators as Wherry, Capehart, Cain, and Kem 
expressed disappointment in the speech and testimony of the General. Senator 
Taft declared t1 at General Eisenhower's report to Congress made the outlook 
"more hazy and indefinite and uncertain than it had [beenjbefore." He asked 
Congress to set a ratio of one American division to every nine the Europeans 
could raise and reiterated his stand that Congress should sanction further 
troop commitments overseas. 
On February 9 former President Herbert Hoover repeated his warning against 
involvement of United States troops in a land war in the "quick sands of either 
Europe or China." He called on Congress to recover its "constitutional authority 
over starting war." The party's titular leader, Governor Thomas E. Dewey of 
New York, however, split with these Republicans when he said on February 12 that 
we should reinforce our units in Europe, and he criticized proposals to withdraw 
to a Western Hemiiphere defense line. The next few days saw Senator H. Alexander 
Smith, New Jersey Republican, asking for a "reasonable ratio of troops," Senator 
Edward Martin, Pennsylvania Republican, giving qualified support to Hoover's 
views, and Senator John Sherman Cooper, Kentucky Republican, lining up solidly 
with Governor Dewey. 
At this point in the "Great Debate" public hearings on the Wherry resolu-
tions were scheduled, and these hearings opened February 15 with the Secretary 
of Defense, General George C. Marshall, as the first Administration witness. 
On February 14, 120 Republicans out of the 199 in the House of Representatives 
endorsed the principles of the Wherry resolution by putting their signatures 
to a "Declaration of Policy" which assailed the current Administration foreign 
policy as "dangerous" and tragic, end pleaded that foreign policy be "determined 
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with the full participation and approval of Congress," The initiators of the 
petition were Representatives Laverne Smith (Wisconsin), Frank Fellows (Maine), 
Katherine St, George (New York), Joseph P. O'Hara (Minnesota), Harry L. Towe 
and T. Mellet Hand (New Jersey), all Republicans, but in addition to Republi-
cans, the petition gained support from scattered members on the Democratic side. 
Beyond asking for a full role for Congress in shaping foreign policy, the 
"Declaration" urged further strengthening of this country and hemisphere, 
reduction of Federal spending on non-defense items, greater cooperation from 
western Europe, and peace treaties with Germany, Austria, and Japan.57 
Still other Republicans voiced their views on the troops-to-Europe issue 
before the debate resulted in any action. Representative Leon H. Gavin, Penn-
sylvania Republican, supported the troops program; Senator Wayne Morse (Oregon) 
said it was a mistake for the United States to admit it planned sending only 
four more divisions to Europe; and Senator Robert C. Hendrickson (New Jersey) 
said he would vote to provide a reasonable supply of ground troops, the number 
to be determined by the best judgment of our military leaders. Knowland on 
February 28 introduced a resolution recommending Congressional approval of four 
divisions to Europe but setting a 1:6 ratio for divisions to be sent abroad in 
the future; that is, that for every one United States unit, the Europeans would 
have to recruit six. 
Also on February 28, the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees 
released a document surveying the entire question of whether the President 
might commit troops without express Congressional approval. The document said 
there had been at least 125 incidents where the President had committed troops 
without legislative authorization. 
57Cong_. Record, Vol. 97. p. 1258 (82nd Cong., 1st Sess., Feb. 14, 1951) 
For approximately three weeks three committees held secret and public 
hearings at which Administration officials, Republican Congressional leaders, 
and private groups expressed their views to the committees. On March 5 the com-
mittees began work on a simple Senate resolution. The new resolution would have 
endorsed the Administration's authority to send troops abroad without express 
Congressional sanction and would have signified the "sense of the Senate" that 
the United States should bear a "fair share" of the defense burden of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization. This resolution was reported on March 14, 
Meanwhile, across the Capitol the Republican Policy Committee approved on 
March 9 a party resolution which would bar consignment of troops to Europe 
without explicit Congressional consent. On March 13 Representative Harry L, 
Towe (New Jersey) offered this GOP resolution in the form of a rider to the 
draft (Selective Service) bill being considered by the House Armed Services 
Committee. He and other Republicans on the committee attempted to attach it to 
that measure but were turned back by a 14 to 24 vote,58 
The Senate debate on the committee's resolution began on March 16, 1951. 
and, after a brief Easter recess, voting began on amendments April 2, Wherry, 
who first introduced a resolution on the subject, promptly moved to displace 
the simple resolution with a joint one. Connally, Wherry's chief antagonist 
throughout the debate, raised a point of order to prevent this maneuver and 
was sustained by the Vice-President. The Administration won a second victory 
when the Senate defeated (27-62) the move by Case to prevent troops under 
twenty years of age from being used abroad. Republicans favored this amendment 
by a vote of 25 to 18.^9 
^Ibid.. p. 3288 (Apr. 14, 1951) 
59Ibid.. p. 3075 (Apr. 12, 1951) 
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An amendment by Watkins (Republican, of Utah) to lift peace treaty limi-
tations on Italy's military strength so she could participate in NATO was 
accepted by the Senate (67-20) and was supported by Republicans by a vote of 
35 to 9. ° Herbert Lehman (Democrat, of New York) proposed an amendment calling 
for full collaboration between Congress and the President, This was defeated by 
the Senate (55-35) and was overwhelmingly opposed (4-4l) by the Republicans.&1 
Both of these votes were considered rebuffs to the Administration, but 
the Administration's greatest defeat came on April 2 after what had appeared to 
be a victory, McClellan (Democrat, of Arkansas) offered an amendment expressing 
the sense of the Senate that no troops in addition to the four divisions con-
templated for Europe "shall be sent...without further Senatorial approval." 
Opponents of the proposal persuaded McClellan to change the word "shall" to 
"should," and then succeeded in defeating the amendment (44-46),2 Shortly 
thereafter, however, Case moved to reconsider this narrow vote, and despite 
pleas by Connally and even some GOP leaders not to clamp limitations on the 
troops program, the Senate voted (49-43) to reconsider the vote, and then 
voted immediately by the same margin to pass the McClellan amendment as 
6'5 modified. -' Eleven Democrats joined 38 Republicans to put this amendment 
across, while only eight Republicans joined the Administration's leaders in the 
attempt to defeat it. 
Other amendments of somewhat less import followed and the Senate on April 
4 granted final approval to the modified resolution by a vote of 62 to 21.^" 
60Ibid., p. 3088 
61Ibid.. p. 3104 
g2Ibid.. p. 3082 
63Ibid.. p. 3096 
^Ibid., p. 3293 (Apr. 4, 1951) 
Nineteen of the twenty-one negative votes were cast by Republicans, but twenty-
seven Republicans voted in favor of the Resolution. By a vote of 59 to 29 the 
Senate then agreed to a Wherry motion to incorporate the language of the simple 
resolution just passed into a concurrent resolution which would open the way to 
possible House action. The Republicans favored this motion (40 to 5) and voted 
(36 to 9) in favor of the concurrent resolution when it passed (45-4l).*>5 
III 
While the central issues in American foreign policy during the early years 
of the Cold War were concerned with the great aid programs which were intended 
to help build a strong free world, many peripheral problems came to the atten-
tion of Congress on which it may be interesting to examine Republican attitudes. 
One of these was the question of trade with Communist-dominated states. 
As early as 1948 Congress had enacted legislation designed to limit or 
prohibit the export of war materials to Iron Curtain countries from countries 
receiving United States assistance. Such a provision was included in the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1948 and another was added in 1950 to a supplemental 
appropriation bill (Republicans in favor 32-0). A third provision was enacted 
in 1951 sponsored by Senator Kem (Republican, of Missouri), and was contained 
in the Third Supplemental Appropriations Act. The Kem Amendment repealed the 
earlier amendment and spelled out export limitations in greater detail. It 
prohibited economic or financial (but not military) aid to any nation exporting 
military equipment or materials used for military production to the Russian 
orbit. The restrictions applied when United States armed forces were engaged 
in hostilities while Carrying out United Nations decisions. Exceptions to the 
embargo could be made by the National Security Council. 
65lbid.. p. 3288 
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Using this power to make exceptions, the Council suspended operation of 
the Kem Amendment for 90 days on the grounds that it was against the best 
interests of the United States. The Economic Cooperation Administration also 
objected to the amendment, complaining that it was too strict to permit effective 
continuation of the United States foreign aid program. On June 2, in signing 
the appropriation bill which included the Kem Amendment, President Truman 
called for prompt repeal of the provision and asked for separate legislation if 
Congress decided some restrictions were necessary. 
Following this suggestion, a House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee began 
study of new legislation and prepared a bill (H. R, 4550), which Representative 
Battle (Democrat, of Alabama) introduced on June 21; it was favorably reported 
by the full committee on July l6; and on August 2 the House considered the bill 
and passed it by a voice vote. On August 21 the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee reported the bill with amendments. The major modifications favored by 
this group would have made the Administrator of the foreign aid program respon-
sible for carrying out the provisions of the bill, whereas the House version 
called for a special Mutual Defense Assistance officer to handle the administra-
tion. 
During the floor debate on August 27 and 28, Senators Kem and Wherry 
attacked the bill on the grounds that its purpose was "to destroy the Kem 
Amendment" and replace it with "a flexible, discretionary statute, which could 
be interpreted by the State Department as it sees fit, and which would permit 
the flow of strategic materials to Red China to continue."°° The Senate re-
jected (29-46) Kern's motion to recommit the bill so that a committee could hold 
hearings on the measure. Kem was handed a second defeat when the Senate refused 
(27-44) to accept an amendment substituting a version by him which v/as stronger 
^Cong. Quarterly Almanac. Vol. VII, p. 212 (l95l) 
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than the original "Kem Amendment." On the first of these roll calls Repub-
licans favored recommittal by a vote of 29 to 7» and on the second, the GOP 
Senators supported the "Kem Amendment" by a vote of 25 to 8. On final passage, 
however. Republicans supported the bill by an l8 to l6 vote. The Senate passed 
the bill (56-16) with the committee amendments intact, and the House accepted 
the Senate version by voice vote. ' 
A survey of many minor issues would merely repeat the pattern already 
visible. This chapter has shown in some detail the behavior of Republicans in 
Congress on foreign policy issues involving Europe over a four-year period 
(1949-1952). It has been shown that a distinct trend toward less support for 
Administration policies developed through these years. A subsequent chapter 
will show some of the causes and significance of this trend in terms of intra-
party and inter-party relationships. 
67oon£.. Record, Vol. 97, pp. 10745-10746 (82nd Cong., 1st Sess., Aug. 28, 
1951) 
201 
FIGURE A EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE 
SENATE REPUBLICAN SUPPORT 
1948 European Recovery Program 
Reduce Authorization $5.3 billion to 
Passage of Act 









1949 Extension of ERP 
Cut authorization by 15 percent 
Cut authorization bv 10 percent 
Eliminate authorization-leave to 














1950 European Econ. Aid Portions 
Cut one billion dollars 
Out $500,000,000 
Cut $250,000,000 
Passage of Bill 













1951 Econ. Aid Portions of Mut. ! 
Cut $500,000,000 
Cut $250,000,000 





















FIGURE B EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE 
HOUSE REPUBLICAN SUPPORT 
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FIGURE C MILITARY COOPERATION WITH EUROPE 
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FIGURE C - Continued 
1951 Troops to Europe 
Limit to four divisions 
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Cut four additional divisions 
First adoption (S. Res. 99) 















1952 Mutual Security Act 
Amend to cut one billion dollars 
Amend to cut $500,000,000 
Amend to cut $400,000,000 
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REPUBLICANS AND THE COLD WAR: ASIA 
I. China 
By the beginning of the period now under consideration (1949-1952), 
it had become quite apparent that the Cold War would not be limited to Eu-
rope. While making determined efforts by subversion and coup d' etat in 
that area, the Communist-led nationalist movements in Asia were waging open, 
as well as covert, warfare against the governments of China, Indonesia, Ma-
laya, Indochina, and others. Taking advantage of strong popular resentment 
against a century of colonialism or corrupt local regimes, the Asian Commu-
nists were making considerable headway in their revolutionary drives. The 
greatest clashes came in China, Korea, and Indochina, and these explosive 
conflicts posed new and difficult problems for American foreign policy. 
The problems that faced the United States in China following World War 
II were some of the most perplexing and controversial in the field of foreign 
policy. The United States had long been deeply interested in maintaining 
the integrity and independence of that country, regarding a stable China as 
essential to peace in the Far East. But hopes that the Chinese Republic 
would serve as a stabilizing force in the post-war era were shattered by the 
impact of a long armed struggle and by the attitude of the Soviet Union. 
Twelve years of fighting and eight years of Japanese occupation had weaken-
ed and divided the country. Inflation steadily increased and production re-
mained low. The Nationalist government failed to hold the confidence of the 
masses and appeared unable to solve China's many grave problems. In .addi-
tion, the Soviet Union, which had agreed in 1945 to support the Nationalist 
government and extend it economic assistance, permitted huge quantities of 
Japanese war material to fall into the hands of the Chinese Communists. The 
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Russians also removed some $2,000,000,000 worth of industrial equipment 
from factories in Manchuria after the Japanese surrender.1 
The United States, on the other hand, had extended to the Nationalist 
government of China substantial military and financial assistance. The 
State Department estimated that this aid amounted to approximately $1,515,-
700,000 from 1937 toV-J Day. This assistance was continued after the war 
in the form of lend-lease, Export-Import Bank credits, and UNRRA funds amount-
2 
ing to an additional $2,007,700,000 by 1949. 
In the post-war period, however, the Administration decided that if 
large-scale aid were to be made effective, some kind of unity had to be 
achieved in China itself where the Communists were the principal and most 
threatening rivals of Chiang Kai-shek's regime. There were various propos-
als for creating some kind of coalition government, and this objective, in 
fact, was advocated by the Nationalists at that time. President Truman 
sent General Marshall to China in 1946 to try to assist the Chinese leaders 
in forming a coalition — including Communists — that would foster national 
unity and stability. Not only did the Marshall mission fail in respect to 
its efforts to form an effective coalition, but the General was frustrated 
in his attempts to get American assistance into what he regarded as the pro-
per hands in China. After more than a year of futile negotiations, the mis-
sion had not achieved its goal and was withdrawn. Following Marshall's re-
turn home, the Chinese civil war broke out in earnest. 
Wm. C. Bullitt, "A Report to the American People on China," Life. 
Oct. 13, 1947, pp. 35 ff. 
United States Relations with China (State Dept. Pubi No. 3573, July 
30, 1949), p. 1042 (Annex No. 185) This publication is usually referred to 
and is hereafter cited as the White Paper on China. 
3Ibid., p. 78 
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It was during the course of this experience that Administration leaders 
apparently became convinced that corruption and inefficiency in the Nation-
alist government nullified American assistance to Chiang Kai-shek. Presi-
dent Truman then placed an embargo on the shipment of arms to China for a 
period of about ten months. 
There was intermittent Republican criticism of almost every Administra-
tion action with regard to China after the war, and there was a great deal 
more after-the-fact criticism of these policies when it became apparent in 
1948-1949 that China was lost to the free world. The decisions at Yalta with 
regard to China were not immediately made public, but after they were, Re-
publicans were highly critical. Even Vandenberg, who was one of the milder 
critics of our Asian policy, felt that at: 
"... .Yalta... .F.D.R. sold Chiang Kai-shek down the 
river in order to get Joe Stalin into the Jap war (just 
four days before the Japs surrendered)."4 
This statement was made in 1949, and in 1952 the Republican National 
Committee issued a document on foreign policy which put it in these terms: 
"....not withstanding the 1943 Cairo pledge to restore 
the boundaries of China and to return Manchuria to the Chinese 
people, the Administration leaders agreed (at Yalta) to 
force the National Government of China to surrender Man-
churia, with its strategic ports of Dairen and Port Arthur 
and its railroads, to the control of Communist Russia. 
This was the price for Russia's promise to enter the war 
against Japan after the defeat ofCGermany — a promise already 
delivered free of cost sixteen months before by Stalin him-
self at the Moscow conference. 
"China was not invited to the Yalta Conference or 
even consulted. But Alger Hiss was there advising Presi-
dent Roosevelt."5 
Further criticism was directed at the Marshall mission and tne ac-
companying embargo on shipments of arms to China. Former Governor Alfred 
^Arthur Bh Vandenberg, Jr., The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg. 
p. 535 
5 
Republican Natl. Committee, Foreign Policy. Democrat Record-Republ1-
can Program, pp. 2-3 
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Landon of Kansas attacked the Marshall program because it tried to "force 
Chiang Kai-shek to take in the Communists." Vandenberg said: 
"I think our China policy was wrong (and always said 
so) in striving to force a Communist coalition on China... 
I think we should have taken realistic_,steps long ago to 
sustain the Nationalist Government..." 
Finally, the Republicans were critical of the embargo placed on arms ship-
ments to China and in addition began to push for more economic and military 
aid for China. 
In 1948 Congress authorized $463,000,000 for China, to be divided 
$338,000,000 for economic assistance and $125,000,000 for military aid. 
The Chinese aid program was approved as Title IV of the ECA legislation, 
8 
and ECA was empowered to administer the economic side of the plan. Of 
these funds some $54,000,000 remained unspent at the beginning of 1949. In 
March 1949 the House Foreign Affairs Committee drew up and reported a bill 
authorizing the President to aid non-Communist China by spending the $54,000,-
000 which would remain available to him through February 15, 1950. The only 
major opposition to the bill came from certain Republicans who objected 
to the fact that the President's discretion in the use of the funds had 
been considerably broadened as against the 1948 bill. The committee final-
ly agreed to reinstate the 1948 restrictions and the bill was passed on 
April 4 by a vote of 279-70,9 with 116 Republicans favoring the bill and 
only 29 opposed. 
6Vandenberg, p. 527 
8White Paper on China, p. 996 
9Cong. Record. Vol. 95, p. 3829.. (81st Cong. 1st Sess., Apr. 4, 1949) 
10The 1948 Republican platform stated: 
"We will foster and cherish our historic policy of friendship 
with China and assert our deep interest in the maintenance of its 
integrity and freedom." (Proceedings. Rep. Natl. Cony.. 1948, p. 193) 
The Democratic platform did not mention China. 
Instead of taking up the House bill as such, the Senate borrowed the 
gist of it, and, in the form of a new section, appended it to the bill ex-
tending the Marshall plan. Senator William F. Knowland, California Republi-
can, submitted an amendment containing this provision. Senator Tom Connally, 
Texas Democrat, offered a similar amendment but would not have restricted 
the President's discretion by the words "areas which he may deem to be not 
under Communist domination." Knowland's version was adopted on a voice 
vote, and the House later accepted the Senate's method of handling this 
matter. 
Following this action a running debate on China policy took place 
through the spring and summer of 1949. As the situation worsened, the dis-
cussion of what should be done or what should have been done became more 
heated. Republican criticism of the Administration's handling of the whole 
Chinese affair mounted higher and higher and more aid was called for. In 
the House Walter Judd, Minnesota Republican, for many years a Christian 
missionary to China, called for all-out aid to the Nationalist regime. 
Senate debate was touched off by a bill introduced by Pat McCarran, Nevada 
Democrat, which called for ai $1.'5J-bill ion loan to China for military and 
economic purposes. In a letter to Senator Connally, Chairman of the For-
eign Relations Committee, Secretary Acheson stated that a move such as that 
suggested by McCarran would be "catastrophic," and that there was no evi-
dence that such aid would alter the pattern of current developments in 
China. He said that the more than two billion dollars given to China since 
V-J Day had not stemmed the Communist forces. 
Following this statement of policy, several RepublicanrSenators opened 
fire on the State Department. Styles Bridges, New Hampshire, urged a Con-
gressional investigation of the Department's entire China policy. Bridges 
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accused the Secretary of what "might be called sabotage" of the"valiant 
attempt" of the Chinese Nationalists to keep at least a part of China free. 
Senator Knowland charged that we were following a policy of undermining the 
morale- of a former friend and ally. Wayne Morse, Oregon Republican, said 
that Acheson's position appeared to be "a sad and late admission of a fum-
bling and bumbling China policy." In April Bridges and Kenneth S. Wherry, 
Nebraska Republican, also an outspoken critic of the State Department's China 
policy, were invited to the White House for a conference on China with the 
President and Acheson. Wherry reported that the situation was discussed in 
considerable detail, and that it was a "most interesting conference," in 
which he "learned some things he hadn't known before." 
By this time outlines of the Administration's plan to arm countries 
against Communist aggression were becoming known to Congress. This was the 
$1,450,000,000 Military Assistance Program drawn primarily for Western 
European nations. It made no mention of aid to China, but Senator Knowland 
announced that a group of Republicans planned to move to add $200,000,000 
to the measure for China. 
Another policy question bothering the Republicans was the possible rec-
ognition of the Communist government of China by the United States. Late in 
June Senator Vandenberg expressed concern that a secret move to recognize the 
Communist regime was under study in the State Department. Senator Knowland 
then released a letter that twenty-one Senators — five Democrats and six-
teen Republicans — had sent to President Truman on June 25, expressing 
bitter opposition to any such move. They requested that all possible aid 
be given the Kuomintang or any other constitutional government resisting 
communism in China, asserting that any other policy would be inconsistent 
with the Truman Doctrine. This same group got behind Knowland in pushing 
a military program for China similar to the Greek-Turkish aid plan, to be 
administered by a military mission to China like the United States main-
tained in Greece. Knowland told the Senate that if it were necessary to 
aid Greece, a nation of 15 million people, to keep it from the Communist 
orbit, it was of equal importance to provide the same aid for Ghina. 
The following month, Knowland and eleven other Senators drew up an 
amendment to the Military Assistance Program which they said they would offer 
whenever it reached the Senate floor. Their measure called for $175,000,000 
in military aid to non-Communist China. The Senators said that if this were 
not incorporated into the MAP, they would press it as a separate legisla-
tive proposal. To dramatize their position they asked Secretary of Defense 
Johnson to recall General Douglas MacArthur from Japan to testify before 
Congress on the MAP, with special reference to China and the Far East. 
The Administration's response to pressure from the Knowland group was 
its release on August 6 of a White Paper on China prepared by the State 
12 Department. This document said the Chinese Nationalists were on the 
verge of collapse because of the military, political, and economic incapac-
ity of the Kuomintang leaders. The White Paper rejected the idea that 
greater American help could have averted successive defeats by Chiang Kai-
shek at the hands of the Red armies. The issuance of the White Paper merely 
provoked a new outburst of the same arguments by the same people in Con-
gress. There were further demands for new assistance to Chiang, and before 
11The Republican signers of this letter were Baldwin (Conn.), Knowland 
(Calif.), Bridges (New Hampshire), Brewster (Maine), Reed (Kansas), Mundt 
(S. Dak.), Ferguson (Mich.), Morse (Oregon), Young (N. Dak.), Thye (Minn.), 
Martin (Pa.), Butler (Neb.), Cordon (Oregon), Cain (Wash.), Taft (Ohio) and 
Bricker (Ohio). 
12Referred to in footnote 2 
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adjournment, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee called upon Secretary 
Acheson to clarify his position on the recognition of the Communist Chinese 
regime. 
Late in the summer Congress focused its attention on the foreign arms 
aid legislation, and the supporters of military aid to China had their pro-
posals at hand in the form of amendments to the MAP. When debate on this 
measure got underway in the House, John D. Lodge, Connecticut Republican, 
offered an amendment to the MAP to authorize a $100,000,000 grant to China 
and southeast Asia, a $50,000,000 RFC loan, and a supervisory military mis-
sion in China of American troops. The amendment was rejected by a 94 to 
164 teller vote on August 18.13 As it passed the House, the MAP made no 
provision for aid to China. 
When the MAP came under consideration by the Senate Foreign Relations 
and Armed Services Committees, these groups compromised on an amendment 
giving $75,000,000 for use in China and the Far East. This was in the na-
ture of a substitute for the amendment proposed by Knowland granting $175,-
14 000,000 and was adopted by a 9 to 11 party-line vote. A few days later a 
further compromise on China aid was suggested by Vandenberg, who asked for 
a change in the wording to read the "general area" of China, so that it 
would be left up to the President to define the term "general area" and de-
termine how the money should be spent. The Vandenberg proposal was approved 
/ \ 15 
(16 - 5), with the Republicans solidly in favor of the change. 
In a declaration on the floor Knowland presented the China feature of 
the bill as a political victory for the Republicans. He said that by in-
cluding China in the program's scope, they had reversed the State Depart-
•^Oong. Record. Vol. 95, p. 11791, (81st Cong., 1st Sess., Aug. 18, 1949) 
14Cong. Quarterly. Vol. V, p. 358, (1949) 
15Ibid. 
ment's policy of writing off China. The $75,000,000 China feature was ulti-
mately accepted by the House and written into law. 
By the end of the first session of the 81st Congress, Chiang Kai-shek 
had left the mainland and fled to the island of Formosa off the China coast. 
Before the Congress returned in January, China was under control of the 
Communists, and Formosa remained the last Nationalist outpost. Congress, 
however, continued to vote funds to the Nationalist regime, partly to aid it 
in defending Formosa against the Reds, and partly, perhaps, in a slight hope 
that Chiang might, after all, stage a comeback on the mainland. In 1950 Con-
gress extended from February 28 to June 30 the time in which the President 
could spend $103,000,000 in unused ECA-China funds. In addition a total of 
$75,000,000 was authorized to be granted for the "general area" of China. 
In 1951 a portion of the $535,250,000 for Far Eastern military aid went 
to Nationalist China,and,$237,500,000 in economic aid was voted to the "gen-
17 eral area" of China. Again in 1952 Formosa was voted a share of the 
18 
$560,316,500 military and $181,114,000 economic aid voted to Asia. In none 
of the latter three years did the authorization of these funds come in for 
any extensive debate, nor were there any votes on which Republican:- attitudes 
could be measured, but it will be shown later, that the partisan debate on 
China was by no means over. 
II. Korea 
An adjunct to the China policy debate was the problem of the United 
States' role in Korea. After V-J Day, Korea was administered as an occupied 
territory, governed north of the 38th degree parallel by the Soviet Union 
and south of it by the United States. Relief sent the southern part of 
^Ibid.. Vol. VI, pp. 204-216, (1950) 
17Ibid., Vol. VII, p. 210, (1951) 
18Ibid., Vol. VIII, p. 161r (1952) 
Korea by Congress was authorized and paid for as part of the Army's occupa-
tion program to prevent disease and unrest. It was estimated that by 1949 
some $434,000,000 in all types of aid were furnished the occupied territory. 
When attempts to unify northern and southern Korea had been fruitless, 
and after the United Nations had upheld an election in southern Korea by 
which an autonomous Republic of Korea was established, the American Army 
withdrew, terminating its military government on January 1, 1949. The army 
could no longer administer the remaining relief funds it had been granted for 
Korean assistance. These funds, however, were transferred to the ECA for 
expenditure in Korea. In June, 1949, the President sent a message to"Con-
gress requesting it to continue economic assistance under a separate program. 
The President's request was taken up by the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, which voted On July 12 to favorably recommend a bill authorizing 
Korean economic aid. The Committee's bill authorized the appropriation of 
$150,000,000 to aid Korea by providing it with essential relief, and by help-
ing it to establish a sound economy and to maintain its democratic form of 
government. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation was directed to advance 
$50,000,000 to Korea at once pending approval of the appropriation authorized. 
The Committee warned against any cuts in the money which would only curtail 
South Korea's recovery effort and would postpone the day when South Korea 
could economically take care of itself without substantial outside assistance. 
It was also pointed out that the question of more aid to Korea was no 
longer one of relief but of economic recovery. This fact was causing a shift 
away from the emphasis of previous programs and was reflected in the broader 
scope of the proposed bill. The group admitted that no course of action 
which the United States might pursue in South Korea could be guaranteed to 
be successful, but it felt that to discontinue that aid would be interpreted 
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in the Far East as a failure of our policy to contain Communism and bolster 
South Korea against the Communist-dominated northern part of that country. 
Debate in the Senate on the proposed bill was opened and closed on 
October 12, 1949. Committee Chairman Tom Connally explained and supported 
the bill. William Knowland, California Republican, long-time critic of 
many of our Far Eastern policies, stated that he "most heartily" agreed with 
all that Connally had said relative to the bill's importance, and he joined 
him in urging its prompt passage. The third and final Senator to speak was 
Henry Cabot Lodge, Massachusetts Republican, member of the Committee, who re-
called that Republican members had unanimously supported the bill in Com-
mittee. It was passed by a roll-call vote of 48 to 13. No amendments were 
offered to it from the floor, and Republicans voted favorably on the measure 
(21 - 6). The six, it may be interesting to note, were Senators Capehart 
and Jenner (Indiana), Kem (Missouri), Langer and Young (North Dakota), and 
Martin of Pennsylvania. 
The House Foreign Affairs Committee, upon receiving the President's re-
quest for Korean aid, proceeded to hold somewhat more extensive hearings 
than did its Senate counterpart. The group indicated a desire to go into 
the Korean aid program not only on its own merits, but also in relation to 
United States' policy in the Orient as a whole. To this end, the Committee 
heard a long train of witnesses and spent considerable time in drafting a 
policy section to the bill it would report. 
In drafting this part of the bill, the Committee encountered expres-
sions of dissatisfaction with the over-all United States approach to the Far 
East. Two Republican members, Lawrence H. Smith (Wisconsin) and Walter Judd 
(Minnesota) complained that aid to Korea just treated the symptoms of a 
x yS. ReptT No. 748. 81st Cong., 1st Sess., (July 22, 1949), pp. 10-11 
^Oong. Record. Vol. 95, p. 14339. (81st Cong., 1st Sess., Oct. 12, 1949) 
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political, economic, and military disease being spread in China by victorious 
Communist armies. Judd summed it up: 
"This is just the first of the rat holes we will have 
to start pouring money into all around China if we don't 
plug up the basic rat hole in China itself."21 
There was considerable support for Judd's position, and according to John M. 
Vorys, Ohio Republican, also a member of the Committee, the score was about 
22 20 to 5 against the Korean aid plan. 
No House proposals in legislative form yet existed for the program, and 
both President Truman and Secretary of State Acheson renewed their requests 
for action. The Committee responded, and, after accepting an amendment by 
John Davis Lodge, Connecticut Republican, to stop Korean aid should that 
country form a coalition government including either Communists or collabo-
rators with the Communist-dominated government in northern Korea, the bill 
was reported on July 1. The amounts authorized in the House committee ver-
sion were the same as those in the Senate bill, 
On July 26 a minority report was issued by Donald R. Jackson (California) 
on behalf of himself, Robert B. Chiperfield (Illinois), Lawrence H. Smith 
(Wisconsin), John DaVis Lodge (Connecticut), and John M. Vorys (Ohio), all 
Republicans. The arguments advanced by these gentlemen in Committee on the 
necessity of curbing aid to a coalition government were repeated, and they 
also pointed to an apparent contradiction between aid to Korea, the wartime 
enemy, and no aid to China, a wartime ally being overrun by Communists. 
The proposed bill (H. R. 5330) was never brought before the House, 
which also failed to take action on the Senate bill, and the whole matter 
210ong. Quarterly. Vol. V, p. 383. (1949) 
22Ibid. 
23H. Rent. No. 962, 81st Cong. 1st Sess., (July 1, 1949), pt. 2, pp. 1-3 
218 
was deferred to the second session. In spite of the failure of Congress to 
provide economic aid to Korea in 1949, sixty million dollars were voted in 
military aid as part of the Military Arms Program. These funds were to keep 
the Koreans in training and to equip security forces to insure their ability 
to serve as a deterrent to external aggression and a guaranty of internal 
order. The bill for $150,000,000 "little ECA," which had failed of passage 
in the House in 1949, was given immediate consideration on the floor of that 
chamber when the 81st Congress reconvened in January, 1950. Speaking in favor 
of the proposal were several Democrats and four Republicans — Charles A. 
Eaton (New Jersey), Francis P. Bolten (Ohio), Jacob K. Javits (New York), and 
William Lemke (North Dakota). Most opposition came from a group of Republi-
cans who objected to sending more money "down the rat hole" mentioned earlier. 
Principal among these were Lawrence H. Smith (Wisconsin), A. L. Miller (Nebras-
ka), John M. Vorys (Ohio), and Fred L. Crawford (Michigan). The opposition 
first succeeded in cutting the amount of aid from $150,000,000 to $60,000,000. 
Vorys then moved to send the measure back to committee, but this was rejected 
by a roll-call vote of 190-194, Republicans, however, went on record Cl31 >•-.• 
21) in favor of returning the bill to committee.2 Following this action, 
the House balloted on the bill itself and defeated it by a vote of 191 to 192. 
On this roll call the Republicans cast 130 votes against the bill and only 21 
25 in favor. 
The day after the House defeated H. R. 5330, the original Senate measure 
(S. 2319) was submitted to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Secretary 
of State Acheson went before the group January 30 to plead for continued 
Korean aid, and when a Committee vote was taken the next day, the ballot was 
17 to 1 in favor of the program. Only Robert B. Chiperfield, Illinois 
^Cong. Record. Vol. 96, p. 655 (81st Cong., 2nd Sess., Jan. 19, 1950) 
25Ibid.. p. 656 
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Republican, opposed the bill, although one other Republican did not vote. 
The form in which the committee reported S. 2319 was the form in which 
the bill became law. It earmarked $60,000,000 for Korean economic help 
through June 30, 1950, and authorized the loan of ten merchant ships. In 
addition a Formosan aid feature (mentioned above) was added to the measure. 
This provision gained a certain amount of Republican support for the bill as 
a whole, and it was approved by the House without amendment by a roll-call 
vote (240 - 134). On this final ballot 42 Republicans favored the bill and 
91 opposed it. The final vote came, however, only after a motion by A. L. 
Miller, Nebraska Republican, to recommit the measure with instructions to cut 
the Korean aid section from $60,000,000 to $20,000,000 was defeated (137 -
239). On this vote 99 Republicans voted to recommit while 30 opposed the 
26 
move. The Senate concurred in the House changes and approved the revised 
version February 10. 
Under Title I of the Foreign Economic Assistance Act of 1950 this "little 
ECA" for Korea was continued through June 30, 1951, and up to $100,000,000 
was authorized to finance it. As a part of the big "one package" bill, this 
program received little attention or debate but was passed together with the 
entire bill. In addition to this, a small sum was authorized for Korea under 
the Military Aid Program the same year. 
As can be seen from what has been said thus far, many Republicans — often 
a majority of them — had been in clear-cut disagreement with the Administra-
tion's Asian policy. A combination of historical and business interest fac-
tors presumably made for a great Republican concern with Chinese and Far 
Eastern affairs. In addition an opposition party is always looking for 
chinks in its opponent's armor, and the GOP thought it saw one in the breast-
26Ibid., p. 1749 (Feb. 9, 1950) 
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plate of the Administration which opened wider and wider until 1950 when a 
whole section of vulnerability lay exposed. 
Things did not go well for the United States in Asia during the post-war 
years, and the Republicans saw no reason for not laying the blame at the 
Democrats' door. They perhaps felt even less hesitation, because in general 
they had never been asked for their opinions on what could be done to save 
the situation in the Far East. Whereas the President and the Secretary of 
State took Vandenberg, Dulles, and a few others into their inner councils on 
Europe and the United Nations, this was never the case on Asia until Dulles 
helped with the Japanese Peace Treaties in 1951-1952. 
An interesting thesis has been advanced on this point by James Reston, 
Chief Washington correspondent for the New York Times. Writing in April, 
1951, Reston explains the Republican attack on Asian policy in this way: 
"The imperative need to unify behind an effective Ameri-
can foreign policy not only broke the back of the isolationist 
power, but it created a fundamental political problem for the 
Republican party. That party has been out of power since 1932. 
It was blamed at the end of World War I for sabotaging the 
peace...It wished to avoid that charge after World War II. 
"It wanted to go along with the policy of collective 
organization and collective security, but at the same time 
it naturally wanted to avoid the charge that it was merely an 
echo of the party in power. The Far Eastern question provided 
the Republicans with the answer to that dilemma. They like 
to complain that they weren't consulted about the Far East. 
I can remember Senator Vandenberg explaining all this clearly 
early in 1946. There must be one or two areas left out of 
the bipartisan arrangement, he said, for otherwise we would 
be left without any point of opposition in the whole realm of 
foreign affairs.... 
"Thus any Administration controversy or calamity in the 
Far East provides the Republicans with a political argument — 
indeed with almost their only foreign policy argument."2''' 
Nowhere else has the suggestion been made that the lack of consultation 
between the Republicans and the Administration on Asian affairs was a matter 
of conscious policy on the part of the Republicans. Reston's contention is 
^James Reston, "Memorandum to General MacArthur," New York Times Maga-
zine. Apr. 22, 1951, p. 5 
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that Vandenberg believed sincerely that Europe was the primary theatre In 
the Cold War and that it was essential to collaborate there, but thought the 
Republicans should emphasize for domestic political purposes the importance 
28 
of the Asian theatre and the failure of the Democrats in that area. The 
basis for Reston's analysis is, as indicated above, private conversations he 
had with Vandenberg as early as 1946. 
The Republican reaction to the President's intervention in Korea (June 
25, 1950) was, as one might suppose, mixed. Many Republicans immediately 
supported the move. Senator Knowland (California) said, "I think... the 
President of the United States today has drawn a line in the Far East which 
was essential to be drawn at some time... I believe... he should have the 
overwhelming support of all Americans, regardless of their partisan affilia-
tion."29 Senators Saltonstall and Lodge (Massachusetts) and Smith (New 
Jersey) voiced their agreement with Knowland's support. No Senator directly 
attacked the wisdom of the move at the time, but several made critical, rather 
than praising remarks. Kem (Missouri) asked, "Does this mean that he fthe 
3 30 
has arrogated to himself the authority of declaring war?" Malone 
(•̂ evada) said, " [i am J not objecting to sending material and assistance to 
Korea if first the executive department... will fix a foreign policy... That 
has never been done."31 
In a speech in the Senate, June 28, 1950, Robert Taft of Ohio pointed 
specifically to the Administration's shifting position on Korea itself. 
Acheson had stated, Taft charged, as late as January, 1950, that except for 
Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines, we could not assure the rest of the Far 
Letter from James Reston to the author, March 8, 1955 
29Cong. Record. Vol. 96, p. 9229, (81st Cong., 2nd Sess., June 27, 1950) 
30Ibid., p. 9228 
31 
Ibid.. p. 9239 
East against attack. The Secretary, he felt, had made it clear that neither 
Formosa nor Korea was included behind the line upon which the United States 
would stand. 
The Senator from Ohio then recalled the words of the Chairman of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Tom Connally) on the subject of Korea in 
an interview of May 5, 1950. On this occasion Senator Connally had told re-
porters of the United States News and World Report that South Korea was not 
an essential part of the defense strategy. Taft further pointed to statement 
by the President which indicated that our military aid to Korea was going for 
forces only to prevent border raids and to preserve internal security, where-
as the money had been appropriated by Congress with the intent to build de-
fenses against external aggression. 
This Administration attitude, Taft contended, was a direct invitation to 
the North Koreans to attack and to Soviet Russia to believe that Korea was a 
soft spot where Communism could move in without difficulty. He went on to 
point out that the President's intervention in Korea and his statements con-
cerning this action indicated a complete reversal of the previous policy of 
the State Department, and that he, Taft, welcomed this change. He did, how-
ever, somewhat question the timing of the action and strongly attacked the 
President's acting without consulting Congress: 
"It seems to me that the new policy is adopted at an un-
fortunate time and involves a very difficult military operation 
indeed... 
".... I have only a few words to say on the legal right 
of the President's act. 
"Although I should be willing to vote to approve the 
President's new policy as a policy and give support to our 
forces in Korea, I think it is proper and essential that we 
discuss at this time the right and the power of the President 
to do what he has done.... 
"His action unquestionably has brought about a de facto 
war with the government of northern Korea. He has brought 
that war about without consulting Congress and without Con-
gressional approval... if the President can intervene in Korea 
without Congressional approval, he can go to war in Malaya 
or Indonesia or Iran or South America. Presidents have at 
times intervened with American forces to protect American 
lives or interests, but I do not think it has been claimed that, 
apart from the United Nations Charter or other treaty obliga-
tions, the President has any right to precipitate any open 
warfare. 
"It is claimed that the Korean situation is changed by 
the obligations into which we have entered under the charter 
of the United Nations. I think this is true, but I do not 
think it justifies the President's present action without 
approval by Congress."32 
Taft went on to assert that under Section 6 of the bill passed by Con-
gress to implement United States participation in the United Nations, the 
circumstances under which the President could use armed forces in support of 
a resolution of the Security Council of the United Nations had been clearly 
stated. He then said these circumstances could not be said to even remotely 
exist. He even argued that the resolution of the Security Council was not 
legal in view of Article 27, which requires the affirmative vote of the five 
permanent members. The Russians were not in attendance when the resolution 
was passed. 
These points brought out in June, 1950, by Senator Taft are extremely 
important, because they form the basis of the attack which the Republicans 
launched on the Administration for its policy in Korea, an attack which was 
continued relentlessly for two years and which, it can be argued, played no 
small part in the defeat of the Democrats in 1952. While much of the initial 
reaction in June was not critical of the President's action, more and more 
criticism was voiced as time went on. In August the Republican members of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee issued a statement which revealed 
some of the events which they felt lay at the root of our problems in Korea 
32Ibid.. pp. 9319-9323. (June 28, 1950) 
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and elsewhere in Asia: 
"Strong bipartisan leadership and cooperation had al-
ready resulted in 1945 in the writing and ratification of 
the United Nations' Charter. During 1947 and 1948 this bi-
partisan spirit brought forth the program for Greek and 
Turkish aid, the Marshall Plan, the Rio Pact, and in 1949 
the North Atlantic Treaty. These have combined to frustrate 
Communist subversion and to discourage Communist aggression 
in Europe and in the Americas. 
"In sharp contrast, however, has been the policy in 
the Far East, where we were consistently led to believe 
that Chinese Communism was only a great agrarian reform 
movement. After half a century of cordial relations in the 
Far East and especially with China, with all its troubles 
and difficulties, in about 1945 we were suddenly faced 
with a change of policy which is •difficult to understand 
unless we evaluate the subtle betrayals of China at the 
Yalta Conference. This conference sabotaged the assurances 
given to China at the Cairo Conference of 1943, where also 
the future freedom of Korea was pledged. The Yalta agree-
ment turned over to Stalin the control of Manchuria and 
outer Mongolia and the ports of Dairen and Port Arthur. 
This was part of the price we paid for the unnecessary 
token participation of Soviet Russia in the war against 
Japan, one of the consequences of which was the division of 
Korea at the 38th parallel. 
"Our Far Eastern policy, growing out of these events, 
consistently temporized with and capitualted to the ruth-
less demands of the Communists dominated by Moscow. Under 
it the Kremlin was, in effect, given a green light to get 
whatever it could in China, Korea, and Formosa. This was 
never a bipartisan policy. It was solely an Administration 
policy."33 
It can be seen that the Republicans under Taft's leadership felt they 
had discovered a formula for attacking the Administration at every point of 
its Far Eastern policy. First, they had established that they had had no 
part in forming it. Second, things had gone badly for us in the Orient; 
therefore, the policy must have been wrong. Third, we had betrayed China 
to the Communists (l) by territorial concessions to Russia at Yalta and (2) 
by attempting to push Chiang into a coalition with the Chinese Reds. 
3*5 
Statement issued Aug. 14, 1950, by Sens. Wiley, H. A. Smith, Hicken-
looper, and Lodge, with Vandenberg's office announcing that he was in "gen-
eral agreement" with the views expressed. Reprint in Rep. Natl. Com., 
Background to Korea, pp. 54-56, 1952 
Fourth, we had failed to take a firm position in defense of Formosa and 
China and had then invited the attack across the 38th parallel. Fifth, 
after inviting the attack, we reversed our policy by a military intervention 
that was both unwise and unconstitutionally carried out, although this latter 
charge was not made until sometime after the Intervention took place. 
With the Korean war thus launched under this severe criticism, it was 
not surprising that there should be criticism of its prosecution. It was a 
new kind of war for the United States, and decisions had necessarily to be 
made as to how much of our strength could be committed, how far into Korea 
we should carry the war, what were our aims, and under what terms we would 
terminate the fighting. Almost any decisions made on these points could be 
questioned, and every decision gave the Republicans an opportunity for attack. 
The greatest conflict over the conduct of the war came between the 
policies announced by the President and those favored (often publicly) by 
the United States (and United Nations) Commander-in-Chief in the field, Gen-
eral of the Army Douglas A. MacArthur. MacArthur's distinguished military 
career in World War II and in Korea had made him extremely popular with many 
Americans, and,because of his avowed Republican sympathies, he was a real 
hero to the GOP. He had on several occasions voiced to Republican Congress-
men and others views contrary to the policy of the Administration on foreign 
affairs and to the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the execution of 
the war in Korea. 
It is not difficult to see then why President Truman touched off an al-
most unprecedented furor in Congress and the country when on April 11, 1951, 
he recalled MacArthur as United Nations Military Commander in the Far East 
and relieved him as Supreme Allied Commander in Japan, United Nations Com-
mander-in-Chief for Korea, United States Commander-in-Chief for the Far 
East, and Commanding General of the United States Army in the Far East. In 
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a dramatic early morning statement, Truman said he was firing MacArthur be-
cause the General was "unable to give his wholehearted support to policies 
of the United States government and the United Nations in matters pertaining 
to his official duties."3 He said his decision reflected "specific responsi-
bilities imposed upon me by the Constitution of the United States and the 
added responsibility which has been entrusted to me by the United Nations..." 
"Full and vigorous debate (Truman said] on matters of 
national policy is a vital element in the Constitutional 
system of our free democracy... fbut] military commanders 
must be governed by the policies and directives issued to 
them in the manner provided by our laws and Constitution. 
In time of crisis this consideration is particularly com-
pelling. 
"General MacArthur's place in history as one of our 
greatest commanders is fully established. The nation owes 
him a debt of gratitude... I repeat my regret at the ne-
cessity for the action I feel compelled to take in his 
case."35 
In an evening radio address the same day, the President took up some 
of the points on which he was at issue with MacArthur. The five-star gen-
eral had favored permitting the Chinese Nationalists to attack the mainland 
of China since Chinese soldiers were now fighting against us in North Korea. 
He also had suggested that United Nations forces be allowed to bomb China 
after they had pushed their way nearly to the Korea-China border. MacArthur 
felt that we could never win and hold North Korea until we were able to hit 
at the base from which the Chinese were pouring troops and equipment into 
Korea. The President said that by following these suggestions "we would be 
running a very grave risk of starting a general war," and he repeated that 
the entiî e basis for United States participation in Korea was action to 
avert a general war. 




On the same day of MacArthur's removal, distinct legislative proposals 
emerged in Congress, all sponsored by Republicans. Early that day GOP Sen-
ate and House leaders met in the office of Joseph W. Martin, Minority Leader 
of the House. Amid telephone calls to MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo 
and talk of impeaching President Truman, a Republican plan was drawn up. It 
took the form of a resolution terming the General's removal "a situation 
fraught with danger., a blow to the national unity...," and urging that the 
General should be invited to place his "unsurpassed knowledge of political 
and military conditions in Korea and Asia generally" before a joint meeting 
37 
of Congress. MacArthur's headquarters advised that the General would be 
"delighted and honored" to accept such an invitation. Attending the meeting 
were GOP Senators Taft, Bridges, Wiley, Knowland, Wherry, and H. Alexander 
Smith, together with House Minority Leader Joseph W. Martin, Jr. and other 
members of the House GOP Policy group. 
As soon as the Senate convened on that day, Wherry obtained unanimous 
consent to introduce the resolution and attempted to get action on it the 
same day. Majority Leader Ernest W. McFarland, Arizona Democrat, however, 
objected successfully to this procedure, and the resolution went to committee. 
In the House the same resolution, introduced by Martin, was sent to the Com-
mittee on Rules. 
Following these moves, Senator Richard M. Nixon, California Republican, 
introduced another resolution to express the "sense of the Senate that... 
the President should reconsider his action and should restore General Mac-
Arthur" to his command. Nixon's resolution was referred to the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, where Republican members were already drawing up a 
g^Ibid. 
38Cong. Record. Vol. 97, p. 3708 (82nd Cong., 1st Sess., Apr. 11, 1951) 
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a plan whereby MacArthur could speak to Congress.39 
In the Senate the same afternoon, many Democrats strongly defended 
President Truman's action, and he was not without a number of Republican 
supporters. Senator Saltonstall said he felt the President had no alterna-
tive but to take some action against the General, and both Senators Duff and 
Lodge agreed. Most Republican reaction, however, ranged from the "shocked" 
one of Senator Watkins to the references to Munich made by Senators Bridges 
and Knowland. 
The action which finally brought MacArthur before Congress was a motion 
by House Majority Leader John W. McCormack, Massachusetts Democrat, to hold 
a joint session to hear him. This was passed April 11 by the House and April 
17 by the Senate, and the General appeared on the 19th in the House Chamber. 
His speech set forth his position on the Far Eastern situation and asserted 
that all his aims had been shared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This was 
promptly denied by the Pentagon, and the way for an investigation was opened. 
In commenting on his emotion-packed address, Republicans were enthusiastic 
in their praise, while most Democrats were cautious or critical. 
Hearings conducted jointly by the Senate's Armed Services and Foreign 
Relations Committees began May 3 following the release by the committees of 
the hitherto unpublished report on China and Korea by Lieutenant General 
Albert C. Wedemeyer submitted in 1947. In this report General Wedemeyer had 
told the President of the danger of a Soviet-inspired invasion of South Korea 
and urged creation of an American-South Korean force to cope with the threat. 
The release of this report led to comments by some Republican Congressmen 
criticizing the suppression of the report and speculating that the whole 
Korean War might have been avoided had Congress been given the facts. 
39Ibid.. p. 3614 
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As the hearings began, Republicans on the Committee made a concerted 
attempt to open them to the public; whereas the Democrats, urging the problem 
of security information, fought to keep them closed. Other Senators were to 
be admitted, but a motion by Bourke Hickenlooper, Iowa Republican, to open 
the hearings beyond Senate membership was defeated (9 - 14). On the floor 
Kenneth Wherry, Nebraska Republican, attempted to get the Senate as a body 
to open the Committee sessions but failed also. In a series of four roll-
call votes on procedural questions, the purpose of which was to get the Sen-
ate to consider open hearings, it is significant to note that the Republicans 
and Democrats voted more nearly on party lines than on most such issues. All 
the GOP Senators voting supported Wherry's maneuver, while all but one of the 
Democrats voted to block them.McCarran being the one dissenter. Almost 
no Republican, it would seem, failed to see in the MacArthur firing an excel-
lent opportunity to embarrass the President. 
The greatest part of the testimony at the joint hearings consisted of 
the opinions of MacArthur, Secretary of Defense Marshall, and the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. Between the ousted officer and the Pentagon there were sev-
eral basic points at issue. MacArthur definitely favored the use of Chinese 
troops from Formosa, while Marshall felt the use of these troops would be 
ineffective and unwise. MacArthur did not believe there was any danger of 
bringing the Soviet Union into the war by bombing Chinese air bases across 
the Yalu river; whereas the Administration spokesmen thought such a move 
would run a definite risk of general war. Marshall also pointed out the 
seriousness of a situation where a field commander was making policy state-
ments apparently contradictory to the views of the Administration. 
After Marshall had completed his testimony, Senator Hickenlooper, Iowa 
Republican, wanted immediately to broaden the hearings by calling Secretary 
Wibid., p. 4852 (May 4, 1951) 
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of State Dean Acheson , but the Committee voted (11 - 14) to hear first the 
Joint Chiefs. Acheson did not appear until June 1 when he stated that he 
was concerned not only that MacArthur's policy would have risked Russian 
intervention in the Far East, but that it would have endangered the solidarity 
of the United Nations. He disagreed with MacArthur's belief that the United 
States could afford to go it alone. He said that use of Chinese Nationalist 
troops would have raised very serious complications, particularly among the 
United Nations participants in Korea. Acheson further declared that Mac-
Arthur's offer to confer in the field with a Red commander on peace terms 
seriously embarrassed the United States government, which was considering a 
proposed Presidential peace statement. 
Both the questioning and the testimony of Acheson ranged over the 
whole area of American foreign policy. The subject of the Yalta Conference 
was pursued at some length. Acheson stoutly defended the concessions made 
to Russia at that time and noted that Chiang Kai_shek had endorsed them. Re-
publican critics, however, continued to label Yalta as a "sell-out" and as 
one of the main roots of present United States difficulties in Asia. The 
Secretary stated that there was no connection between the Yalta agreements 
and the Communist victory in the Civil War. He implied that the Nationalist 
defeat was due partially to economic collapse despite huge credits extended 
Chiang by the United States before the war. 
Far from convincing any of his critics, however, Acheson's testimony 
only furnished an occasion for further demands for his ouster. Senator 
James P. Kem, Missouri Republican, declared June 2 that "Acheson must go 
soon," while Representative Paul W. Shafer, Michigan Republican, called the 
41 
Secretary "an admitted liar." 
^Oong. Quarterly. Vol. VII, p. 250 (1951) 
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Questions were raised at several points about the so-called "China 
lobby," said to operate in this country on behalf of Chiang Kai-shek's Na-
tionalist regime, and Acheson, Wedemeyer, and others were questioned on what 
they knew of such a group. Senator Morse, Oregon Republican, told Acheson 
that it had been widely charged that the China lobby had for several years 
been conducting a campaign against policies in China and attempting to dis-
credit the State Department by charging that its policies reflected Communist 
influences. Both Morse and Brian McMahon, Connecticut Democrat, asked for an 
investigation, and Acheson agreed that the public should know it if any Ameri-
can funds had been misused for this purpose. Acheson resisted any suggestions 
that the State Department make the investigation, but when he returned to the 
hearings on June 9, he informed the Senators that President Truman had in-
structed the heads of executive departments and agencies to compile any data 
they might have on the China lobby. 
At this point Senator Styles Bridges, New Hampshire Republican, declared 
that any China lobby would be revealed as "a very minor thing" compared to 
other pressure groups seeking American power. He, in turn, asked for an in-
vestigation into evidences of any pressures from "the Communist government of 
China" or other enemies of the United States. Bridges has since been charged, 
particularly in the Reporter magazine, with a close association with this 
still somewhat undefined "China lobby." 2 No decision to investigate was 
made in Congress at this time or any time subsequently. 
Considerable discussion ensued on the question of whether top American 
officials tried to promote a coalition Nationalist-Communist government in 
China in 1945. Acheson said on June 6 that MacArthur himself had approved 
plans in 1945 for an attempt to compromise differences between the National-
32 
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ists and Communists in China. This was based on an endorsement by MacArthur 
of a plan to use United States assistance to China as a basis for negotiation 
to bring together and effect a compromise between the major opposing groups 
in order to promote a united, democratic China. The General, three days later 
in a telegram to Senator Knowland, denied strongly that this meant support 
of any plan to use American assistance as a weapon to force the existing 
(Nationalist) government into a political alliance with the Communists. 
The investigation closed after nearly two full months, and the Committee 
began to consider what reports were to be made. On June 27 a unanimous state-
ment was issued which warned "those who threaten us" not to mistake the con-
troversy which had just been aired for any basic weakness or change in the 
"temper of our people," and on August 17 the Committee voted (20 - 3) to make 
44 
no formal report on the investigation. On August 20 eight of the twelve 
Republican members released voluminous "conclusions" on the investigation 
which they said they offered "as Americans," not as Senators. The eight were 
Bridges, Wiley, H. A. Smith, Hickenlooper, Knowland, Cain, Brewster, and 
Flanders.45 
The eight signers concluded that the removal of General MacArthur was 
within the constitutional power of the President, but the circumstances were 
a "shock to the National pride." They felt there was no serious disagreement 
between General MacArthur and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to military strat-
egy in Korea, and that the testimony revealed that General MacArthur's was 
the only positive plan for victory there. The eight Republicans declared 
that under Acheson the policy of American foreign affairs has been primarily 
-to conciliate certain of our United Nation allies rather than to advance the 
^Oong. Quarterly. Vol. VII, p. 252. (l95l) 
^Ibid.. p. 253 
45New York Times. Aug. 20, 1951, pp. 10-11 
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security of the United States. With regard to China the eight GOP Senators 
"had not been convinced that Chiang lost China for any other reason than that 
he did not receive sufficient support, both moral and material, from the 
United States." This last statement goes all the way in laying the complete 
responsibility for the success of the revolution in China at the door of an 
American government to whom that success meant a severe setback in the struggle 
with the Communist world. 
Two of the Republican members who did not sign the statement issued 
their own opinions. Leverett Saltonstall (Massachusetts) said he considered 
"our present task and duty" to be "to deal with the present... and look 
ahead... rather than look backward in anger and with recriminations." Wayne 
Morse (Oregon) was the only member of either committee, either Democrat or 
Republican, to defend the Administration in the final analysis. He criti-
cized the report of his eight colleagues as partisan and biased and concluded 
that MacArthur should have resigned his commission "to carry the issue as a 
47 civilian to the people of the United States." 
At the end of the period under consideration, then, the United States 
was still carrying on a limited war in Korea, which had by the end of 1952 
become stalemated, with both sides unwilling to commit sufficient troops and 
equipment to push the battle line very far in one direction or the other. 
Peace negotiations began in mid-1951 but seemed at the close of the Truman 
Administration to be as stalemated as the war itself. The Republicans (or 
some of them) found in the situation grounds for two kinds of attack on the 
Administration. The continued and apparently fruitless loss of American lives 
led many Republicans to attack the war itself as a blunder, to call it "Tru-
man's war," and to condemn our entry into it; while the MacArthur affair led 
46Ibid.. Aug. 20, 1951, p. 1 
47Ibid. 
them to criticize the way in which the war had been executed and to declare 
that carrying the war into China by air would have ended the whole affair 
much more quickly. 
III. India 
While the bulk of partisan controversy centered on American policy in 
China and Korea, Congress was obliged in 1951 and 1952 to consider certain 
aspects of our relations with two other important Asian nations — India and 
Japan. As is well known, the position of India in the Asian cold war has 
been unique. While at all times standing outside the Communist orbit and 
being associated with the British Commonwealth of Nations, India has nonethe-
less persisted in a course of action considerably more independent of the 
United States than our own government would wish. India, of course, shares 
with the rest of Asia the resentment of any policy which smacks of Western 
colonialism or domination in Asia and has not been completely immune to the 
Communist propaganda which plays on this theme. Also, many of her leaders 
have been influenced by the Ghandi approach to world problems, and her Prime 
Minister, Pandit Nehru, has been willing to go to great lengths to make a 
conciliatory approach to Communist Russia and China in order to succeed in 
keeping peace in Asia and the world. It is possible, too, that these leaders 
regard India's position as favorable to playing the role of "holder of the 
balance" in the power relations in that area of the world. 
The United States, too, has considered India as a key nation in Asia 
and has been anxious to have her weight thrown clearly on our side in the 
battle with Communism. We do not want the millions who populate India to 
follow China under the Communist yolk. To this end we have striven to sup-
port Nehru's democratic regime but have been frequently irked by his friend-
liness to the Communist powers and his reluctance to line up solidly with 
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the West in the United Nations and in other international relations. 
Early in 1951 the Indian government requested food in the form of grain 
from the United States to avert a threatened famine. There was surplus grain 
available in the United States under government control, and many Congress-
men from both parties voiced support for an Indian aid program. At that 
time, however, India was opposing certain United States diplomatic moves in 
the United Nations, and there was considerable resentment at this expressed 
on Capitol Hill. 
On February 12 President Truman urged Congress to give two million 
tons of grain to India "despite important political differences with that 
country." The cost of the gift was estimated to be $190,000,000. In spite 
of a somewhat unenthuslastic response in Congress, the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee held hearings on an Indian Aid bill and formally reported the meas-
ure on March 5 as a proposed gift. This bill was sent to the Rules Committee 
for clearance to the House floor, but this group held it up, despite the 
strong humanitarian arguments voiced by its backers. 
In the Senate the Foreign Relations Committee held its own hearings, 
and on April 27 reported a bill putting the program on a half-gift, half-loan 
basis. The Senate itself rejected this formula, voting (52 - 32) to put 
India's aid on a straight loan basis and requiring India to repay the loan 
partially in certain oriental raw materials (Republicans: 3 7 - 2 ) . With 
49 
these changes the bill was passed by a voice vote on May 16. The addition 
of the raw material requirement came at the urging of some of the isolation-
ist Republicans such as Styles Bridges (New Hampshire), George W. Malone 
(Nevada), and Everett Dirksen of Illinois who said, "It's high time we get 
something out of this." 
480ong. Quarterly. Vol. VII, p. 233, (1951) 
490ong. Record. Vol. 97, p. 5400 (82nd Cong., 1st Sess., May 16, 1951) 
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After considerable prompting by President Truman, the House Rules Com-
mittee finally approved a "clean" bill authorizing the aid program on a 
straight loan basis. The House did not open debate until May 22. Some op-
position came from Republicans such as Lawrence W. Smith (Wisconsin), Leo E. 
Allen (Illinois), and Charles A. Halleck (Indiana), and the latter supported 
an amendment to predicate aid on an attempt to get India to furnish raw 
materials to the United States. This amendment was accepted by a voice vote, 
although a slightly stiffer version had been defeated. By a roll-call vote 
the bill was then passed (293 - 94), with Republicans supporting it by a mar-
50 
gin of 121 to 58. The House version of the bill, which did not make the 
repayment in raw materials mandatory, was adopted by the conference committee 
and passed by a vote of 286 to 82 in the House and a voice vote in the Sen-
N 51 
ate (Republicans in the House: 110 - 51). 
IV. Japan 
Six years after the close of hostilities representatives of forty-eight 
nations signed in San Francisco on September 8, 1951, a peace treaty for 
Japan and a Japanese Security Pact. The President did not send these agree-
ments to the Senate, however, until early in 1952, and hearings began in the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee in late January. By February 20 the Com-
mittee had unanimously recommended Senate ratification, but suggested the 
adoption of a reservation which stated that the treaty should not be inter-
preted to prejudice in favor of the Soviet Union the right of Japan or the 
Allied powers to the South Sakhalin, Kurile, Hakurai, and Shikotan Islands. 
On the Senate floor support came from many quarters, but Senator William 
„E. Jenner, Indiana Republican, proposed several additional reservations to 
SOlbid.. P. 5842 (May 24, 1951) 
51Ibid., p. 6187 (June 6, 1951) 
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the peace treaty and the security pact, and these also had the backing of 
Margaret Chase Smith (Republican, of Maine). Senator Dirksen, Illinois Re-
publican, on the other hand, wanted to delay action on the treaties pending 
a "show down" on United States Asiatic policy as a whole, and to this end he 
filed a motion for indefinite postponement. 
This motion was withdrawn and the first Jenner-Smith reservation was 
taken up. Jenner contended that certain references to the United Nations 
in the peace treaty would "put American boys under the control" of the world 
organization, and his reservation provided that nothing in the treaty could 
limit United States sovereignty or impose continuing limitations on Japan. 
It was rejected by a vote of 25 to 55, although Republicans supported it 
(22 - 17). 5 2 
Jenner's second reservation stipulated that the treaty did not approve 
any of the Potsdam agreements affecting Russian-occupied former Japanese is-
lands. The resolution of ratification under which the treaty was brought up 
disavowed recognition of any Yalta agreements in favor of Russia, but Jenner 
wanted mention of the Potsdam agreement included, contending it reaffirmed 
Russia's rights to the islands given at Yalta. This reservation was defeated 
by a vote of 27 to 54, although Republicans cast 23 votes in favor and only 
17 against adoption.BS 
The next proposed reservation brought forward by Jenner was designed to 
protect certain rights of Americans in reparations claims against Japan but 
was turned down (23 - 58) (Republicans: 19 - 21). Jenner's fourth proposal 
was to reaffirm the United States "open door" policy and stipulate that the 
only China government recognized in the treaty would be the Nationalist 
Chinese. Rejection of this reservation was by a vote of 29 to 48, but Re-




54 publicans favored it (25 - 13). Dirksen's motion to postpone consideration 
of the treaty was then defeated (ll - 64) and the peace treaty was approved 
55 
by a vote of 66 to 10, nine Republicans and one Democrat opposed. 
On' the Japanese Security Pact Jenner proposed two reservations: one 
which would require Senate ratification of any administrative agreement 
covering United States troops, and another declaring that United States se-
curity rights could not expire without Senate consent. The first was re-
jected by a vote of 22 to 45 (Republicans: 12 - 22), and the second by a 
56 
vote of 26 to 41 (Republicans: 25 - 9). Following this the Security Pact 
57 was approved by a vote of 58 to 9, all opponents being Republicans. 
P^Ibid. 
pre 
Ibid., p. 2594. Those voting "nay" were Republicans Dirksen (ill.), 
Dworshak (Idaho), Ecton (Mont.), Jenner (ind.), Kem (Mo.), Malone (N©v.), 
McCarthy (Wis.), Welker (Idaho), Young (N. Dak.), and Democrat McCarran (Nev.) 
poIbld.. pp. 2604-2605 
°fIbid. Those opposed were Bricker (Ohio), Dirksen (ill.), Dworshak 
(Idaho), Ecton (Mont.), Jenner (ind.), Kem (Mo.), Malone (Nev.), Welker 
(Idaho), and Young (N. Dak.), all Republicans. 
CHAPTER VIII 
COOPERATORS VS. OPPOSITIONISTS', 1949-1952 
I. 
The 1948 elections returned the Republicans to Congress as a Minority of 
42 in the Senate and 180 in the House of Representatives. From the stand-
point of their foreign policy views a number of Senate oppositionists — 
including Senators Revercomb (West Virginia), Robertson (Wyoming), Moore 
(Oklahoma), Buck (Delaware), Brooks (Illinois), and Wilson (Iowa) — were 
among the victims of the Democratic victory. This group was considerably 
larger than the number of cooperators who were defeated, the latter group 
being limited to John Sherman Cooper (Kentucky) and Joseph Ball (Minnesota). 
Writing in the Christian Science Monitor. Roscoe Drummond pointed out that 
of ten Republican Senators up for re-election who supported cuts in the Eu-
ropean Recovery Program, nine were defeated, and of six who voted against ERP, 
2 
five were defeated. Although this may have indicated that voters were 
strongly behind the bipartisan policy and that the oppositionist nature of 
the candidates had something to do with their defeat, it will soon appear 
certain that whatever reduction in oppositionist ranks the election may have 
caused, it did not forecast a more bipartisan attitude on the part of the 
GOP Republicans remaining. 
The very fact of the party's defeat was felt by many to be a repudiation 
of the bipartisan or "me-tooism" approach to foreign policy. Had not Dewey 
been the one who first in 1944 committed the party to cooperation with the 
Administration? Had not he and his whole "soft" approach in the 1948 cam-
•'•Although Ball was earlier an ardent internationalist, he was nearer to 
the "middle of the road" by the time of his defeat. 
2Quoted in Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., The Private Papers of Senator 
Vandenberg. p. 466, citation not given 
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paign been thoroughly repudiated by the American people? Then surely it was 
time to drop the whole idea and return to the policy of presenting the country 
with clear-cut alternatives in the field of foreign policy. Whatever flaws 
this reasoning may have had, it could hardly fail to have some effect in 
party circles after the November humiliation. The selection of Kenneth Wherry 
of Nebraska to replace Wallace White of Maine as GOP Senate Floor Leader prob-
ably can be interpreted as a normal succession inasmuch as Wherry had been 
whip for five years, but this change did, nonetheless, place in that key posi-
tion an implacable foe of the Administration's bipartisan foreign policy. 
How powerful Wherry was in the role of Floor Leader with respect to in-
fluencing the voting of fellow Senators is not easy to evaluate. On frequent 
occasions he would point out that his bitter attacks on the Truman foreign 
policy or on bipartisanship as a working arrangement were not made in his role 
as Floor Leader but only as an individual Senator.3 The selection of Wherry 
came following a minor revolt in Republican Senatorial ranks on the part of 
a group of younger Republicans against the leadership of Taft and Wherry. 
Pointing to the results of the 1948 election noted above, these Senators, led 
by Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. of Massachusetts, demanded more liberal leadership. 
Vandenberg sympathized with Lodge and admired him, partly because of his 
record of solid support on bipartisanship, and Vandenberg considered Wherry 
the center of the isolationist wing of the party; whereas Taft had often 
opposed Vandenberg on foreign policy. On the other hand, Vandenberg ad-
mired Taft's leadership on domestic issues, was quite sure rebellion was not 
very likely to succeed, and felt that if he joined the rebellion he might 
jeopardize the support he needed for his own bipartisan aims in foreign 
policy. Vandenberg hoped that Taft would step aside, but when he did not, 
Vandenberg supported Taft against Lodge for Chairman of the Policy Committee 
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and Wherry against Knowland as Floor Leader. Taft and Wherry won (28 - 14), 
but Vandenberg felt something had been accomplished by the adoption of cer-
tain new party rules and the inclusion of some "new lookers" on the Policy 
Committee. 
Wherry's successor as Assistant Floor Leader (whip) was Leverett Salton-
stall of Massachusetts, a firm supporter of bipartisanship, while Senator 
Millikin of Colorado continued as Chairman of the Party Conference. On the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Vandenberg remained the ranking Republican 
member, and with the retirement of Senators Capper (Kansas) and White (Maine), 
the remaining members, Senators Wiley (Wisconsin), Smith (New Jersey), Hicken-
looper (Iowa), and Lodge (Massachusetts), all favorable to the bipartisan 
approach, moved up to second, third, fourth, and fifth positions respectively. 
While the Republicans were preparing to name a sixth member to the Committee, 
however, the Democrats made and announced a decision which caused the first 
inter-party skirmish of the new Congress. After the Committee reorganization 
of 1946, the Republicans had established in the 80th Congress a 7-6 majority 
on the Foreign Relations group. The Republicans had assumed, and perhaps had 
been privately assured, that the Democrats would continue this practice, but 
instead the Democratic leadership announced January 5 that the new ratio 
would be 8-5. While this did not mean the actual unseating of any Republican 
member, it deprived the Republicans of an opportunity to satisfy at least one 
of a number of requests on the part of their own membership to be appointed to 
one of the seats vacated by Capper and White. 
But the implications of this decision were far greater than this. The 
move was widely interpreted by those who wanted to do so as a double blow 
^Vandenberg, pp. 464-468. The new rule probably referred to was that by 
which the nominees to the Policy Committee made by the Chairman of the Confer-
ence could be rejected individually by the Conference instead of in a bloc. 
The "new lookers" were probably Ives— one of the "rebels"— and, perhaps, 
M. C. Smith of Maine and Vandenberg himself. 
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struck by the Democrats at bipartisanship and at Vandenberg's prestige. 
Whether or not these were factors in making the decision is not known. The 
Democrats probably felt they had to make places for members of their own 
party, but the effect was to open the way for the Republican oppositionists 
to charge that this was the kind of reward that could be expected from follow-
ing Vandenberg's leadership in support of Administration foreign policy. It 
was clear that Vandenberg's influence within his own party would be reduced 
as a result of this move. The oppositionists were quick to point out that 
they felt relieved of any responsibility to support bipartisanship if that 
5 
was the way the Democrats were going to behave, 
Vandenberg himself reacted by accusing the Democrats of having struck at 
the outset of the new Congress a blow against the bipartisan foreign policy 
that was "implicit with hostility." He contended that the implication before 
the country would be that the Republicans were no longer trustworthy in 
g 
matters of foreign affairs. Two days later Representative Joseph W. Martin 
(Massachusetts), Republican Floor Leader in the House, was able to announce 
and praise the decision of the Democratic leadership there to retain the 
14-11 ratio in the House Committee on Foreign Affairs as it had been in the 
80th Congress. 
Republican leadership in the new House remained in the hands of Mr. 
Martin as Floor Leader and Leslie C. Arends (Illinois) as Assistant Floor 
Leader. Republican membership on the Foreign Affairs Committee remained 
practically unchanged from the 80th Congress. It will be remembered that the 
Republicans on this Committee were considerably more "international" or bi-
partisan minded than the Republican membership of the House as a whole. 
Figure I shows the distribution of these members on a scale of votes cast 
5New York Times. Jan. 6, 1949, p. 7 
6Ibid.. p. 1 
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differently than those of Noah Mason of Illinois in the 81st Congress. Only 
Lawrence A. Smith (Wisconsin), Robert B. Chiperfield (Illinois), and Donald 
L. Jackson (California) cast fewer than half their foreign policy votes 
differently than the oppositionist Mason, while John M. Vorys (Ohio), Francis 
P. Bolton(Ohio), Chester H. Merrow (New Hampshire), Walter H. Judd (Minnesota), 
Jacob K. Javits (New York), and John Davis Lodge (Connecticut) were among 
the 13 percent of House Republicans opposing Mason on more than half the 
roll calls. (Figure II) 
Following on the heels of the committee ratio flare-up came the debate 
on the nomination of Dean Acheson to be Secretary of State. There was no ad-
vanced consultation with the Republicans on the Foreign Relations Committee as 
to the acceptability of this nomination, and whether there should have been or 
not, many Republicans were able to find in this another prop pulled from under 
the bipartisan approach to foreign policy by the re-elected President. As 
a result, the nomination was not very welcome among Republicans, by whom 
Acheson was not particularly respected anyway. On the vote to confirm, how-
ever, there were only six negative Republican votes, those of Bridges (New 
Hampshire), Capehart and Jenner (Indiana), Knowland (California), Langer 
(Worth Dakota), and Wherry (Nebraska). Vandenberg himself was cool toward 
Acheson and felt that the President might have made a wiser choice or at 
least have consulted leading Republicans beforehand. The Michigan Senator 
supported the appointment and asked for its confirmation, but he left the im-
pression in his writings and speeches of the next few years that his relation-
ship with Acheson had perhaps been less satisfactory than with any of the 
7 
other four Secretaries of State during the period of bipartisanship. It can 
perhaps be speculated that the problem grew not only out of the differences 
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between Acheson and former Secretaries in personality and approach,but, also, 
from the more self-confident attitude of the President himself after gaining 
the Presidency in his own right. 
In addition to these two disputes as the new Congress opened, there was 
another factor which contributed to the conclusion that the leadership of 
Arthur Vandenberg was somewhat weaker than previously in the ranks of the 
GOP. It was probably true that during the 80th Congress some of the Republi-
cans went along with Vandenberg on the bipartisan program because there was 
always the possibility at that time that he would be the 1948 Republican 
Presidential nominee, and they would not want to oppose a man in that posi-
tion. This possibility was now removed, and so was this element of his 
prestige. 
The mood of disenchantment with the bipartisan foreign policy as it was 
now working (or not working), which marked the opening of the 1949 session 
and was soon to be reflected in the Republican voting record, burst into a 
full scale attack in June. The assault came, albeit in varying degrees, from 
a wider segment of the GOP than previously; and it was no longer restricted 
to specific details, dollar amounts, and technicalities of administration, 
but was directed at some of the basic concepts of our foreign political 
policies. 
One of these was, of course, the Chinese issue, discussed in some detail 
in Chapter VII. As mentioned there, this was one issue on which Senator 
Vandenberg dissociated himself and his party from the Administration's record. 
Although there had been scattered criticism up to this time, China had for 
many years been out of the area of sharpest controversy. Now the full im-
pact of the successful Communist revolution was being felt in Congress. Re-
publicans such as Senator Taft were leading a bitter attack on the China 
°New York Times. Jan. 6, 1949, p. 7 
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policy, which included charges of disloyalty in the State Department, fail-
ure to help the Nationalist Chinese, and misjudgment of the Communist aims; 
and the usual GOP Administration supporters, such as Vandenberg, were not 
attempting to reconcile their party to the Administration point of view, but 
rather joined in the attack (in somewhat milder terms) and pointed out that 
the China policy had never been a part of the bipartisan program, since the 
9 
GOP had never been consulted or advised with regard to it. 
The existence of a report by General Wedemeyer to the Administration on 
the China problem and the fact that repeated demands for publication of this 
report had been in vain added fuel to the rising Republican fire. The 
frontal assault on the Administration on China, which was to continue for at 
least four years, had thus begun in earnest. The precipitating issue for a 
China debate at this particular time was the nomination by the President of 
W. Walton Butterworth, the State Department's officer, who as Director for 
Far Eastern Affairs had been in charge of the unfortunate China policy, to 
be an Assistant Secretary of State in charge of Far Eastern affairs. This 
promotion for Butterworth, although perhaps not the chief target of the op-
positionists, was sufficient occasion to bring on the general clamor. When 
the nomination reached the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Vandenberg, 
feeling that a fresh point of view was needed in the State Department on Far 
Eastern affairs, voted "present," thus breaking the series of recent unanimous 
votes in that group. On the floor Vandenberg stated his criticism of the 
China policy, his dissociation from it, and his disappointment with the 
Butterworth nomination, but in the final analysis he and seven other Republi-
9Vandenberg, p. 532 
This was subsequently published as Report to President Truman by 
Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer. U. S. Army, reprinted as Annex No. 135 
to U. S. Dept. of State, United States Relations with China, p. 764 
11Vandenberg, p. 533 
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cans voted "yea," while thirty of his GOP colleagues either voted or announced 
12 
themselves against the appointment. 
More blows at the bipartisan foreign policy were soon to come in the 
debate over the North Atlantic Pact and its implementation. Although the 
Republicans voted 32 to 11 in favor of the Pact, the opposition included 
Senator Robert Taft of Ohio, which added, as Vandenberg put it, "a certain 
respectability" to that group.13 It also meant the breaking on an important 
issue of the "informal understanding" existing in the 80th Congress between 
these two Republicans, whereby Vandenberg followed Taft's lead in domestic 
affairs, while Taft sought to minimize conflict with Vandenberg on foreign 
14 
policy. 
In contrast to the preparation of the Pact itself, on which there had 
been a great deal of cooperation between the Administration and Capitol Hill 
(Senator Vandenberg in particular), the initial proposals for the implementa-
tion of the North Atlantic Treaty came to Congress with no advance bipartisan 
consultation. The bill called for a $1,450,000,000 arms program, and it met 
almost immediate and overwhelming opposition at the Capitol. Vandenberg 
served notice in a press statement that he would not support this request, 
but favored instead only an interim measure to carry over until serious study 
could produce a well-thought-out program in the next Congress. This state-
ment did the kind of thing Vandenberg had seldom done in recent years — 
flatly oppose an Administration measure on foreign policy after it was sent 
from the State Department. His own view, expressed to his wife, was that: 
"The old bipartisan business is certainly 'out the win-
dow' on this one, yet I don't want to be shoved into a posi-
tion of seeming hostility to the objective (in which I deeply 
12Cong. Record. Vol. 95, p. 13293, (81st Cong., 1st Sess., Sept. 27, 1949) 
13Vandenberg, p. 498 
14Ibid.. pp. 318-319 
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believe). So it's a pretty tight 'poker game' between 
Acheson and me." 
In the Committee on Foreign Relations he had the support of both Re-
publicans and Democrats in his attitude, and he was also working closely 
with John Foster Dulles, just appointed to the Senate from New York to fill 
the vacancy left by the resignation of Senator Robert Wagner. As Vandenberg's 
health began to fail in the last half of 1949, Dulles, as an early architect 
of bipartisanship, became increasingly important as the leader of the Senate 
group wishing to continue such an approach. 
On the arms aid issue a few sharp statements by Vandenberg and others 
at a Foreign Relations Committee hearing, where Acheson and Secretary of 
Defense Johnson were present, persuaded the Administration to submit a new 
draft which was considerably more acceptable. The whole affair, however, was 
sufficiently dramatic to lead Joseph Alsop in the New York Herald Tribune to 
conclude that the era of bipartisanship had died. Continuous exchange of 
information and continuous consultation on policy had made a success of bi-
partisanship in the past, Alsop said, but Republicans could not be expected 
to go along blindly with Administration policies after that system was dropped. 
While Alsop felt that Senator Connally's sensitivity about Vandenberg's key 
role in the 80th Congress was an obstacle to the continuation of bipartisan-
ship, he did not see a resumption of that role as a necessity. Rather he felt: 
"The need today... is only for a resumption on a rea-
sonable, modified plan, of the normal exchange of information 
and prior consultation on policy without which any bipartisan-
ship is wholly impossible.... it is certainly not a bad bet 
that the present situation originated, at least in part, in 
the White House attitude toward bipartisanship."1^ 
Vandenberg quoted the Alsop analysis with approval, especially with 
regard to putting the blame on Truman, but his own reaction to the arms pro-
15Ibid.. p. 504 
Quoted in Ibid.. pp. 505-506, citation not given 
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gram debacle was stated as follows: 
"The episode has not been without some collateral ad-
vantages — from my point of view. It has publicly demon-
strated that the Republican contribution to so-called 'bi-
partisan foreign policy' was not on a 'me-too' basis. This 
'rae-too' charge has been the most successful criticism which 
the isolationist wing of the Republican Party has been able to 
throw at me, I have never felt free to answer. Now events 
have answered for themselves. The truth of the matter, of 
course, is that the Republican contribution to 'bipartisan 
foreign policy' has always been the exact reverse of 'me-
too. ' The only difference is that heretofore the 'surren-
ders,' if you want to call them that, have occurred in 
private and in advance." fa reference to the Administra-
tion's withdrawal of the original arras aid bill] 
After the "surrender" a kind of ad hoc cooperation between Vandenberg 
and Dulles on one hand and the State Department on the other helped to put 
a revised version of the bill through Congress. The votes, however, in both 
the House and Senate indicated that there was less Republican support for this 
program than for any other of similar importance since Pearl Harbor. Repub-
licans in the Senate supported (23 - 10) two moves to cut the authorizations 
by $200,000,000 and divided 19 for and 14 against on final passage. In the 
House a proposed $50,000,000 cut received the support of the GOP by a vote 
of 137 to 8, and only 51 Republican Representatives voted to pass the bill, 
while 94 voted to reject it. 
Even before the compromises between the Senate and House versions of 
the bill were ironed out, Vandenberg left Washington for reasonsof health 
and returned only for a few brief visits before his death in April, 1951. 
From this time on active leadership of the Republican side of the bipartisan 
bloc, or the cooperators, which now became a more fitting term, passed to the 
hands of John Foster Dulles (until November 1949 only), Irving Ives (New 
York), Wayne M0rse (Oregon), Margaret Chase Smith (Maine), Alexander Wiley 
(Wisconsin), and Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. (Massachusetts), which is to say 
17Ibid., p. 509 
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that there was no longer any one person who exercised an influence anywhere 
nearly approaching that of Vandenberg. In the year and a half before his 
death Vandenberg was still a member of the Senate and still a force. His 
offices were maintained, he announced himself on roll-call votes in the Sen-
ate, he conferred with leaders in both parties, and he issued statements of 
policy at infrequent intervals, but his potent influence was missing. 
If bipartisanship could not be held together with Vandenberg present and 
voting, it was not hard to guess that its chances for surviving his departure 
were few. When he was no longer present and fighting, not only were the 
chances for effective Republican-Administration consultation and cooperation 
severely impaired, but the force to rally Republican votes for such a coopera-
tive policy was missing. Taft's personal obligation to Vandenberg no longer 
had to be fulfilled, and many Senators who, even if not respecting him, had 
felt the pull of his influence, now were free to form new allegiances. 
Less than three months after Vandenberg's departure, the man who had 
come to be called "an effective co-commander of President Truman's foreign 
policy" — John Foster Dulles — was also retired from the Senate as the re-
sult of a special election in November, 1949. In spite of Dulles' will-
ingness in the past to cooperate, the Administration was quite active in in-
suring his defeat by Herbert Lehman. Dulles tried hard to put across the 
idea that on his election hung the fate of the bipartisan foreign policy, but 
Lehman argued that there had been bipartisanship for eight years without 
19 Dulles in the Senate and that it could continue again without him. 
Vandenberg lent his support to the Dulles thesis, but when Truman was asked 
whether the defeat of Dulles would mean any modification of the bipartisan 
attitude on foreign policy, the President replied that it certainly would 
l^New York Times. Oct. 25, 1949, p. 26 
19Ibid., Oct. 29, 1949, p. 7 
not. Senator Ives, on the other hand, felt that a movement against the 
bipartisan foreign policy was building up and that Dulles' defeat might 
bring an end to that policy. 
Partly, no doubt, as a result of the Dulles defeat, partly as a reac-
tion to the year's other events, December, 1949, was a month for statements 
by many leading Republicans on the issue of bipartisanship in foreign affairs. 
In spite of the many obvious setbacks, many of the cooperators were not will-
ing to recognize defeat of a favorite idea. They undoubtedly felt that the 
bipartisan notion had strong support in the country at large, and they wanted 
to continue to work for it. Following an operation, Vandenberg returned on 
December 22 to say that the "unpartisan" policy approach "should be contin-
ued in an effort to obtain, after full debate, a unified policy against those 
who would divide and confuse us."21 Senator Wayne Morse (Oregon) also 
called on his fellow Republicans to defend the bipartisan policy against 
attack from the midwestern wing. 
On the other hand, there were for the first time since the war several 
direct attacks on the bipartisan idea as such. Of oourse the midwestern 
wing or oppositionists had often fought the whole program but usually had 
done so in the name of defending "true bipartisanship." There had long been 
accusations that the Administration was destroying bipartisanship, but after 
the events of 1949, Senator Wherry felt he could call for an end to the bi-
partisan foreign policy "as it is now known" and declare his unwillingness 
to accept (as if he ever had) future commitments "made by bipartisan big-
op 
wigs." Wherry proposed a nonpartisan foreign policy under which this 
^uIbid.. Nov. 11, 1949, p. 24 
21Ibid.. Dec. 22, 1949, p. 22 
23Ibid.. Dec. 26, 1949, p. 1 
country could be committed to no step by the State Department until the 
23 
subject in its details had been put before the full Senate. A few days 
later Senator Jenner (Indiana) attacked Vandenberg by implication, and Sena-
tor George Malone (Nevada) dennounced the bipartisan foreign policy and 
challenged the right of Senator Vandenberg to commit the Republican party to 
support it. 4 These statements heralded significant changes in the Congres--
sional Republican attitude on foreign affairs and in the distribution of 
influence on foreign policy in the Congressional party. 
II. 
Two days after the opening of the second session of the 81st Congress 
new Republican views on bipartisanship were voiced. In view of the rising 
challenge to Vandenberg in the Senate and of the doubt raised by Taft's own 
split with him on the North Atlantic Treaty, the Senator from Ohio made a 
comprehensive statement of his position. He said he did not intend to join 
those who had challenged the Michigan Senator and the bipartisan foreign 
policy. While he admitted that he differed with Vandenberg on some foreign 
policy matters, he did not think they would be very far apart on questions 
facing the new session. 
Taft felt that, politically speaking, the procedure of advance, secret 
consultation between Republicans and the Administration had certain disad-
vantages, but recognized the need for facing the world with a united foreign 
policy. He emphasized that this did not require him to go along with funda-
mental policies which he opposed, but he pointed out that the opposition in 
Congress lacked both the means and the information to devise a detailed 
aaibia. 
^Ibid.. Dec. 29, 1949, p. 24, and Dec. 30, 1949, p. 3 
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foreign policy of its own.26 
For the moment at least, cold water was thrown on the smoldering re-
bellion, but only four days later Taft in a debate with Senator Paul Douglas, 
Illinois Democrat, denied that he had ever stated he would support a biparti-
san foreign policy. He also charged that any true bipartisanship which in-
cluded advance consultation died when Dean Acheson became Secretary of State. 
In view of this Taft felt that Republicans should go along with the Admini-
stration on foreign policy until they "run up against some basic question." 
Then they must "assert that principle."27 He said that cooperation was de-
sirable to insure that America not speak with two voices, but that such a 
cooperative cause should not be called bipartisan.28 
At that very time, also, the split with the Administration over the 
China question was growing broader and deeper. The New York Times on January 
5 reported that Representative Charles Eaton of New Jersey, ranking Republi-
can on the House Foreign Affairs Committee and faithful nonpartisan in this 
field, and Mrs. Margaret Chase Smith of Maine, who also had supported most of 
the Administration foreign policy moves, had broken with the State Department 
29 
over the issue of China. Mrs. Smith was understood to have told the Depart-
ment that its refusal to publish the Wedemeyer report was a denial of bi-
partisanship. Former President Herbert Hoover and Senator Taft recommended 
that the American fleet be ordered to hold Formosa from the Communists, but 
this did not accord with Administration policy. 
Of all those who openly challenged the Administration on this issue, none 
was so outspoken as Senator William Knowland of California. In the 80th 
^6Ibid. 
27Ibid., Jan. 9, 1950, p. 12 
28IMd. 
29Ibid.. p. 18 
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Congress Knowland had been a supporter of Vandenberg and bipartisanship, and 
the Michigan Senator had praised him as a "magnificent" young Republican.30 
But now Knowland wanted the United States to help Chiang's fleeing govern-
ment, and he threatened a long and violent series of maneuvers in the Senate. 
He pointed out that from his position on the Appropriations and Armed Forces 
Committees, he could drag his feet on ERP and the Military Assistance Program. 
Although he had previously supported these programs, he said he would now in-
sist upon a resurvey of all United States economic and military commitments 
abroad so that more assistance could go to the Orient. x 
As this confusing welter of criticism continued, an attempt was made in 
early February to get a statement to which the three major bodies of Republi-
can policy-making could adhere. In all-day separate and closed sessions on 
February 6 the National Committee and the Republican Conferences in the House 
and Senate gave their approval to a "Statement of Principles and Objectives" 
designed to serve as a platform for the November elections. Agreement on the 
foreign policy plank was not easy to achieve. In the National Committee 
Werner Schroeder of Illinois attempted to put the party on record as opposed 
to the continuance of the bipartisan foreign policy, but was reported to have 
been overwhelmingly defeated. In the Senate at least Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., 
Margaret Chase Smith, George Aiken, and Irving Ives voted against the state-
ment as adopted, and Representatives Jacob Javits (New York) and James Fulton 
(Pennsylvania) promptly made known their dissatisfaction. On the other hand, 
both Wherry and Vandenberg declared they were pleased with the foreign policy 
plank. The text of that section of the statement was as follows: 
"To win lasting peace, to build a country in which every 
citizen may make the most of his skill, initiative and enter-
prise, and to hold aloft the inspiring torch of American free-
«5UVandenberg, p. 467 
31New York Times. Jan. 5, 1950, p. 18 
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dom, opportunity and justice, assuring a better and happier 
life for all our people, we dedicate our efforts and issue this 
statement of principles and objectives supplementing the Re-
publican platform of 1948. 
"We shall not passively defend the principles stated 
here, but shall fight for them with all the vigor with which 
our forefathers fought to establish what we now seek to ad-
vance and perpetuate — human liberty and individual dignity. 
"We pledge that in all we will advocate and in all that 
we will perform the first test shall be: Does this conduct 
enlarge and strengthen or does it undermine and lessen human 
liberty and individual dignity? 
FOREIGN POLICY 
"The American people face the hard fact that though 
they won the war nearly five years ago, they have not yet 
won the peace. We offer them leadership in new efforts to 
achieve this vital end. 
"We favor a foreign policy in which all Americans, re-
gardless of party, will join to assure peace with justice in 
a free world while maintaining the independence and the rights 
of the American people. 
"We insist upon restoration of our foreign agreements to 
their proper place inside the Constitution and we insist that 
the United States shall not be bound by any course of action 
unless the spirit and letter of our Constitutional procedure 
are followed. 
"We oppose secret commitments and we denounce the refusal 
of the Administration to furnish accurate and adequate infor-
mation to the Congress. 
"Under our indispensable two-party system, we shall be 
vigilant in critical exploration of Administration foreign 
policy. We favor consultation between the Executive and mem-
bers of both major parties in the legislative branch of gov-
ernment in the initiation and development of a united Ameri-
can foreign policy; and we deplore the tragic consequences of 
the Administration's failure to pursue these objectives in 
many fields, particularly in the secret agreements of Yalta, 
subsequently confirmed at Potsdam which have created new in-
justices and new dangers throughout the world. 
"We favor full support of the United Nations and the im-
provement of its Charter so that it may be an effective inter-
national organization of independent states prepared to mobil-
ize public opinion and the armed forces of the world against 
aggression. We favor full support of the inter-American 
system as an integral part of the international organization, 
and of our treaty obligation in the North Atlantic community. 
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"We advocate a strong policy against the spread of com-
munism or facism at home and abroad, and we insist that Ameri-
ca's efforts toward this end be directed by those who have no 
sympathy either with communism or fascism. 
"We support aid to those states resisting communism, but 
such aid should be given only if it is essential to our na-
tional security, if it is within the total limits which the 
American economy can afford, if it will be effective, if it is 
beyond the ability of the aided nation to supply for itself, 
and if there is a program for progressive reduction. 
"The Republican party has always believed in a strong 
national defense. We must maintain our armed forces at a 
strength completely adequate for tne security of our people. 
"We favor the promotion of world trade on the basis of 
fair and reasonable competition and we assert that this can 
be done within the Republican principle that foreign products 
of underpaid foreign labor shall not be admitted to this 
country on terms which imperil the living standards of the 
American workman, of the American farmer, or threaten serious 
injury to a domestic industry. A strong American economy is 
a vital factor for our security."32 
"Middle ground" was an apt term to describe the position of this resolu-
tion.33 It could scarcely be called highly critical of Administration foreign 
policy, yet it did not, on the other hand, manifest an attitude of friendly 
bipartisanship. Indeed, the famous word was not even mentioned — a fact 
which must have represented a considerable victory for the oppositionists. 
A reference was made, it will be noted, to "consultation between the Execu-
tive and members of both major parties in the legislative branch of the 
government," which might be interpreted by those who so wished as the central 
theme of bipartisanship, but it certainly was no ringing indorsement of the 
principle. The statement as a whole can be contrasted with the very uncriti-
cal statement adopted by the same groups in 1945 when the Republicans had 
said, "In foreign affairs we shall continue to strive to avoid partisanship." 
The 1950 statement charged that the Administration had failed to "con-
sult," and in another month Republicans were complaining further about the 
32ibid.. Feb. 7, 1950, p. 11 
258 
failure of the President and the State Department to take the GOP into their 
confidence. The occasion for this protest was the meeting of the North At-
lantic Treaty powers in The Hague March 5. No Republican had been asked to 
attend in the manner that Vandenberg had so often gone to such conferences, 
and both oppositionist and bipartisan Senators complained. Wherry said that 
the omission was "just another bit of evidence that the bipartisan foreign 
policy is only one of lip service," while Bridges of New Hampshire and Salton-
34 
stall of Massachusetts also voiced protests. 
Within two days of this latest evidence of the collapse of bipartisanship, 
however, there were new efforts to patch up the nonpartisan idea. These 
efforts were more serious than had been made for over a year and began on the 
Republican side with a suggestion by Vandenberg that an unpartisan committee 
be established to study what American responsibilities in Europe would be 
35 
when the Marshall Plan ended in 1952. As if by prearranged signal this pro-
posal was widely commended by both Republicans and Democrats. Among GOP 
Senators, Taft, Smith (New Jersey), and Knowland applauded the idea, while 
Nixon jumped in with a suggestion for a broader bipartisan conference on 
foreign policy to include such Republicans as Hoover, Taft, Vandenberg, 
36 
Stassen, Dewey, and Dulles. 
Mr. Truman, for his part, instructed Acheson to thank Vandenberg for 
his appeal, and the State Department announced that former Republican Senator 
John Sherman Cooper had been appointed as a consultant to the Secretary of 
State. Vandenberg indicated his wholehearted approval of this step, but there 
was some comment on the fact that the Administration had passed over John 
Foster Dulles who had formerly represented Republicans at foreign ministers' 
meetings. Some Republicans regarded this as a partisan act because it seemed 
34pbid.. March 25, 1950, p. 6 
35Ibid., March 26, 1950, p. 1 
36lbid., p. 5 
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to carry a spirit of revenge for Dulles' political campaign in New York in 
1949. The day following the announcement of Cooper's appointment it was 
also revealed that Acheson had started "a series of conversations" with Sena-
tor Vandenberg on ways and means of strengthening the bipartisan foreign 
policy. It was said that Truman wanted Acheson to explore with Vandenberg 
the possibilities of appointing a Republican as Ambassador-at-large to help 
work out a bipartisan Asian policy.37 Within a week Dulles was appointed to 
a post similar to Cooper's. 
Still later in April the President announced a plan to hold White House 
conferences to which Republicans would be invited for the purpose of helping 
make and carry out American foreign policy. The plan was outlined by Truman 
and Acheson to Senator Styles Bridges as senior Senator in the absence of 
Vandenberg. The President's formal statement was as follows: 
"It will be my purpose as well as that of Secretary 
Acheson not only to keep the members of the minority currently 
informed, but to solicit their views and take them into serious 
account in both the formulation and implementation of our for-
eign policy." 
The following day the Senate Republican Policy Committee endorsed this 
approach to bipartisanship after Bridges had given a detailed account, and 
the Chairman of the Committee, Robert Taft, said after the meeting that Re-
publicans would "be glad to see any suggestions on cooperation from the Presi-
39 
dent and to discuss them with him and his representatives." 
Having traced these developments with the accent on the positive, it 
must be noted that all was not sweetness and light. These moves to recreate 
the idea of ending politics at the water's edge were certain to meet hesita-
- -tion and criticism from the oppositionists. It is not hard to imagine a 
37lbid.. March 30, 1950, p. 4 
38Ibid.. April 19, 1950, p. 1 
39Ibid., April 20, 1950, p. 6 
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connection between the Administration's "good will" gestures (and perhaps 
Vandenberg's, also) and the need to get the ECA authorization through Con-
gress without too serious damage being done to it. The Republicans in the 
House announced, for example, that the Administration request for $3,372,-
450,000 would have to be substantially cut. Minority Leader Joseph Martin 
said after a meeting of the GOP Policy Committee that "if we are going to 
make cuts in the domestic field, we've got to make some in the foreign field, 
too."40 
At this time, also, the charges of Republican Senator McCarthy (Wiscon-
sin) concerning the presence of Communists and Communist sympathizers in the 
Department of State, hitherto regarded as a personal campaign, were beginning 
to get wider support among his fellow partisans in Congress. Wherry said he 
felt that Acheson himself was "a bad security risk," and Taft said he had 
41 encouraged McCarthy to press his charge against the Department. 
At the end of March the President, in spite of his apparent moves to re-
vive bipartisanship, denounced McCarthy, Wherry, and Bridges as "saboteurs 
of American foreign policy" and labeled them "the Kremlin's greatest assets."42 
This kind of an attack, of course, gave these three Senators an opportunity 
to express some very unbipartisan-like views. McCarthy said he would like to 
plead guilty to sabotaging our foreign policy in the Far East. Bridges claim-
ed he was only trying to sabotage subversives and would cooperate in a bi-
partisan foreign policy if it were truly bipartisan. For his part Wherry 
stated that "the best way to know who the agents of the Kremlin are is to 
make the loyalty files available to a duly authorized committee and let the 
people decide who is harboring subversives and moral perverts in high 
%°lbid.. March 28, 1950, p. 23 
41Ibid., March 27, 1950, Sec. IV, p. 3 
42Ibid.. March 31, 1950, p. 1 
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government places."43 On the same day Guy G. Gabrlelson, Chairman of the 
Republican National Committee, called on his party to review its position in 
the bipartisan foreign policy. He felt, he said, that the Administration 
had violated bipartisanship and that the Republican party should now propose 
an all-American policy, regardless of party, to assure peace. 
After the appointments of Dulles and Cooper, the question arose among 
Republicans as to who could and who could not represent the party in relation 
to the Administration. In general the cooperators such as Vandenberg, Ives, 
Dewey, and Hickenlooper welcomed the appointments, but Taft stated the follow-
ing: 
"To be bipartisan there must be real consultation on 
policies before they are adopted with the responsible repre-
sentatives of the Republicans in Congress. It is not accom-
plished by the appointment of an individual Republican to 
executive office as a roving ambassador."4° 
Taft said the conditions of bipartisanship existed for a while at the 
time Vandenberg was in continual contact with the State Department. While 
some Republicans felt that Vandenberg carried the process too far, he said, 
there could be no question but that he was a "responsible representative of * 
the Republicans in Congress." Taft indicated that he felt the same objectives 
(of cooperation) could now better be worked out in debate in Congress. 
It was the feeling of Vandenberg (discussed previously) that a Senator 
could not very well perform the double role of working on foreign policy in 
consultation with the State Department and carrying on his duties on Capitol 
Hill. He therefore thought that Dulles and Cooper, by consulting with Repub-
licans in Congress, could work well toward bipartisanship. Just how well the 
Cooper and Dulles appointments did work or what contribution they made to the 
—«5sa:— 
^Ibid.. p. 5 
45Ibid., April 7, 1950, p. 1 
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strengthening of a bipartisan foreign policy is difficult to say. It is cer-
tain that Republican support for European Economic Assistance dropped off 
sharply in terms of votes from what it was in 1948 and 1949. Cooper said in 
May that in his attempts at cooperating with Congress on foreign policy, 
"the reaction from the Republicans on Capitol Hill has not been discouraging," 
and in August he and Dulles were members of the American delegation to the 
United Nations General Assembly together with Republicans Austin and Lodge. 
It was also in August, however, that the four active Republican members 
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (with Vandenberg in "general agree-
ment") issued a comprehensive statement on American foreign policy (discussed 
in Chapter VII), which, while supporting the ideal of bipartisanship, spared 
nothing in attacking the Administration for its errors, past and present, 
which,they held, resulted in the fighting in Korea and in other phases of our 
current predicament. The four were Wiley, Smith (New Jersey), Hickenlooper, 
and the document's author, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. of Massachusetts. All of 
these men were considered internationalists, and since all of them had de-
voted many years on the committee to foreign affairs, a somewhat thoughtful 
and responsible statement was to be expected, although obviously its issuance 
was timed for the opening of the 1950 election campaign. Reference has already 
been made to the section dealing with Asia, which indicated severe criticism. 
Certain other parts of the statement pertaining directly to the subject of 
bipartisanship will bear quoting here: 
"We, minority Senators of the Foreign Relations Committee, 
herein expressing our individual views, pledge our full support 
to the national effort to build strength for victory. We pay 
tribute to the heroism and sacrifice of our fighting men in 
Korea. To be worthy of them we must, above all, face the future 
with faith, realism and courage. In this spirit and in dis-
charge of our duty under the American two-party system to 
scrutinize relentlessly the basic facts of America's position 
in the world, we set forth: I, an analysis of the events of 
1945 which today bear so directly, on America's present world 
position; II, an analysis of the crucial events which began 
in 1947; and III, our recommendations for future action. 
I - 1945 
"The major tragedy of our time was the failure and re-
fusal of American leadership in 1945 to recognize the true 
aims and methods of the rulers of Soviet Russia. To this 
failure can be traced the disintegration of our armed forces 
in 1945, which would not have occurred if the need for re-
taining adequate forces had been explained to the American 
people, and the senseless destruction of billions of dollars 
worth of military equipment which the United States and its 
friends so desperately need today. 
"To this failure also can be traced the blindness of our 
leadership in ignoring the Communist attempt to capture the 
minds of men. We missed the opportunity to broadcast to the 
world our democratic doctrine of the dignity of man as the 
spiritual rallying point for all freedom-loving peoples. 
"By this failure we lost the initiative and the influ-
ence for peace which we had won by force of arms and by virtue 
of our historic pioneering in the evolution of democracy 
Ill - THE FUTURE 
"These are all facts which must be faced. The American 
people will not now excuse those responsible for these blun-
ders. The President's decision to sustain, by military ac-
tion, the stand of the United Nations against aggression in 
K0rea must receive united support. But the liberation of 
Korea and the mere building of strength to resist aggression 
are, by themselves, not enough. We shall not sleep peacefully 
at night until our Government's policy is based on the full 
realization that world dominion by Communism is still the goal 
of the Kremlin. It will continue to be the goal until the 
free nations of the world, each contributing its fair share, 
realistically join together through the United Nations to es-
tablish peace in a free world. 
"We must reassure the world of our constant desire and 
readiness earnestly to search for and consider any and all 
proposals for peace based on justice. 
"The United States must, therefore, regain the initiative 
and the power for the organization and preservation of lasting 
peace, which it threw away in 1945. This means that the pres-
ent-intolerable military weakness of the free world must be 
remedied by us and our friends at top speed. Never again must 
we allow ourselves to be caught, as we were when Korea was in-
vaded, in a position where our failure to foresee the possible 
implications of our basic foreign policy will result in our 
being inadequately prepared to carry out that policy in time 
of crisis. 
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"In this crisis there can be no *politics as usual* or 
'business as usual.* This is fundamental. 
"Once we regain the initiative, we can then redouble 
our efforts through the United Nations (l) to establish a 
reliable program of international inspection and control-of 
atomic activities; (2) to halt lawless aggression of the 
strong over the weak and the slavery which Communism inflicts 
upon its victims; and (3) to pursue every effective means to 
give greater strength to the United Nations as a powerful 
force able to prevent aggression in the world, urging that, 
if lesser means are unavailing in this effort, a special ses-
sion of the General Assembly be called to amend the United 
Nations Charter, as proposed in the Vandenberg Resolution of 
1948. 
"These things need not mean bloodshed and war. They 
ought to prevent war. They do mean, however, the powerful 
unity of the free nations acting in enthusiastic concert. 
In place of ineptitude, American strength and integrity must 
become the major encouragement for purposeful unity among 
those peoples who, possessing freedom themselves, seek to ex-
tend it to others. Then, and only then, will the military 
victory and the moral leadership which we achieved in 1945 — 
and then lost in that same year — be translated into concrete 
results for humanity. 
"Our aims should be thought out now and translated into 
major long-range American policy consistent with our human and 
material resources. Without such major aims we cannot expect 
the maximum effort either from ourselves or from other peo-
ples. Great sacrifices require great objectives. We must 
not wait until the present crisis is over and then fumble 
the ball of international peace because we are not prepared 
for victory. For the attainment of such aims we will hold 
the Administration strictly responsible. 
"On the basis of honest recognition of past errors, and 
courageous resolve for the future, we wholeheartedly pledge 
our unpartisan cooperation to final victory."46 
The election came and went, leaving increased Republican membership in 
both Houses of Congress, but the end of the campaign saw no lessening of the 
anti-Administration warfare being carried on by many Republicans. In con-
trast, however, to the criticism based on high policy issues discussed in 
the document issued by the Republicans in the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, post-election criticism seemed to center more directly on the person-
46lbid.."Aug. 14, 1950, p. 1 (For section on Asia see Chapter VII, 
vp. 224 
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ality of the Secretary of State. Although begun earlier in the year, Decem-
ber saw a climax of the efforts to discredit Dean Acheson as the architect 
of a tragic foreign policy the mistakes of which were costing blood and money 
in Korea. 
The number of Senators calling for Acheson's removal as Secretary of 
State had been steadily growing until it reached the extreme in a statement 
by Senator Kem threatening impeachment if Acheson did not resign. On Decem-
ber 6 Senator Taft called the Republican Policy Committee to consider the 
question whether the attack on Acheson should be formalized. A paper pro-
posing that it be laid down as party dogma that Acheson must be ousted was 
being prepared by Irving Ives (New York), a regular Administration supporter, 
who, it was reported, had become convinced that there could be no bipartisan 
foreign policy as long as Acheson was Secretary of State. The next day, how-
ever, the Committee declined to act on the proposal. Instead, Ives was 
placed at the head of a sub-committee to draft a resolution for presentation 
to the Republican Conference. In the face of this step, Governor Dewey of 
New York issued a statement saying he would withhold criticism of this sort 
in a time of crisis. Following this, Ives showed signs of a modified atti-
tude, and by December 14 his subcommittee found itself still unable to agree 
upon a resolution to present to the Conference.47 
While the Senate delayed, however, the House GOP Policy Committee, 
headed by Floor Leader Martin, called a Republican caucus to decide on mak-
ing the Acheson issue a party matter, and on December 15, as Acheson was 
preparing to go to Europe for a NATO Conference, the caucus adopted the 
following resolution: 
"In this critical hour, confidence of the American people in 
their leadership is essential to our security. 
,il7, 
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"It is completely obvious that Secretary Acheson and the 
State Department under his leadership have lost the confidence 
of the Congress and the American people and cannot regain it. 
"Recognizing this fact, we earnestly insist for the good 
of our country that Mr. Acheson be replaced as Secretary of 
State, that there be a thorough house cleaning in the State 
Department, and changes in personnel and policies responsible 
for this lack of confidence."48 
This strong statement was opposed by only about a dozen votes in the 
House caucus, and when the Senate Republican Conference passed it later the 
same day, only five (Aiken, Morse, Mi's. Smith, Langer, and H. A. Smith) 
voted against it, while 23 supported it. The Senate group, however, added 
th i s paragraph: 
"We pledge our fullest cooperation with the President and 
the Administration in a united effort to meet by the most ef-
fective means the present national crisis. For this effort 
there must be national cooperation in substance as well as in 
form, in fact as well as in name." 
No Senator (or Representative) offered any defense of Acheson, but it 
was noted that Vandenberg, Lodge, and Wiley absented themselves from the meet-
ing. It was an unusually strong attack, but was probably an accurate indi-
cation of the extent to which the oppositionists had gained influence dur-
ing the year. 
As shown in Figures II and III, a comparison of House and Senate voting 
in 1949-1950 with that of 1947-1948 shows a truly significant contrast. A 
glance at these is sufficient to see the shift, but the contrast is made 
clearer if it is noted that in the House the percentage of Republicans voting 
differently than Mason (Illinois) on more than half the foreign policy roll 
calls dropped from 55 percent in the 80th Congress to 13 percent in the 
81st, and that in the Senate those voting differently than Langer dropped 
from 61 percent in the 80th to 37 percent in the 81st. Something of the 
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meaning of this change will be discussed in the concluding chapter of this 
study, but it is clear that the oppositionists had greatly gained in strength. 
Ill 
The 1950 elections increased the number of Republicans in the Senate 
by six — making a closely divided party situation (49 Democrats, 47 Republi-
cans). The Republican oppositionists on foreign policy could claim to have 
gained four adherents — Dirksen (Illinois), Welker (Idaho), Butler (Maryland), 
and Bennett (utah), while Nixon (California) and Duff (Pennsylvania) were 
frequently to be found voting with the shrinking group which supported the 
Administration. This gain was not overlooked by the oppositionist leadership, 
which attempted to consolidate it in two ways. The first was by electing 
several oppositionist members to the Republican Policy Committee when Vanden-
berg, Ives, Margaret Chase Smith, Hickenlooper, Bridges, and Cordon stepped 
down, and new members were chosen. These were Knowland, H. A. Smith, Ferguson, 
Brewster, Thye, and Martin of Pennsylvania, and it was generally conceded 
•50 
that this group was clearly more hostile to Administration foreign policy. 
While neither Knowland nor H. A. Smith could be considered oppositionists 
in the same sense as Wherry, they were now among the bitterest critics of 
the policies pursued in the Far East. Certainly, also, dropping Ives and 
Margaret Chase Smith meant the loss of two devoted bipartisan supporters. 
In another organisation scuffle in the Senate, the issue was over filling 
the new seat on the Foreign Relations Committee awarded the Republicans as a 
result of their 1950 election gains. A leading contender for this seat was 
Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon, a very internationalist-minded Senator. Morse 
had urged representation for the West Coast on the Committee and had the 
51 explicit backing of Vandenberg. Vandenberg was, of course, not active at 
wIbid.. Jan. 9, 1951, p. 14 
51Willard Shelton, "Civil War in the GOP," The Nation. Jan. 27, 1951 
pp.75-77 
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this time and could not make his influence strongly felt. Since places on 
major committees are usually alloted by sonority, Morse stood high on the 
list, but the foreign policy conservatives proposed Homer Capehart (Indiana), 
who outranked Morse. The internationalists countered with George Aiken 
(Vermont), who outranked Capehart, but the oppositionists then moved to Owen 
Brewster (Maine), who was senior to Aiken. Finally the cooperators suggested 
Tobey (New Hampshire), who outranked Brewster. 
Under the rule preventing any Senator from holding more than two com-
mittee posts, Tobey would have had to give up his top ranking seat either on 
the Banking and Currency Committee or the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Com-
mittee. Brewster did not have the top position on any committee, although he 
was second in rank on the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee. Brewster, 
was, therefore, interested in getting Tobey to give up his post on this 
latter group if he went to Foreign Relations. Tobey, on the other hand, 
offered to renounce Foreign Relations if Brewster would do the same, thus 
clearing the way for Aiken. No agreement was reached, so Tobey retired from 
Banking and Currency, got his seat on Foreign Relations, and thus assured a 
continued internationalist group on that Committee. 
It was clear by January, 1951, that Vandenberg would never return to the 
Senate, and as this became increasingly certain, the importance of Taft in 
the area of Republican foreign policy formation grew more apparent. Some 
attention has been given to the views of Taft from time to time, and in so 
far as possible to do so, his position on foreign policy will be clarified 
further in later pages. Several factors are important to remember. With the 
1950 Congressional elections out of the way, tho 1952 presidential election 
loomed increasingly larger on the political horizon, and Robert Taft was 
52!bid. 
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again aiming at the 1952 nominating convention. Senator Vandenberg on several 
occasions explained the anti-bipartisan foreign policy behavior of Taft in 
terras of "presidential fever," and it is not unreasonable to assume that 
Taft's increasingly oppositionist actions might in part be explained on this 
basis.* 
Further to be kept in mind is Taft's idea of how the Republican party 
should arrive at a position on foreign policy. Taft did not feel that the 
opposition party had either the information or the mechanism to formulate a 
complete foreign policy program, and in spite of his general theory that the 
role of the opposition is to oppose, he maintained that the Republicans should 
follow the President's lead in foreign policy matters except where some "funda-
mental issue" was at stake on which the Republicans could not agree. At that 
point, it seemed to Taft, the Republicans should be bound by no bipartisan 
agreement to be silent. Rather than have advance consultation between the 
Administration and one or two Republicans, Taft thought Republican positions 
should be worked out in debate in Congress. Perhaps this analysis is too 
simple or too coherent, for Taft's position was certainly not unchanging or 
always logical, but this seemed to be the approach most often voiced through-
out the years. It was, of course, quite different from the Vandenberg program. 
In spite of this doctrine Taft announced on January 9 that he was ready 
to join President Truman in the preparation of a coalition foreign policy. 
He said, "I should be quite prepared to sit down with the President of the 
United States or anybody else on the majority side and try to work out a pro-
gram which could command the unanimous and consistent support of the people of 
the United States."53 
This proposal received no direct notice from the Administration, and the 
next two years were to see no strengthening but rather a steady decline of a 
•:• .-: :'ft?New York Times. Jan. 10, 1951, p. 1 
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bipartisan foreign policy. Republican positions — many more than one on 
each issue — were, according to the Taft formula, worked out in Congress. 
A greatly reduced number of Republicans continued to support much of the 
President's program. An increasing group opposed most of that program. John 
Sherman Cooper and John Foster Dulles continued in the Department of State as 
consultants, but what fruits their efforts bore in terms of support in Con-
gress is difficult to determine. Certainly the isolationists neither followed 
Dulles nor approved the role he was trying to play, but at least one observer 
felt his voice was not without influence in Republican circles. James Reston 
wrote that Dulles had influence with "that extremely important, often deci-
sive group of Republicans, who are neither isolationist nor internationalist, 
but who are often influenced on critical votes by their respect for Mr. 
54 
Dulles' experience and their confidence in his independent judgment." 
Whether those Republicans in Congress supported the President's program for 
these reasons or because their own political and personal situation dictated 
such support cannot be definitely ascertained. What is certain is that the 
number of these Republicans decreased sharply in the period from 1950-1952. 
From time to time bipartisan sentiments were voiced both by Republicans and 
the Administration, but no pattern was worked out such as that once prevail-
ling. In October the President offered to appoint Dulles as Ambassador to 
Japan following his (Dulles') contributions in writing the Japanese Peace 
Treaty. The appointment was declined, although Dulles' work at the Japanese 
Peace Conference may have had something to do with the fairly broad support 
in the Senate for the treaties emerging from that Conference. 
Generally, however, during the last two years of the Truman Administra-
tion, bipartisanship was paid lip service only, mostly as an ideal that had 
died. In June, 1951, Acheson said he was doing everything he could to bring 
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about a "return" to nonpartisanship, and that he knew of nothing that he 
could do that he had not done. Taft said there was little possibility of 
"bringing back" the bipartisan approach to foreign policy, since Secretary 
Acheson would not make any concession to the Republicans. Taft and others 
tended to trace the end of bipartisanship to the change in Truman's attitude 
after 1948. Arthur Krock, writing in the New York Times, pointed to the 
- ^ 5 
"ratio shift" on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as the turning point. 
James Reston and Anne O'Hare McCormick, on the other hand, felt that 
56 
Vandenberg's decline and demise were the principal factors involved. 
Reston wrote that "the so-called bipartisan United States foreign policy fell 
sick and died with Senator Vandenberg, and any reincarnation before the Presi-
dential election of 1952 is highly unlikely." In further comment on the 
state of affairs prevailing Reston said: 
"Moreover, the lapse of the bipartisan experiment now is 
taken for granted so generally by the leaders of both parties 
that they no longer make much of an effort even to minimize the 
conflict."57 
The details of what this situation meant in terms of Republican voting 
behavior have been given in preceding chapters. The general picture was one 
of sharply reduced support for European economic aid, criticism of the com-
mitting of United States troops to the European continent, and decreasing 
enthusiasm even for foreign military spending, although it is clear that most 
Republicans were loyal to the basic policy of the defense of Western Europe. 
The Far Eastern situation provided an even more fertile field for attack, and 
as seen in Chapter VII, the number of Republicans willing to go along with 
this attack became increasingly greater as long-time Administration supporters 
5fc»Ibid.. July 6, 1951, p. 22 
5 6 Ibid.. April 21, 1951, p. 16, and July 5, 19-51, p. 9 
57Ibid. 
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(such as Margaret Chase Smith and H. A. Smith) seized upon this issue, per-
haps partly to prove that they were not "me-too" Republicans. When the Re-
publican members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee — all internation-
alists — issued their all-out blast at Administration Far Eastern policy, 
it was clear that bipartisanship was fading fast. The outline of this attack 
has been explained, and although it was not always logical, it was certainly 
all-inclusive. 
An analysis of voting on foreign policy issues in the Senate for the 
last two years of the Truman Administration shows several things. It shows, 
first of all, a more united Republican party with fewer Senators voting at 
extreme poles from one another. It clearly reveals also that this increased 
unity represented agreement on a position much nearer, although by no means 
identical with, the views of the oppositionists such as Wherry, Malone, Kem, 
and Ecton, than those of such bipartisan supporters as Wiley, Lodge, Salton-
stall, and Morse. If the percentage of members of Congress voting in agree-
ment with the extreme oppositionists on more than half the foreign policy 
issues coming before the Senate and House in 1951 and 1952 be compared with 
the same figures for previous bienniums, the results are as follows: (See 
Figures IV and V) 
Senate House 
1947 - 1948 39 percent 45 percent 
1949 - 1950 63 percent 87 percent 
1950 - 1952 80 percent 96 percent 
The question to be answered becomes whether or not the Republicans in 
Congress returned to isolationism after 1949. It must be remembered that the 
scale used here is not designed to reveal the exact views of any group, but 
only to measure the strength of the groups. It is clear that the Republicans, 
or a majority of them, did stop supporting the economic aid program for Eu-

















t — ' 
I - 1 











00 J>2 S O 
V J J 
o V J J 
l-» 
VJL) 
ro V J J 
V J J 







V J J 
V J J 
Kem vjj 
But l e r , Capehart JP? 
Bricker -P-
Jenner -fc-
Welker, Ecton ^ 
Hickenlooper, Young ^ 
Williams, Dworshak, Dirksen •£-
Schoepell X 
Ferguson, Mart in J5 
Cordon £ 
Bridges vo 
But le r (Md.), Taft , Bennet t , McCarthy ^ 

































Figure IV: Voting on Foreign Pol icy I s sues i n the Senate; Republicans; 
82nd Congress; 1951-1952; as compared wi th the record of Senator 
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Figure V: Republican Voting on Foreign Policy Issues in the House 
of Representatives; 82nd Congress; 1951-1952; As compared 
with the record of Congressman Noah M. Mason of Illinois 
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that a majority of Republicans in both houses wanted to scale down the mili-
tary aid programs for Europe. On the other hand a sizable majority of Sen-
ate Republicans always voted for the military aid bills on the final vote, and 
a majority of House Republicans did so in 1950 and 1952. Further, Republican 
support for Far Eastern aid and intervention was very strong, and Republicans 
were often advocating a more active role for the United States in the Far 
East than the Administration felt wise. While there were scattered Republi-
can criticisms of the United Nations, GOP support for continued American 
participation there can be presumed to have been strong. The 1950 statement, 
adopted by Senate and House Conferences and the National Committee, can be 
cited as evidence that internationalism was not dead or dying. That declara-
tion, which was more criticized by the internationalists than the isolationists, 
spoke of "full support of the United Nations," a "strong policy against the 
spread of Communism or Fascism ...abroad," and "support of aid to those 
states resisting communism." 
In conclusion, then, it would seem reasonable to say that while Republi-
cans had less enthusiasm for spending in Europe after 1949, they by no means 
returned to isolationism. It is doubtful that a majority in either house 
would have favored abandoning NATO. In Asia a continued advocacy of an ac-
tive role became Republican doctrine, and to some extent the increased 
strength of the oppositionists in this period can be accounted for by the 
large number of Republicans who were critical of the Administration for too 
little, rather than too much, American intervention there. Finally, it is 
evident that the Republicans were not talking like isolationists. In their 
efforts to attack and embarrass the Administration they did not, like their 
predecessors of 1918-1941, develop a theory of nonparticipation. Rather, 
they contented themselves with criticism of a more particular and less gen-
eralized nature. 
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By the opening of Congress in January 1952 the disagreements among Re-
publicans on foreign policy were being voiced in terms of support for candi-
dates in the 1952 National Convention. There were both presidential and 
foreign policy implications in the election of Styles Bridges to succeed 
Kenneth Wherry as Senate Floor Leader January 8. His rival for the office was 
Leverett Saltonstall who had been Wherry's assistant or party whip. The vote 
in Conference was 26 for Bridges and 15 for Saltonstall, and the ballot was 
not made unanimous as is usually done. Since Saltonstall was considered to 
be an Eisenhower man, the result was viewed as favorable to the presidential 
aspirations of Senator Taft, whom Bridges supported, although tradition, also, 
favored Bridges in that he was the senior Republican in the Senate. In terms 
of foreign policy Bridges was, or had been previously, much more of an inter-
nationalist than was his predecessor (Wherry), but had been of late much more 
critical of Administration foreign policy, particularly in the Far East, than 
had Saltonstall. A glance at the voting charts will show Bridges moving 
gradually toward the oppositionist position. 
It soon became clear that foreign policy was to be one of the issues 
which most clearly separated the two leading contenders for the 1952 presi-
dential nomination. While it is true that a platform acceptable to both Taft 
and Eisenhower was written without great difficulty, foreign policy was one 
of the few points on which complete agreement was not reached at the famous 
Moraingside Heights conference after the nomination. 
The issue was first clearly drawn in May when Eisenhower addressed a 
joint session of Congress on the foreign aid question. Taft and Eisenhower 
sharply disagreed on how much could be cut from the program without endanger-
ing our position in Europe. In a radio address in June Taft discussed his 
foreign policy views and also the Republican role in foreign policy over the 
past few years. He said: 
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".... in the Republican campaign of 1952 there must be 
no hesitation about attacking the foreign policy of Mr. Truman 
and Mr. Acheson...Some Republicans would avoid mention of the 
subject in the campaign and they criticize me because I am 
not being sufficiently bipartisan. 
"Of course bipartisanship today is a fraud. When Mr. 
Truman talks of it, he means that he will make the policy 
and the Republicans must always go along with it. Since 
1948 he has not bothered to consult any of the Republican 
leadership even about the fateful step of making war in Korea. 
"Mr. Truman has never extended bipartisanship to many 
basic questions of policy. Even Senator Vandenberg was at no -
time consulted about Teheran or Yalta or Potsdam or Manchuria 
or China. He indicated his wholehearted disapproval of our 
policy in the Far East. 
"Mr. John Foster Dulles was consulted about the Japanese 
Peace Treaty and did a good job, but his recent speeches in-
dicate his complete disapproval of many basic features of Mr. 
Acheson's foreign policy, particularly in Europe.... 
"Its fthe Republican party'3 candidate must not say-
that he approves the Acheson foreign policy, but that he will 
do it better. That was our fatal mistake in the last three 
elections. We cannot afford to nominate a candidate who will 
not condemn the utter failure of the Truman Administration. 
"is this isolationism? Certainly not if we support a 
policy which opposes Communist advances throughout the 
world."58 
With regard to the specific foreign policy problems facing the country, 
Taft's views as stated in this speech can be compared with Eisenhower's, 
stated a few days later in a letter to John Foster Dulles and in-a press 
59 
conference on June 25. 
Purposes of Foreign 
Policy 
Eisenhower 
"American foreign policy must 
be based on our own self inter-
est. Each step in the policy 
must meet the test: Is this 
good for the United States?" 
Taft 
1. protect the liberty 
of the United States 
2. protect the peace of 
the people of the 
United States while 
at the same time 
protecting our lib-
erties. 
58ibid.. June 2, 1952, p. 14 
59Ibid.. June 25, 1952, p. 1 
Eisenhower Taft 
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Purposes of Foreign 






"America cannot live alone. 
We must face facts. Any 
thought of retiring within 
our own borders will certain-
ly lead to disa.ster for the 
United States of America." 
"We support the United 
Nations." 
"Our foreign policy programs 
must protect us and the areas 
in which we are concerned from 
both kinds of Soviet aggres-
sion —that is direct mili-
tary aggression and aggres-
sion of political infiltra-
tion." 
"We support NATO. Exclu-
sive reliance on mere power 
of retaliation against mili-
tary aggressors is not good 
enough. We must assure our 
Allies that we are standing 
with them. We must be success-
ful in developing collective 
security measures that will 
encourage each of our Allies 
to develop its own economi-
cal, political, and military 
strength." 
3. must be conducted so 
as to maintain the 
solvency of the Unit-
ed States and prevent 
the destruction of a 
free economy. 
"Those who think only of 
Western Europe and of 
making it impregnable 
are just as blind as 
those who think only of 
the United States and 
of making it impregnable. 
Would I withdraw from 
Europe? Certainly not." 
"I am in favor of remain-
ing in the United Na-
tions even though our 
experience in Korea... 
shows that it is a hope-
less weapon to be used 
to prevent aggression." 
"Certainly we should be 
good neighbors and give 
economic aid in emergen-
cies. Certainly we 
should arm those who de-
sire to defend themselves 
against Communist attack. 
But the expense of this 
program must be within 
our economic capacity, 
and handouts of money 
cannot be the key to our 
foreign policy." 
"It has been said that I 
am an isolationist be-
cause I voted against the 
Atlantic Pact, but I made 
it clear at that time 
that I was in favor of 
definitely notifying Rus-
sia that if they attack-
ed any of the Pact na-
tions, they would find 
themselves at war with 
us, a Monroe Doctrine for 
Europe. I do not want to 
depreciate the importance 
of Europe or withdraw our 
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Eisenhower Taft 
NATO - Continued aid, but I do wish to 
point out that control 
of the air: must be 
priority No. 1." 
The main points of difference between the two prospective nominees would 
appear to have been the following: 
1. Taft spent much(a major portion) of his time attacking the Administra-
tion and those Republicans who supported the Administration foreign policy. 
Eisenhower was only "critical of the Administration for its lack of steadiness 
and its failure to define its goals in terms that the American people could 
understand." 
2. Expenditures for foreign aid — Taft continually emphasized the need 
to reduce these expenditures, whereas Eisenhower, although favoring cuts, put 
little emphasis on the point, but rather positively outlined the need which 
gave rise to the expenditures. 
3. Land forces versus air power — Taft did not favor withdrawing from 
Europe, but he felt our command of the air was the essential ingredient to 
maintaining peace. Eisenhower did not deny the need for air power but was 
devoted to the building of a North Atlantic land army. 
In spite of the fact that Eisenhower had said that he did not think it 
would be possible to write a platform acceptable to both himself and Senator 
Taft, little difficulty was encountered in the Convention in doing just that. 
In fact, no dispute whatsoever was ever revealed to the public, such as so 
often had happened in the past. Eugene Millikin, Senator from Colorado and 
Chairman of the Resolutions Committee, also assumed the Chairmanship of the 
Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs. Two special advisors were appointed to aid 
in the drafting of the plank on foreign policy — John Foster Dulles (how 
having resigned from the State Department) and Clarence B. Kelland, National 
SOlbid. 
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Committeeman from Arizona, and both Eisenhower and Taft were understood to 
approve of these appointments. Dulles clearly represented the segment of the 
party supporting Eisenhower and had been friendly to the Administration , 
although he had made some more critical comments since his resignation. 
Kelland could be taken to represent the Taft supporters and had been aligned 
with the oppositionists on foreign policy issues. Dulles was sure he could 
write a platform agreeable to both major contenders for the nomination, and 
came to Chicago with a draft which was in substance accepted by the subcom-
mittee, whose version was in turn approved unanimously by the full Resolutions 
Committee and by the Convention itself. 
This was one of the longest foreign policy planks in party history. It 
discussed many phases of our foreign relations in almost every part of the 
world. Many of the points made in the 1950 resolution and in the declaration 
of the Republicans on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee were repeated. 
"Sell out" at Yalta, bungling in Korea, and "betrayal" of Chiang Kai-shek 
were all discussed in roughly the same terms as had been used before. There 
were, however, two or three new ideas or emphases. 
More attention was given to attacking the personnel who had administered 
as well as formulated our foreign policy. There was no personal attack on 
the Secretary, as one might have expected, but the criticism was broadened to 
imply that large numbers of civil servants at every level were responsible 
for failures in foreign policy and should be removed. No doubt this reflected 
the widespread Republican acceptance of charges of disloyalty, incompetence, 
et cetera, in the Department of State: 
"We shall eliminate from the State Department and from 
every Federal office all, wherever they may be found, who 
share responsibilities for the needless predicaments and 
perils in which we find ourselves. We shall also sever from 
the public payroll the hordes of loafers, incompetents and un-
necessary ̂employees who clutter the administration of our 
foreign affairs. The confusions, overlappings and. extrava-
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gance of our agencies abroad hold us up to the ridicule of 
peoples whose friendship we seek. 
"We shall substitute a compact and efficient organi-
zation where men of proven loyalty and ability shall have 
responsibility for reaching our objectives. They will re-
flect a dynamic initiative. Thus we can win the support 
and confidence which go only to those who demonstrate a 
capacity to define and get results." 
The idea of bipartisanship was mentioned only by implication: 
"The good in our foreign policies has been accomplished 
with Republican cooperation, such as the organization of 
the United Nations, the establishment of the trusteeship 
principle for dependent peoples, the making of peace with 
Japan and Germany and the building of more solid security 
in Europe. But in the main the Republican party has been 
ignored and its participation has not been invited." 
There was no suggestion that there ought to be more inter-party consulta-
tion and no promise that if elected to power, the Republicans would try a 
bipartisan approach to foreign affairs. 
Perhaps the most interesting and important of all the new ideas in the 
1952 Republican platform was the suggestion that the policy of the "contain-
ment" of Communism was a negative policy, and that a positive Republican 
foreign policy would not be content with mere containment but would never rest 
until the frontier with Communism was pushed back: 
"They abandoned friendly nations such as Latvia, Lithuania, 
Esthonia, Poland, and Czechoslovakia to fend for themselves 
against the Communist aggression which soon swallowed them... 
"We shall again make liberty into a beacon light of hope 
that will penetrate the dark places. That program will give 
the Voice of America a real function. It will mark the end 
of the negative, futile and immoral policy of *containment* 
which abandons countless human beings to a despotism and God-
less terrorism which in turn enables the rulers to forge the 
captives into a weapon for our destruction... 
"The policies we espouse will revive the contagious, 
liberating influences which are inherent in freedom. They 
will inevitably set up strains and stresses within the cap-
tive world which will make the rulers impotent to continue 
in their monstrous ways and mark the beginning of their end. 
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"Our nation will become again the dynamic, moral and 
spiritual force which was the despair of despots and the hope 
of the oppressed."61 
The Republicans, it appeared from these statements, favored seizing the 
initiative, going on the offensive. They would not be satisfied with a mere 
defense of the status quo. 
As in every election year since 1940, the midwestern Republicans were 
defeated in their support of Taft for the presidential nomination. For the 
second time they failed even to strongly influence the naming of the vice-
presidential candidate, who in the person of Richard M. Nixon of California. 
was both a non-midwesterner and a Republican who in Congress had supported, 
with at least some regularity, the Administration's lead in foreign policy 
matters. The election of the Eisenhower-Nixon ticket seemed assured almost 
from the beginning. For the first time in twenty years the Republicans would 
have an official and national leader for at least four years. He would be an 
internationalist and could be expected to try to lead his party in that direc-
tion. For the first time in twenty years the Republicans in Congress could no 
longer formulate their policies with the goal of embarrassing the Administra-
tion unless they wished to defy their own, popularly chosen, head. Republi-
cans were no longer to oppose, but rather under Eisenhower's leadership to 
formulate a systematic policy to meet American problems abroad. Whether or 
not the new "team" would be able to unite the historically divided party, 
whether or not the cooperators under Eisenhower's powerful leadership could 
gain new strength in Congress which had seemingly been lost since 1948, 
whether or not the old division of internationalists versus isolationists or 
cooperators versus oppositionists would persist or whether new issues would 
bring new alignments, it could at least be said certainly in June, 1952, that 
" 61Proceedings. Rep. Natl. Conv., 1952, pp. 310-314 
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if the party won, foreign policy in the Republican party would enter a new 
phase, an era which might well see changes no less important than the 
changes after World War I or during World War II. 
I — 
CHAPTER IX 
REPUBLICANS AND THE TARIFF 
Woodrow Wilson once characterized the tariff as the football of politics. 
Others have said it is a local issue; while it has also been pointed out that 
on no issue has Congress in recent years so consistently divided along party 
lines as on the tariff. The general Republican position (and also that of 
their predecessors, the Whigs) has been one in favor of high tariffs; while 
the Democrats have usually favored lower tariffs (a tariff for revenue only), 
especially when southern influence has been greatest. There have been ex-
ceptions in the case of both parties, and at times bipartisan coalitions in 
2 
Congress have determined rates, but the generalization is valid. 
Few issues have remained as important in our politics throughout the 
last century as has the tariff. At one time the issue was largely sectional — 
southern agriculture favoring lower tariffs, northern manufacturing wanting 
protection — and in so far as Whig and Republican strength lay with the 
latter, protection was the natural policy of these parties. Later other 
groups wanted protection — labor because it feared unemployment would result 
if products made with cheap foreign labor were allowed to compete with domes-
tic goods; western agriculture to achieve parity with industry. E. E. 
Schattschneider has written: 
"...the dominant position of the Republican party before j 
1932 can be attributed largely to the successful exploitation 
of the tariff by this party as a means of attaching to itself 
a formidable array of interests dependent on the protective 
system and intent upon continuing it."3 
J-E. Pendleton Herring, "The Political Context of the Tariff Commission," 
Political Science Quarterly. Vol. XII, p. 421 (Sept., 1934) 
2David Rankin Barbee, "The Tariff in American Political History," Cong. 
Digest. March 1932, pp. 65-68 
3E. E. SchattSchneider, Politics. Pressures and the Tariff, p. 283 
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Schattschneider also points out, however, that 
"Partisan votes on the final passage of the bill are 
not often enlightening, and party lines break in the votes 
on the items."^ 
Another student writes in connection with the Hawley-Smoot debates (1930): 
"Despite a pretense in the debates that there was some ob-
jective test of national welfare, the record of voting on in-
dividual items furnishes much evidence in support of the cyni-
cal proposition that sound protection was that which raised 
the prices of things produced by one's constituents, and un-
sound protection that which raised the prices of things made 
by someone's else constituents. Underlying this conflict was 
a strong sectional clash between country and city and between 
East and West. Although the lines of battle were not always 
sharply drawn, the western conception of what the tariff should 
be was very different from the eastern conception. In their 
speeches, and even more in their votes, the representatives of 
the urban East held to the view that taxes on foodstuffs and 
raw materials are bad because they raise living costs and the 
costs of production. A number of eastern Congressmen apparently 
accepted the premises of free trade by adopting the idea of com-
parative advantage and geographical division of labor, as far 
as it applied to foodstuffs and raw materials. But they re-
jected implications of such an idea as applied to manufacturing, 
either by the tacit assumption that the foreigner pays the 
tariff, or that the tariff — in some unexplained way — en-
ables the domestic manufacturer to reduce his costs. 
"Senatorial spokesmen for the West were very frank in 
saying that their idea of a just tariff was one that gave 
'tariff equality' to agriculture. Not content with this 
generalization, they went on to give to the term 'tariff 
equality' a meaning very different from that given to it fey 
Mr. Hoover and eastern Republicans in the 1928 campaign." 
In the first quarter of the twentieth century Republican platforms ad-
vocated the principle of basing tariff rates upon an equalization of costs of 
production here and abroad. This was not included in the 1928 platform,al-
though some Republicans based their campaign arguments on it. Both in the 
1928 platform and in the Report of the Ways and Means Committee of the House 
on the Hawley-Smoot bill, the position on tariff was something like this: 
4Ibid.. p." 415 
5Frank Whitson Fetter, "Congressional Tariff Theory," American Economic 
Review. Vol. XXIII, pp. 418-419 (Sept. 1933) 
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"Domestic producers are entitled to a 'preferential' 
position in the American market; because of lower costs abroad — 
principally labor costs — a tariff is necessary to insure this; 
competition between American producers prevents tariffs from 
raising prices; the test to apply in determining the need for 
higher rates is the increase in imports; tariffs help rather 
than injure our foreign trade; everyone enjoys the benefit of j 
the tariff; our position as a creditor nation is not to be 
given any consideration in the determination of our tariff 
policy."° 
The last part of the passage quoted above gives an indication of the 
fact that by the 1930's the tariff question had taken on new dimensions. 
Tariff was becoming an important issue in American foreign policy. Despite 
the Republican attitude, the actions of the United States as a leading com-
mercial power and as a creditor nation were bound to be felt abroad and have 
profound effects on world politics. Add to this the fact that the high 
duties of the Hawley-Smoot bill preceded an international, as well as a domes-
tic economic depression of gigantic proportions, and the basis is seen for the 
Democratic attack on Republican tariff policies when the GOP was defeated in 
November, 1930. Democrats in the 73rd Congress did not press for revision 
of tariff rates, but did introduce a bill to remove from the President the 
authority to revise tariff rates upon the recommendation of the Tariff Com-
mission and to require Congress to pass upon all changes. In a statement 
later to be a source of embarrassment to him as Secretary of State, Congress-
man Cordell Hull, Tennessee Democrat, said this presidential authority was 
"too much power for a bad man to have, or for a good man to want."' In de-
fending the flexible provisions of the 1930 tariff act the Republicans on the 
House Ways and Means Committee stated: 
"The flexible provisions of the tariff act of 1930 pro-
vide that the Tariff Commission shall, after thorough investi-
gation, report to the President proposed changes in classifi-
cations, or the bases of value, or rates of duties, within a 
bIbid.. p. 415 
7"Extension of the Reciprocal Trade Treaty Act," Congressional Digest. 
May, 1943, p. 132 
limit of 50 percent, above or below those provided for m 
the law. This promotes promptness in the determination of 
changes and affects in the least degree possible, the 
stability of business, or the production of articles."8 
Democrats also called for an international conference on tariffs, and 
the Democratic bill was passed successfully through Congress but was vetoed 
by President Hoover. In vetoing the bill Hoover said the provisions would 
create uncertainty, break down protection, and destroy flexibility. He 
pointed out also that the bill further called upon the President to negotiate 
reciprocal trade agreements with foreign nations, which is against the Ameri-
can policy of "uniform and equal treatment of all nations without preference, 
concessions, or discriminations."9 
Soon after the election of Franklin Roosevelt as President it became 
known that an important feature of his program for the restoration of pros-
perity would be an attempt to enter into reciprocity tariff treaties with 
foreign countries. This was borne out by the appointment of Cordell Hull as 
Secretary of State, for the Tennessee Congressman had long been an earnest 
advocate of reciprocity. Under his leadership,Congress in 1934 passed an 
act, the declared purpose of which was to expand "foreign markets for the 
products of the United States as a means of assisting in restoring the Am-
erican standard of living; in overcoming domestic unemployment and the present 
economic depression; in increasing the purchasing power of the American pub-
lic in the present emergency, and in establishing and maintaining a better 
relationship among various branches of American agriculture, industry, min-
11 ing, and commerce." 
°H. Rept.'No. 29, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess. (Jan. 7, 1932), p. 7 
9"The Month in Congress," Cong. Digest, June-July, 1932, p. 189 
10"America and Tariff Reciprocity," Cong. Digest. May, 1933, p. 10 
i:LCong. Record. Vol. 78, p. 5256 (73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., March 23, 1934) 
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The salient features of the program were as follows: 
1. Delegation by Congress to the President, acting through the 
Secretary of State, of the authority for a period of three 
years to adjust tariff duties within certain limits. 
2. Tariff negotiations by Executive agreement, which meant that 
the President might negotiate and ratify reciprocal trade 
agreements without the approval of the Senate. 
3. Extension of all tariff reductions (except those granted 
Cuba) to the products of all countries which do not discrimi-
nate against American products. 
Republicans found little difficulty in forgetting temporarily their own 
differences over the tariff and in uniting in opposition to the new plan. 
The Roosevelt-Hull program not only introduced reciprocity which many Republi-
cans had opposed, but failed to make the proposed reciprocal agreements sub-
ject to Congressional approval. Although the Republicans themselves (or 
some of them) had long supported the flexible principle in tariff making, the 
new program introduced two features which they did not like. One of these 
was the idea of treaty making without Senate approval. The other was the 
fact that a Democratic President would now be able to adjust tariff rates on 
the recommendation of a Democratic State Department headed by an advocate of 
low tariffs — Cordell Hull — whereas previously it had been a Republican 
President who could raise or lower rates upon the recommendation of a biparti-
san Tariff Commission often manned by a majority of protectionists no matter 
which party label they wore. The dangers of the new system to protection 
were obvious, and Republicans voted (28 - 5) in the Senate and (99 - 2) in 
the House against the reciprocal trade bill. 
The 1936 GOP platform stated the case in this way: 
"Nearly 60 percent of all imports into the United States 
are now free of duty. The other 40 percent of imports compete 
directly with the products of our industry. We would keep on 
the free list all products not grown or produced in the United 
12"Trade Agreements Extension," Cong. Quarterly. Vol. VII, 1951, p. 215 
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States in commercial quantities. As to all commodities that 
commercially compete with our farms, our forests, our mines, 
our fisheries, our oil wells, our labor, and our industries, 
sufficient protection should be maintained at all times to defend 
the American farmer and the American wage earner from the de-
structive competition emanating from the subsidies of foreign 
governments and the imports from low-wage and depreciated-
currency countries. 
"We will repeal the present reciprocal-trade-agreement 
law. It is futile and dangerous. Its effect on agriculture 
and industry has been destructive. Its continuation would 
work to the detriment of the wage earner and the farmer. 
"We will restore the principle of the flexible tariff in 
order to meet changing conditions here and abroad and broaden 
by careful definition the powers of the Tariff Commission in 
order to extend this policy along nonpartisan lines. 
"We will adjust tariffs with a view to promoting inter-
national trade, the stabilization of currencies, and the 
attainment of a proper balance between agriculture and in-
dustry. 
"We condemn the secret negotiation of reciprocal trade 
treaties without public hearing or legislative approval."13 
Whereas the 1932 platform had made a strong argument in favor of leaving 
adjustment authority in the hands of the President, the 1936 platform was 
less eloquent on this point, although still supporting the flexible tariff. 
The use of the Executive Agreement was condemned, but for the first time 
the Republicans indicated that they felt that perhaps the United States did 
have some responsibility in adopting a tariff policy to consider its effects 
on the rest of the world. The importance of tariff in foreign policy was 
here first recognized. 
The Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act was extended for throe more years 
in 1937 without major controversy, although the Republicans continued in 
solid, though somewhat weakened, opposition. All of the 14 Republicans in the 
Senate voted against the bill, and the Republican vote in the House was 81 to 
3 against renewal. 
13Printed in the Cong. Record. Vol. 95, p. 12901 (81st Cong., 1st Sess., 
Sept. 15, 1949) 
"Trade Agreements Extension," Cong. Quarterly, Vol. VII, 1951, p. 215 
In 1940, with considerably more strength in both houses, the Republicans 
put up somewhat more of a fight against extending the Reciprocal Trade Pro-
gram for another three years. After six years of the program it was still 
difficult to assess what its effects had been in terras of trade stimulation. 
Democrats noted that imports and exports had gradually increased from 1934 to 
1940, but Republicans argued that trade had increased just as much with those 
nations which had no agreements with the United States as with the nations 
that did. 
All ten Republican members of the House Ways and Means Committee issued 
a Minority Report when the bill was sent to the floor. They attacked first 
the common assumption that the protective tariff policy of Republican days 
had brought on the depression: 
"This country did not lead the way in imposing import 
restrictions but merely followed the policy already adopted 
by the rest of the world. The nations which had been at war 
learned many bitter lessons, but no lesson struck them more 
forcibly than that economic self-sufficiency is as vital to 
the national defense as great military and naval strength. 
The Central Powers lost the war largely because they were 
starved out. They, and other nations seeking to profit by 
their experience, were determined* not to be too dependent on 
other countries in the future for essential raw materials and 
manufactures. 
"Because the Tariff Act of 1930 was enacted at about the 
same time the world-wide depression began, it has been unjustly 
charged with largely having brought it about. However, the 
fact is that the Hawley-Smoot Act was not passed until June, 
1930, whereas the depression began in this country at least 
nine months earlier, and the world price decline began five 
years earlier."1^ 
The Republicans also condemned the act for placing too great authority 
in the hands of the Executive and for encouraging imports that compete with 
our products on an unequal basis: 
H. Rent. No. 1594. 76th Cong., 3rd Sess. (Feb. 16, 1940), pt. 2, 
pp. 15-16 
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"The inconsistency between the trade treaty and labor 
policies is also apparent. Recently there was enacted a law 
providing for minimum wages and maximum hours in industry, 
the purpose of which was to increase the wage level of labor 
and improve working conditions. The trade treaty program works 
at cross-purposes with this act by encouraging the importation 
of competitive products of foreign lands where the wages paid 
are but a fraction of those received by American workers, and 
where there is no such thing as a 40-hour week or an 8-hour 
day. 
"The immigration law and the Asiatic exclusion law are 
aimed at restricting competition in the labor market and at 
protecting our workers from having to compete for jobs against 
immigrants who are used to receiving and would be satisfied 
with much less than the American wage scale. The immigration 
law and the Asiatic exclusion law still stand but they have 
been nullified to a large extent by the Trade Treaty Act. 
Foreign workers are not allowed to come here and compete against 
American workers, but under reduced tariffs brought about by 
the trade treaty program, the products of cheap foreign labor 
are allowed to be brought in here to displace the products of 
American labor."1^ 
A great deal of attention in the statement was given to answering the 
argument that the Reciprocal Trade Program contributes to keeping peace. In 
1940 this was, of course, an important issue, and the Republicans were anx-
ious to deal with it thoroughly: 
"While the Trade Treaty Act makes no mention of being in-
tended as an instrument for world peace, such a secondary pur-
pose has nevertheless been ascribed to it in official quarters. 
The only stated purpose of the act is the expansion of foreign 
markets for the products of the United States. It was only after 
the trade treaty program had failed to achieve any substantial 
success in that regard that mention was first heard of the peace 
aspect. 
"Of course, we are all for peace. In fact, most of us are 
so desirous of preserving peace that any program or policy which 
is alleged to promote it attracts our interest even when the 
connection is remote and difficult to see. There is no doubt 
but what a great many people have been led in all sincerity to 
support the trade treaty program because they have been told that 
it contributes to world peace, but we believe they will find upon 
reflection that the program has not been conducive to world 
peace and that it has no connection with world peace."17 
16Ibid.. p. 23 
17Ibid., p. 30 
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Finally, the authors of the minority report denied that the new tariff 
program had been successful in stimulating world trade, especially our ex-
port commerce, and the summary of their position was as follows: 
"Having carefully considered the trade treaty program in 
all its aspects we conclude: 
"1. That it has not been successful in accomplishing its 
purpose of expanding foreign markets for the products of the 
United States or its unstated but officially declared secondary 
purpose of promoting world peace. 
"2. That it has not been administered in the public na-
tional interest. 
"3. That it should not be extended in its present form, 
and as now being administered, particularly in the face of present 
and prospective world conditions. 
"That if the present act is extended, it at least should 
be modified to provide for congressional approval of trade treaties 
before they become operative."18 
On the votes party lines held firm and the Democratic majority had no 
difficulty in extending the act until 1943. House Republicans voted (146 -
5) against the extension and there were no Republican votes in the Senate 
19 
favorable to renewal. One statement, not quoted, from the document dis-
cussed above gave some slight indication that the Republican position with 
regard to the idea of reciprocity might be changing: "While not denying the 
efficacy of a properly administered trade treaty program as a means of ex-
panding foreign trade..."20 
The 1940 campaign platform can be contrasted with the 1936 platform in 
that the former did not proraise repeal of the Reciprocal Trade Program. 
While clearly affirming the principle of protection for agriculture, labor, 
and industry, it had this to say about the trade-agreements feature: 
18Ibid.. p. 36 
19„ Trade Agreements Extension," Cong. Quarterly. Vol. VII, 1951, p. 215 
2 0H. Rept. No. 1594, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess. (Feb. 16, 1940), pt. 2, p. 16 
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"We shall explore every possibility of reopening the 
channels of international trade through negotiations so con-
ducted as to produce genuine reciprocity and expand our ex-
ports. 
"We condemn the manner in which the so-called reciprocal 
trade agreements of the New Deal have been put into effect 
without adequate hearings, with undue haste, without proper 
consideration of our domestic producers, and without congres-
sional approval. These defects we shall correct."21 
Obviously this does not imply repeal, and when the act came up in 1943 
for another extension, .the Republicans supported renewal with modifications. 
The Administration implied that failure to repass the Reciprocal Trade Act 
might result in weakening the war effort of the United Nations. While deny-
ing this contention, many Republicans were willing to go along with renewal 
for two instead of three years. In this form it was passed, and in the Sen-
ate 18 of 32 Republicans voting supported the extension. In the House only 
°2 
52 Republicans opposed the bill,while 145 voted favorably on it." 
The 1944 platform reaffirmed protection but clearly recognized the need 
to stimulate international trade: 
"If the postwar world is to be properly organized, a 
great extension of world trade will be necessary to repair 
the wastes of war and build an enduring peace. The Republi-
can Party, always remembering that its primary obligation, 
which must be fulfilled, is to our own workers, our own 
farmers, and:our own industry, pledges that it will join with 
others in leadership in every cooperative effort to remove 
unnecessary and destructive barriers to international trade. 
We will always bear in mind that the domestic market is 
America's greatest market and that tariffs which protect it 
against foreign competition should be modified only by recip-
rocal bilateral trade agreements approved by Congress." 
In 1945 the Administration attempted not only to extend the Reciprocal 
Trade program for three more years, but to grant the President authority to 
21printed in Cong. Record. Vol. 95, p. 12901 (81st Cong., 1st Sess., 
Sept. 15, 1949) My underscoring 
22"Trade Agreements Extension," Cong. Quarterly. Vol. VII, 1951, p. 215 
23Printed in Cong. Record. Vol. 95, p. 12901 (81st Cong., 1st Sess., 
Sept. 15, 1949) 
I ~ 1 
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make agreements resulting in rate adjustments up to 25 percent above or be-
low the rates as they stood in 1945. This would mean that rates which had 
been lowered the maximum of 50 percent under the original authority could 
now be lowered another 25 percent or a total of 75 percent from what they 
were in 1934. Of course, the same would apply to increases, but few increases 
had been made, and it was the lowering of rates which mainly concerned the 
Republicans, The votes in Congress show somewhat of a return to the opposi-
tion on the part of the Republicans. In the Senate Republicans were still 
divided, 15 for and 16 against extension of the act. In the House, however, 
only 33 Republicans voted- to renew the program, while 140 opposed it. The 
GOP was defeated in three attempts to amend the bill before it passed. First, 
Harold Knutson of Minnesota sought to limit the extension to two years; sec-
ond, Walter F. Judd of Minnesota tried to knock out the authority to adjust 
tariffs by the added 25 percent; and finally, Bertrand W. Gearhart of Cali-
fornia attempted to change the bill to require Congressional approval of all 
24 trade agreements. 
The Senate Finance Committee did cut out the provision for additional 
adjustments by a 10 to 9 vote in which Robert LaFollette, Wisconsin Progres-
sive, joined the nine Republicans on the Committee. The Senate, however, 
rejected the recommendation of its committee in this respect and reinstated 
the Administration provision by a 47 to 33 vote. On this roll call nine 
Republicans broke with their party and supported the new authority. Speaking 
as one of these nine, H. Alexander Smith (New Jersey) said, "After careful 
consideration...it is my conviction that the road of trade expansion is the 
road the United States should take, And that road can be most effectively 
taken if we continue the use of trade agreements in our trade relations."25 
' 24Qong. Quarterly. Vol. I, 1945, pp. 310-316 
25Ibid., p. 312 
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In 1948 the Republicans had an opportunity to show what they really 
thought of the Reciprocal Trade Program, since at that time they held a 
majority in both houses of Congress. The act was extended, but only for one 
year, and it was amended to Include what became known as a peril-point 
clause. In spite of the fact that the Republicans had consistently contended 
that the trade agreements should be made subject to Congressional approval, 
the 80th Congress did not include this requirement. Instead it provided for 
the Tariff Commission to survey all commodities on which the President pro-
posed to negotiate agreements and establish a peril-point — that is, a 
specific rate of duty below which, in the opinion of the Commission, tariffs 
could not be lowered without damaging American industry or business. If the 
President dropped rates below this point, he was required to send an official 
communication to Congress explaining why. 
This provision was written into the House bill by the Ways and Means 
Committee. A motion in the Committee to extend the act for three years in-
stead of only one was defeated by a vote of 15 to 9, and by the same vote the 
altered bill was reported to the floor. The committee incurred some criti-
cism because it held only closed hearings on the bill in 1948, and there was 
further complaint from the Democrats when the bill was brought to the floor 
under a rule which prohibited amendments. The rule was adopted, however, 
and the only chance the Democrats had to block action was on a motion to re-
commit the bill to committee. This was defeated (168 - 211),and the bill 
passed (234 - 119),with the Republicans supporting it by a vote of 218 to 
5.27 
In the Senate Finance Committee an attempt to compromise on the peril-
" 2b"The Reciprocal Trade Program — I. Tracing Its History," Cong. 
Digest, Apr., 1951, p. 106 
27 
Cong. Quarterly, Vol. IV, 1948, pp. 190-192 
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point clause was defeated by a vote of 7 to 6, and the bill was reported with 
that provision included. The Democrats tried in vain to get an extension of 
the old act, and the revised version passed by a 70 to 18 margin. The Republi-
28 
cans voted (47 - l) for the one year, modified extension. 
The peril-point provision, however, never went into effect. It was, of 
course, opposed by the President and many Democrats, and when the GOP lost 
control of Congress in the 1948 elections, the extension of the Trade Agree-
ments Act by the Republican Congress was repealed, the peril-point amendment 
was removed, and the act was extended, retroactively from 1948, for a three-
year period. 
The 1948 Republican platform statement on tariff was the shortest since 
the party was founded. While not explaining what it meant in any detail, the 
GOP was cagey in its reaffirmation of protection and in its support of recip-
rocal trade. In its entirety it stated: 
"At all times safeguarding our own industry and agriculture, 
and under efficient administrative procedures for the legitimate 
consideration of domestic needs, we shall support the system of 
reciprocal trade and encourage international commerce." 9 
From this platform and from the behavior of the Republicans in the 1948 
and 1949 considerations of the reciprocal trade program, there were indica-
tions of some changes and considerable dissension in the party of high 
tariffs. The first break from the solid opposition had come in 1943 under 
the pressures of the war and the new Republican internationalists. Although 
the House GOP swang back to almost complete opposition in 1945, the Senate 
continued to be split. We have noted how party statements became less dog-
matic on the matter of protection, and how the Republicans, once in control 
of Congress and faced with the problem of what to do about tariffs, failed to 
3»Ibid. 
29Printed in Cong. Record. Vol. 95, p. 12901; (81st Cong., 1st Sess., 
Sept. 15, 1949) 
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carry out the threats made over the previous sixteen years. 
Part of this could be attributed to the growing strength of the inter-
nationalists which has been detailed in previous chapters. As early as 1943 
Republicans such as Willkie and Stassen were calling on the party to revise 
its stand on reciprocal trade, and in 1944 a more "regular" Republican, Af-
fred Landon (1936 Presidential nominee), came out solidly against the party's 
ancient tariff policies: 
"Let the high-tariff traditionalists in both parties re-
veal how we can expand our markets without lowered tariff rates. 
Let them explain how else we can compete after the war with a 
desperate Britain and shrewd, horse-trading Russia. Let them 
say how the American worker, the American businessman, and the 
American farmer, will be better off if we maintain our traditional 
tariff policy...The Republican party was founded on a great 
truth, the immorality and economic folly of slavery. It pro-
ceeded on another great truth, that in an infant nation of 
great resources infant industries could grow quickest to ma-
turity under a system of reasonable competition. Now... it 
must dare enunciate a third great truth, that a free and easy 
interexchange of raw materials and finished products among all 
the nations of the world is the quickest way to world prosperity, 
and that world prosperity is the No. 1 prerequisite not only for 
American welfare, but for lasting peace as well."30 
The 1944 platform, as quoted above, contained both elements of old-
fashioned protection and support of international trade in almost equal pro-
portions and stated them in such a way as to satisfy supporters of both ideas. 
This is not surprising since the plank was written by a subcommittee headed 
by Landon but composed of a group predominantly in favor of high tariffs, 
including former Senator Grundy of Pennsylvania.31 
After the war it was the view of the internationalists that we must 
strengthen the economies of nations (in Europe particularly) which were out-
side the Iron Curtain and opposed to Communism. The European Recovery Pro-
gram was the chief undertaking of the United States in that regard, but it 
30Ralph Robey, "A Proposed Major About-Face for Republicans," Newsweek. 
Jan. 31, 1944, p. 60 
^Ralph Robey, "The Republican Platform," Newsweek. July 3, 1944, p. 56 
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was quickly seen that if these nations were to recover, they must sell 
abroad, and the United States furnished the largest, wealthiest market in 
the world. They could not, however, afford to sell to America if tariffs 
designed for protection against all foreign competition were maintained. 
Another source of challenge to the principles of protection, although 
often coinciding with the first in terms of personalities, was the group of 
big businesses who began to swing behind the reciprocal trade program for 
reasons of its own: 
"Outside of active party politics the program has defi-
nitely instigated growing dispute between Big and Little 
Business. Big Business, with its mass production methods and 
need for foreign market's, has favored the program as one . 
allegedly tending to make it easier to sell abroad. Small 
Business, operating with only a limited domestic market, now 
fights the program as one allegedly tending, to force it into 
competition with cheap (sometimes slave) foreign labor. This 
situation is no where better evidenced than in the fact that 
most CIO unions, which are organized chiefly among the big, 
mass-producing industries such as steel and automobiles, favor 
the current Reciprocal Trade Program — while most AFL unions, 
which are organized horizontally among craft groups such as 
carpenters, bookbinders, glass cutters, etc., disapprove it. 
"The Big and Little Business friction also often results 
in an anomalous situation on the management side, for much of 
Big Business is controlled by Republican interests, while a 
great segment of Small Business is run by Democrats. 
"Thus it appears that the old traditional pattern of 
high tariff — Republican — North and low tariff — Democrat — 
South is no longer as clear-cut as in years past. It is also 
doubtful if the political line-up in Congress would follow 
party patterns if the main issues today involved pure economic-
trade theory rather than the administrative handling of the 
program."32 
As early as 1943 the National Association of Manufacturers endorsed the 
Reciprocal Trade Program and by 1949 not only the United States Chamber of 
Commerce, but the American Farm Bureau Federation had swung behind it. 
These attitudes on the part of groups from which Republicans gain a great 
deal of their support were bound to cause changes in the voting behavior of 
^"The Reciprocal Trade Program — II. The Picture Today," Cong. 
Digest, Apr., 1951, p. 110 
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the GOP in Congress. In the 1949 reconsideration of the act's extension 
Republicans were united in their fight to retain the peril-points clause 
which they had inserted in the 1948 extension and were relatively closely 
knit on a motion to recommit the bill to committee. On the vote for final 
passage, however, Republicans in both houses were badly divided. In the 
House 84 GOP Congressmen voted for the three-year extension without the peril-
points provision, while 63 voted against it. In the Senate the vote was 15 
for renewal and 18 against.33 
The 1951 legislation gained strong Republican support because of the 
reinsertion of the peril-points provision, as well as three other features 
which the Republicans wanted. Although GOP members of the House Ways and 
Means Committee were not successful in getting the peril-points clause into 
the bill as it came from committee, they wrote a strong minority report in 
favor of it and were successful in having it written in on the floor. The 
Republican statement called for the following modifications before the act 
should be extended: 
"1. That, with certain modifications as discussed be-
low, the peril-point report provisions established by the 
Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1948 be reenacted; 
"2. That the President be directed to prevent the 
application of reduced tariffs and other concessions made 
in trade agreements with the free nations to imports from 
Soviet Russia and Communist China, and to imports from 
any Communist satellite country (including North Korea) 
which the President finds is part of a conspiracy against 
the free world; 
"3. That, for the purpose of clarification and to 
facilitate procedures, certain standards be established by 
the Congress for the guidance of the President in determining 
relief under the 'escape clause'; 
"4. That the authority of the President to make new 
trade agreements be extended for a two-year period instead of 
a three-year period."3^ 
53Qong. Quarterly. Vol. V, 1949, pp. 362-369 
3 4H. Rept. No. 14, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess. (Jan. 29, 1951), p. 20 
In defense of the peril-point procedure the Republicans explained: 
"1, This peril-point procedure which we recommend will 
in no way interfere with the President's authority to make 
future trade agreements; and 
"2. Under the peril-point procedure, no obligation is 
imposed upon the State Department to adhere to the Tariff Com-
mission's peril-point findings. 
"The only objection of any substance to the peril-point 
safeguard procedure in the 1948 extension act was the require-
ment that a copy of the complete report of the Tariff Commission, 
including the items on which concessions did not go below the 
peril-points, was to be furnished the Ways and Means Committee 
and the Senate Committee on Finance. It was alleged by the 
State Department that some dissatisfaction by foreign countries 
might arise if they learned that their negotiators had not held 
out for the maximum reduction which the Tariff Commission re-
ported could be made without serious injury, or the threat of 
it, to our domestic producers. To remove this objection we 
recommend a change in the peril-point procedure so that the in-
formation to be supplied by the Tariff Comraission to the Congress 
will be limited only to those items on which trade agreement 
concessions go below the peril-points. 
"Thus modified the only basic issue arising from the peril-
point procedure is whether the State Department should have the 
benefit for its guidance of a peril-point report of the bi-
partisan Tariff Commission which we recommend or whether the 
State Department should conduct this program on only a 'calcu-
lated risk' basis without adequate safeguards." 
The "escape clause" first appeared in an agreement with Mexico and pro-
vided that either party could back out of the agreement if it should be found 
that "unforeseen developments" were hurting domestic industry. By executive 
order President Truman stipulated that this clause should be included in all 
future reciprocal agreements. The Republican statement asserted: 
"As the result of the patent looseness and ambiguity of 
the language of the escape clause, and as a result of the 
lack of any standards established by the Congress for the 
President's guidance in determining when relief should be 
granted, only one industry has ever been afforded relief by the 
President under this clause — and this took nearly a year to 
accomplish. 
302 
"In order to remedy this unfortunate situation we 
recommend that Congress provide certain principles which will 
guide and assist the President in the administration of the 
• escape clause and expedite the procedure." 
The peril-point provision was included on a roll-call vote of 224 to 
168,with all but four of the Republicans voting supporting it. Certain 
standards for the escape clause were included by a division vote of 198 to 
37 
89, and the Russian exclusion was accepted on a voice vote. 
The Senate version of the bill also contained all the Republican ideas 
including the two-year as opposed to the three-year extension. A substitute 
bill introduced by Malone (Nevada) drew the support of only 15 Senators, and 
on the vote for passage of the original bill the affirmative vote was an 
overwhelming 72 to 2. The Malone substitute would have taken from the Presi-
dent and the Secretary of State the power to negotiate trade treaties, and 
would have given this power to a new, bipartisan Foreign Trade Authority. 
In the House only five Republicans voted "nay" when the bill passed. Thus 
did the Republicans come to accept and support a modified version of a pro-
gram which for many years they attempted to bring to an end. 
Obviously this cannot be considered the end of the history of the tariff 
policy of the Republican party, but it does show a return to party unity 
in Congress after nearly ten years of division, and unity on a different 
position than that of twenty years earlier. It was not a position of com-
plete support of the President which some Republicans had previously taken, 
nor was it the isolationist, anti-reciprocal trade position favored by Re-
publicans before World War II. Rather it was a stand that recognized the need 
for world trade, but contained elements which could satisfy the need felt by 
all Republicans to oppose the President's program on some points at least. 
36Ibid.. p. 23 
37"Trade Agreements Extension," Cong. Quarterly. Vol. VII, 1951, 
pp. 214-219 
The Republican tariff story, therefore, conforms to the development of 
Republican foreign policy as a whole during this period which will be sum-
marized in the concluding chapter. 
QHAPTER X 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION: THE NEW LOOK IN 
REPUBLICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
A summary of Republican foreign policy, 1939 - 1952, should perhaps 
consider certain general questions, the answers to which may give significance 
to the preceding detailed study of votes, platforms, and politics. What 
characteristics of an opposition party can be observed in Republican foreign 
policy behavior under Democratic presidents? What were the trends during 
this period with respect to the relative strength of the foreign policy fac-
tions within the party? Did the fundamental philosophy of Republicans on 
foreign policy undergo important changes between 1939 and 1952? 
I 
Many of the characteristics which students have observed in the ac-
tivities of American opposition parties can be seen and detailed in the rec-
ord of the Republicans during the period studied. They experienced and were 
conscious of some of the difficulties of their position. Senator Taft's 
comments on what he felt the role of the opposition to be have been discussed 
earlier. One of the problems which he specifically mentioned was the 
minority's lack of information: 
"The opposition could not really devise a detailed foreign 
policy of its own...because it did not have the means or the 
information to do so." 
Karl Mundt, then a Representative from South Dakota, wrote: 
"Critics of Republicans for failure to set forth a de-
tailed foreign policy are within their rights, but all should 
realize that the party of 'outs' lacks access to diplomatic 
pouches, to secret communiques, to tripartite conferences, 
to our counter-espionage reports, and to many other informa-
tion sources available to the President and his Department of 
State."3 
iChapter VIII, p. 253 
2New York Times. Jan. 5, 1950, p. 6 
3,1 This Month in Congress," The Republican. Apr., 1944, p. 10 
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When Senator Taft referred in the quotation above to "the means" to 
formulate a detailed foreign policy, he may have had in mind the lack of an 
agreed forum for policy formation. Although not always admitted by congres-
sional Republicans, at all times during the period studied important leaders 
of party policy formation — men who were influential in drafting platforms, 
nominating presidential candidates, and leading Republican thinking on foreign 
policy — were outside of Congress. Landon, Willkie, Dewey, Stassen, and 
Dulles are examples of such important figures, and some Republican governors 
could be included in this category. 
Attempts by non-congressional leaders — even titular heads of the 
party — to influence congressional party action were almost always rebuffed 
as being beyond the role even of a duly nominated presidential candidate. 
Willkie's attempt to lead party opinion on the lend-lease bill is a notable 
example of this, but at other times there were evidences of the same kind of 
struggle for the right to form the party's policy. The so-called "Governors' 
revolt" against the "Washington cabal" at the Mackinac Conference, and 
another "young Republican" uprising in 1949 both point up the problem of the 
opposition party in policy formation. 
There is little argument over the fact that the theoretical organ of 
policy formation —• the national convention — does not in fact perform that 
role. The struggles over clauses in the platform have their significance as 
tests of strength between factions and may play their part in policy evolu-
tion, but certainly the final platform, in so far as it represents a policy 
statement at all, can hardly be interpreted as authoritative. Members of 




is fixed by the votes of Republicans in the House and Senate, and that it is 
up to them to decide how they shall vote on various issues. They feel they 
must make these decisions in the light of what is favored by their constitu-
ents; that they are responsible to their constituents, not to the Republicans 
outside their own states or districts who fail to elect spokesmen to Congress. 
On the other hand, other Republicans, especially the defeated presi-
dential nominees during this period, had the feeling that the votes of congres-
sional Republicans may have jeopardized their chances of election; that the 
record being written by Republican members of Congress from safe districts 
was not one which appealed to many Republicans and independents whose votes 
7 
might have captured the White House and other posts. This conviction.was, of 
course, reinforced by the nomination in every presidential year (with the 
possible exception of 1948) of a candidate out of harmony with congressional 
leadership on foreign policy matters. 
This situation clearly illustrates the lack of a procedure within the 
party for determining a platform for congressmen in off-year elections. In 
1946 and 1950 joint statements were formulated by the Republican conferences 
in House and Senate and by the National Committee, but even this system could 
not represent all views in the party, nor represent them in any way relative 
to their strength in the party electorate. It is to deal with this problem 
that the Committee on Political Parties of the American Political Science 
o 
Association urges an off-year party convention to frame a biennial platform. 
In view of the evident lack of agreement, not only on policy itself, but 
as to where policy ought to be formulated, the main Republican policy during 
^"Revolt Inside Republican Party," United States News and World Report. 
Jan. 14, 1949, pp. 18-19 
7Ibid. 
Am. Pol. Sci. Assoc, Com. on Pol. Parties, Toward a More Responsible 
Two-Party System, p. 54 
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this period was, more than any other single thing: attack on the President. 
Bearing out the generally observed phenomenon that political parties are more 
concerned with offices than with policies, most Republicans could agree that 
whatever else, their role should be to heckle and embarrass the President. 
Even the question of how far this should be carried divided the Republicans, 
but during most of the period broadest agreement in Congress could be reached 
in attacks on any measure which gave the President added powers, in support 
of amendments which restricted the role of the President, in attacks on the 
President's handling of a program, or in criticisms of the President's chief 
foreign policy adviser — the Secretary of State. This last was less true of 
Secretaries other than Dean Acheson, but long before Acheson occupied that 
office, Republicans had manifested a mistrust of the capabilities of the 
State Department's personnel. 
In 1945 an amendment proposed by Senator Taft to "remove the President's 
authority" to sell lend-lease material gained wider Republican support than 
other proposed changes in that program. In 1948 the Republicans, including 
Senator Vandenberg, wanted to be sure that administration of the Marshall 
Plan was not placed in the hands of the Secretary of State,but rather that 
it should be under a special agency whose head the Senate would have a share 
in selecting. Also in 1948, the GOP was successful in putting the "peril-
point" clause in the Reciprocal Trade Extension Act, which was designed to 
restrict by means of publicity, rather than by legal restraints, the power 
of the President in negotiating reciprocal trade treaties. These are illus-
trative of the general pattern. In this connection it is significant to note 
that it was during the years that certain groups of Republicans were trying 
to counter this tendency to criticize the President that the party was most 
badly split. Before 1943 and after 1949 there was practically no attempt to 
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restrain these attacks, and party unity in Congress was comparatively high. 
II 
Bearing out this conclusion is the fact that the 1952 platform was 
written by John Foster Dulles and was adopted by the Foreign Affairs Subcom-
mittee of the Platform Committee, by the Platform Committee itself, and by the 
National Convention virtually without modification or opposition. This could 
be said of no other platform during the period under study, for even in 1948 
when the foreign policy plank was essentially the work of Senator Vandenberg, 
there was a considerable fight at both the committee and subcommittee stages. 
Perhaps the new unity was based in part on the fact that there was no attempt 
to soft-pedal criticism of the Administration. While he was active, Vanden-
berg was anxious, in order to further bipartisanship, not only that inter-
nationalism be firmly endorsed, but that criticism of the Administration be 
kept to a minimum, and in this he was successful. By 1952 most pretenses of 
bipartisanship had been dropped, and the Republicans in Congress were more 
united in their desire to attack the President's policies. 
The increased unity of 1951-1952 was not complete even on this question. 
The most obvious statement that can be made from a study of Republican foreign 
policy is that there is never a single party policy. Both in 1939-1940 and 
in 1951-1952, periods of comparative unity, there were Republicans in Congress 
who voted against other Republicans on almost all issues of foreign policy. 
And it is probably safe to say that beyond the extremes found among Republi-
cans in Congress there were even more extreme Views held by those outside Con-
gress who called themselves Republicans. In both 1940 and 1952 there were 
Republican isolationists and Republican one-worlders. The method of vote 
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analysis used in this study has obvious limitations. There are probably ele-
ments of inaccuracy in the attempt to compile thousands of votes over a four-
teen-year period. Certainly there are features of inexactness: the factor of 
absenteeism, the question of the number of issues on which roll-call votes are 
available, the transformation of numbers into percentages all detract from 
this method as a means of reaching preciser'conclusions with regard to indi-
vidual roll calls, individual members, or even single sessions. The applica-
tion of the same techniques, however, to fourteen legislative sessions and the 
results obtained have convinced the writer that it is a method well suited to 
measuring trends in the party's voting patterns over a number of years. 
As will be understood from the earlier discussions, the indications of 
very nearly 100 percent "unity" in the 77th and 82nd Congresses (House of 
Representatives) by no means indicate the kind of solidarity that might be 
found, let us say, in the voting behavior of a British political party. The 
unity of these periods is a relative unity only by comparison with the inter-
vening sessions and by use of a very liberal standard, that is, votes cast in 
unison on 50 percent of the issues. The purpose is not to suggest this as a 
new standard, but only to find a measurement criteria which will reveal 
trends. As seen in Figure I, it is well suited to that purpose. 
What then are the trends? In brief summary they are as follows: Before 
Pearl Harbor the isolationist elements in the Republican party clearly domi-
nated the congressional scene. The war years of 1943-1944 show a strong shift 
toward the internationalist side of the scale. The reaction to the pre-war 
isolationism combined with the nature of the few wartime issues of the 78th 
Congress can be credited with producing this phenomenon. It seems probable 
that this swing did not indicate so fundamental a change in party thinking as 
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at first might be inferred. This session alone represents wartime voting.10 
It seems more reasonable to look upon the pattern for 1945-1946 as the first 
real and solid trend away from the situation prevailing before Pearl Harbor, 
although without question the "war shock" was the sina quae non of the "con-
version process" discussed below. The voting in the 80th Congress was the 
culmination of a five or six year trend which resulted in a working majority 
of those who favored cooperation with the Democratic Administration in a 
program of support of international organization and participation in world 
politics. Beginning in 1949, the number of those who favored bipartisanship 
declined rapidly until in the 82nd Congress more than 90 percent of all Re-
publican Congressmen and 80 percent of all Republican Senators cast votes on 
50 percent or more of the issues in agreement with those members who were most 
bitterly opposed to the Administration's handling of foreign affairs. 
As will be more clearly shown below, however, this four-year phenomenon 
following 1949 can be interpreted as a victory for the "isolationists," but 
not for isolationism. Those who favored close cooperation with the Democratic 
Administration found themselves increasingly out of step after 1949 with a 
majority of their congressional colleagues on this question, but the shift 
away from them did not mean a return to a position of American non-participa-
tion in world politics. The isolationists themselves did not now favor 
isolation and could more properly be called oppositionists. Although favoring 
a more restricted role for the United States in some areas than did the Presi-
dent, the oppositionists favored a more expanded role in other areas, and the 
general basis of most of their criticism had to do more with the manner 
• rather than with the extent of that participation. 
10The only foreign policy roll calls in the House in 1942 were the dec-
larations of war on Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania. These comprised three of 
the six roll calls in the Senate. Two others in the Senate dealt with our 
relations with Panama. Only one, on aid to China, could be considered as in-
volving the essence of foreign policy philosophy. 
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An incidental feature of the compilation of votes made for this study 
is the confirmation of certain generally held ideas about the sectional varia-
tions within the Republican party. Using the sections delineated by Grass-
muck and the same scale as that employed for the voting trends discussed 
above, the patterns indicated on Figure II are revealed. Differences in 
the constituencies, issues, and personalities no doubt partially account for 
discrepancies between the House and Senate percentages. In both the House and 
the Senate members from the New England and N0rth Atlantic area cast, in this 
period, the most votes on the internationalist side of the foreign policy 
issues considered. In order to rank the other regions from this standpoint 
the percentages may be combined with the following results: 
Oppositionists Cooperators 
New England and North Atlantic 53 percent 47 percent 
Pacific States 65 percent 35 percent 
Great Plains 70 percent 30 percent 
Lake States 78 percent 22 percent 
Rocky Mountains 80 percent 20 percent 
Border States 84 percent 16 percent 
III 
It is certain that by 1939 the Republicans, with few exceptions, favored 
a less active role for the United States in world affairs than did the Demo-
crats under Roosevelt's leadership. As compared with the period of the 1940's, 
Republicans in Congress were well unified on most matters of foreign affairs 
in opposition the the President's interventionism. In spite of the defection 
of a small group of Senators, the votes on the neutrality repeal, selective 
11George L. Grassmuck, Sectional Biases in Congress on Foreign Policy. 
pp. 34-52. The sectional definitions are as follows: 
Pacific Coast: California, Washington, Oregon 
New England and N0rth Atlantic: Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, Con-
necticut, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, Delaware 
The South: Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, Arkansas, Alabama 
Border States: Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Oklahoma, West Virginia 
The Lake States: Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio 
Great Plains: Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota, South 
Dakota, Wisconsin 
Rocky Mts: Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Mont., N. Mexico, Utah, Wyoming 
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service, and lend lease, as well as the compilations for the entire 77th 
Congress, make this very clear. 2 The opposition to Administration measures 
in this period was not based primarily on differences over how we could best 
stop the spread of fascist aggression. It was not merely a question of 
whether the President wanted to spend abroad too lavishly, thus endangering 
our national economy. The majority congressional Republican position before 
World War II was that the United States should disengage itself completely 
from any involvement in the wars or politics of Europe and Asia. The Republi-
cans did not believe that America had a responsibility to use her power to 
preserve the status quo. Any financial or military help which we gave the 
Allies fighting in Europe would not be for our own protection, but rather, 
in the words of the 1940 platform, because "our sympathies have been profoundly 
stirred..."13 "Freedom in America," said fifteen Republican elder statesmen, 
"does not depend on the outcome of struggles for material power between other 
nations."14 Needless to repeat, the GOP opposed our entry into the war until 
the afternoon of December 7, 1941. 
Public opinion polls of the period and the nomination of Wendell Willkie 
in 1940 indicate that the minority Republican view in Congress may have had 
the support of a majority of the rank-and-file in the country and certainly 
was espoused by strong non-congressional Republican groups. While the coming 
of the war resolved the immediate question, the new issue in the party became 
whether to regard the war as one of those unfortunate conflagrations which 
the United States had to help extinguish; whether the defeat of fascism would 
again permit American withdrawal from world politics; or whether our position 
-as the world's greatest power would require that henceforth we must use that 
12See Chapter II 
l3Proceedings. Rep. Natl. Conv., 1940, p. 141 
14New York Times, Aug. 6, 1941, p. 6 
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power to play the game of international politics in order to protect our own 
interests by maintaining stability in distant parts of the world. 
The fact that Roosevelt's program of intervention and preparedness seemed 
in retrospect to have been correct led millions of Americans to conclude that 
Republican opposition to this program had been very wrong. It led to a gen-
eral repudiation of isolationism, to a seeming confirmation of the dire pre-
dictions made by friends of the League of Nations, and to a strengthening of 
those elements in the GOP which had favored intervention before Pearl Harbor. 
There were famous conversions from the old doctrine to the new, such as in the 
case of Senator Vandenberg, and there was a clear recognition by others that 
the tide of public opinion was strongly internationalistic. The birth of bi-
partisanism in foreign policy in 1944 was no doubt partly an attempt to re-
move from the Republican party the stigma which attached to it because of its 
pre-war behavior. 
The war reactions clearly carried over to assure the ratification of the 
United Nations Charter by a vote of 89 to 2, and the support of a majority of 
Republicans in Congress for adherence to UNESCO, to the optional clause for 
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, and to other 
experiments in international organization. The idea of bipartisanism had 
been transferred from a campaign arrangement to a legislative one with the 
placing of three Republicans on the American delegation to San Francisco. It 
cannot be said with real assurance, however, that the Republicans would have 
supported an active role in world politics for the United States if it had not 
been for the appearance of the Russian menace even before the ink on the 
Charter was dry. A majority of Republicans in both Houses voted against the 
British Loan Agreement of 1946, and an analysis of Republican voting in the 
House shows that opponents of internationalism were dominant there in the 
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79th Congress. The Senate pattern was influenced heavily by votes on inter-
national organization to which the Republicans were committed. 
A majority of the party, however, with a majority of the people, stood 
committed to the idea of world cooperation, although scarcely able to imagine 
where such a commitment would lead. It seemed clear that endorsement of an 
international organization was the first step, and most Republicans were willing 
to go along with this. The United Nations, however, depended for its success-
ful operation on the unity of the Big Five, and it was here that Republicans 
found it difficult to follow. Before the war was over, serious differences 
with the Russians began to appear, and while the initial reaction of the Ad-
ministration was to soft-pedal these disagreements, the Republicans were not 
willing to do so. In his famous speech of January 10, 1945, Vandenberg made 
this clear: 
"...a great American illusion seems to have been built 
up — wittingly or otherwise — that we in the United States 
dare not publicly discuss these subjects ̂ differences among 
the victors} lest we contribute to international dissension... 
But I frankly confess that I do not know why we must be the 
only silent partner in this grand alliance. There seems to be 
no fear of disunity, no hesitation in Moscow, when Moscow 
wants to assert unilateral war and peace aims which collide 
with ours..,"15 
Although it was often so charged at the time, this attitude could not be 
called a retreat to isolation. It was in this same speech that Vandenberg 
made his so-called confession concerning his change of heart since Pearl Har-
bor and reaffirmed his belief in the necessity for an active world role for 
the United StateB: 
"....I do not believe that any nation hereafter can 
immunize itself by its own exclusive action... 
"I want maximum cooperation, consistent with legitimate 
American self interest... 
15Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., The Private Papers of Arthur Vandenberg, 
p. 132 
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"America has this same self interest in permanently, con-
clusively and effectively disarming Germany and Japan... I 
know of no reason why a hard-and-fast treaty between the major 
allies should not be signed today to achieve this dependable 
end... 
"Let me put it this way for myself: I am prepared, by 
effective international cooperation, to do our full part in 
charting healthier and safer tomorrows..."1 
Although some declared that Vandenberg was not speaking for his party in 
proposing such a program, it seems safe to say in the light of the record of 
the 80th Congress that he was entitled to speak for the views of a majority of 
1 7 Republicans in both Houses. The party did not endorse his suggestions for an 
allied treaty in any formal action, but official statements of 1945 indicated 
18 
strong support for international cooperation in various ways. These also, 
however, indicated distrust and criticism of the Russians. 
It must be remembered here that the Republicans had never been friendly 
toward the Soviet Union. Three Republican presidents refused to recognize the 
communist regime during the entire period of GOP post-war rule. There had 
been severe criticism of Roosevelt when recognition was finally given in 1933. 
If Republican aversion to totalitarianism of any kind was great, it was partic-
ularly so with regard to a totalitarianism based on an anti-capitalist philoso-
phy. As has been shown in the case of Republican attitudes toward Spain and 
Yugoslavia, the GOP exhibited greater friendliness toward a dictatorship of 
the Right than toward one of the Left.19 
Although somewhat suppressed at the time, these attitudes were expressed 
off and on during the war period by Republicans who thought the "strange 
alliance" was definitely a dangerous one and who were anxious to break the 
lbIbid.. pp. 135-137 
17See Chapter V 
1 Statements adopted by House and Senate-Republican Conferences and by 
the National Committee. New York Times. Dec. 6, 1945, p. 18; New York Times. 
Apr. 1, 1946, p. 1 
1 9 „ „, J, „T 
See Chapter VI 
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relationship as soon as possible — at least from the standpoint of sending 
money and material to the Soviet Union. Concessions to the Soviet Union at 
the conference table came increasingly to be subjected to Republican attacks. 
Vandenberg's position was perhaps partially based on the fact that he 
expressed the willingness of Republicans to cooperate in a general way while 
at the same time sharing the anti-Russian fears of his party. Add to this 
the fact that he himself once had been an isolationist, and Vandenberg looks 
like the very embodiment of majority GOP sentiment at the time the Republicans 
assumed control of the 80th Congress. The strong anti-communism of the party 
made it natural for it to support measures designed to stop the spread of 
Russian influence in various parts of the world. As America's world role be-
came increasingly one designed to accomplish this end, Republicans found it 
increasingly possible to support an active political role for the United 
States on the international scene. 
With Vandenberg in a position of leadership, a majority of Republicans 
in the 80th Congress came to support such an active role. The Marshall Plan, 
the Truman Doctrine, and the Reciprocal Trade Program were adopted with strong 
Republican cooperation. Criticism of Administration foreign policy did not 
cease, but it was of a different nature than before the war. After 1949 
criticism of the Democratic course in foreign policy became increasingly bitter 
on many issues. Bipartisanship came to an end on many vital matters. The 
old isolationists, now better called oppositionists, gained in influence dur-
ing the last Truman Administration, but the party did not return to isola-
tionism. It did become critical of our Allies; it did prefer military to 
economic aid to Europe and often voted to restrict the scope of the former; 
it did manifest interest in Asia in preference to Europet but especially in 
this latter respect an expanded rather than a restricted role for the United 
States was advocated. Republican suggestions, for instance, of what the 
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United States could or should have done in Asia went far beyond those the Ad-
ministration thought feasible at the time. Far from criticizing the govern-
ment for dabbling in affairs which were none of our business, the Republicans 
laid at the door of the State Department the responsibility for failing to 
prevent a communist victory in China and a war in Korea. 
Obvious discontent with the Russians as partners in the United Nations 
could have led the Republicans to a retreat from that body and a return to 
their pre-war opposition to international organization. No doubt some Re-
publicans have favored this, but in general the majority of them have not 
been desirous of withdrawing to leave the field to the Soviet Union either 
in or out of the United Nations. 
The 1952 Republican platform, adopted without opposition at any stage, 
clearly indicates the degree to which the transformation to intervention had 
been completed. No Republican platform, even in the expansionist era at the 
turn of the century, laid out so ambitious a program for American participa-
tion in world affairs. Our concern in every part of the world was recognized — 
Eastern Europe, Western Europe, Latin America, Israel, and the Middle East, 
Africa, and the Far East. Boldest of all, the suggestion for the liberation 
of the communist satelites implied an almost aggressive role in world poli-
tics. "We shall not allow ourselves to be isolated...," the platform read, 
and specific commitments were made for world trade, an international exchange 
20 
of students, and ending "the neglect of the Far East." The full power of 
the United States was to be used to "wage peace and win it." 
From rejection to acceptance of an active American role in world affairs — 
this was the basic change in Republican foreign policy between 1939 and 1952. 
•JI) 
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